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This thesis starts from the consideration that a real revolution is taking place today in the 
field of the use of goods and services: sharing. Ownership is becoming less and less a 
requirement, while it is now developing a new culture that favors the concept of expenditure 
referring exclusively to the effective use of what is necessary, when this happens. This concept 
underlines the birth of the sharing economy, a new idea of economy, which is giving rise to 
many new markets. Despite the existing differences in the reference literature, these are some 
aspects that are in line with most of the definitions of shared economy: first, it is necessary the 
presence of a technological platform, where digital relationships are inserted; secondly, 
collaboration is required, implying a relational dynamic between the subjects who start the 
project based on the sharing of goods and services; thirdly, there must be a preference for peer 
to peer relationships, such as horizontal and equal relationships (Huckle et al., 2016). In this 
way, it is possible to assume that not only the real market is facing a radical change, but the 
financial market as well. Indeed, during the last years it has been observable a democratization 
process of finance, in which crowdfunding represents one of the most powerful innovations. 
Within this new scenario, crowdfunding, which until recently has been considered a niche 
business compared to alternatives of business financing, is showing a strong growth trend as 
well as an ability to attract institutional investors, who, even though nervously, are getting 
closer to it. In addition to this, the lack of access to finance is commonly recognized as one of 
the main challenges faced by start-ups, especially those that deal with risky and innovative 
businesses. This difficulty is mainly related to severe information asymmetries and agency costs 
faced by many early-stage ventures, as well as the lack of fit with investors’ investment 
objectives (Leboeuf and Schwienbacher, 2018). Furthermore, when external funds are needed, 
selecting the right form of finance has a key role for successfully developing the entrepreneurial 
activity.  
Hence, crowdfunding is currently seen as a valuable tool of the so-called alternative finance, 
which represents a bundling of instruments developed mainly after the financial crisis in 2008 
and which relies on the further expansion of the Web 2.0 and the higher volume of online 
transactions. The recently developed concept of alternative finance includes, in addition to 
crowdfunding,  instruments such as the system of third-party payments, mini-bonds for small 
and medium-sized enterprises, private placements and other shadow banking mechanisms, 
bonds with social impact, for example the enhancement of regional economies, and alternative 
currencies, such as bitcoins (Iosio and Valentinuz, 2016).  
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After a few years of existence, crowdfunding is surely becoming an important alternative 
method to finance companies, particularly in the case of SMEs. As Belleflamme and Lambert 
(2014) suggested, there are some main features which have been instrumental to the huge 
development of this tool. Firstly, crowdfunding does not refer only to the financial sphere: it 
represents an instrument by which information can flow between entrepreneur and investors, 
and it «cleverly leverages the contributors’ extrinsic and intrinsic motivations by 
complementing monetary compensations with community benefits» (Belleflamme and Lambert, 
2014). Moreover, the literature available until now suggests that crowdfunding projects’ 
success is linked to some principal factors: the project quality, in the measure that projects 
which signal a higher quality level are more likely to be funded; the amount of family and 
friends members willing to invest their money; finally, a large number of relationships on online 
social networks which imply higher interconnection among people. Further, there is a strong 
geographic component linked to the nature of projects, with founders proposing projects that 
reflect the underlying cultural products of their geographic area. The data collected during the 
recent years also suggest that the nature of the population in which founders operate is related 
to project success, thus implying the importance of offline social networks. By considering all 
these findings, it appears that there is substantial value in further studying the dynamics of 
crowdfunding since it is having consequences on a variety of subjects of interest to academics 
and policymakers, with implications for entrepreneurial financing, the role of individual quality 
and networks in venture success, and the importance of geography in new ventures. Nowadays, 
crowdfunding is experiencing a strong expansion trend in Italy as in the rest of European 
countries. Since the last data collected by Collaboriamo.org, the first Italian service and 
information site on collaborative consumption, in the year 2019, 127 platforms were active in 
Italy for the sharing of goods and services. Among companies actively engaged in this new 
sector, it is possible to find names such as Car2Go, BlaBlaCar, Gnammo.1 There are 
communities of users which share goods or services through digital platforms and contribute to 
the creation of new opportunities for work and remuneration. Everyday millions of people 
embrace this revolution, deciding to share experiences, goods, and activities such as homes, 
cars, boats, spaces and small services, effectively revolutionizing traditional business models. 
Moreover, the new concept of shared economy triggered the development of crowdfunding 
policies as a new method to raise funds. Through CF campaigns, individuals have the possibility 
to raise funds by contacting an online community instead of traditional credit institutions. 
Besides, according to Collaboriamo.org data, in 2019 in Italy one out of three start-up 
companies worked through crowdfunding platforms, 20% of the new initiatives concerned the 
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sharing of consumer goods, 12% transport materials, 10% apartments or other services for 
tourism purposes, 9% spaces and professional skills. 
Crowdfunding campaigns are therefore entirely executed through the Internet. Indeed, online 
platforms collect small contributions from very large groups rather than seeking large sums 
from a small number of investors. It is unclear, however, the degree to which crowdfunding 
will ultimately substitute for other forms of more formal venture funding, especially as the rules 
around crowdfunding for equity are still evolving and early stage ventures typically benefit 
much more from venture capital contributions, considering for example benefits coming from 
industry experience, governance, and prestige provided by the VC (Mollick, 2014).  
 
This thesis is intended to provide an overview on the development and expansion of 
crowdfunding procedures among the Italian market, focusing particularly on the equity 
crowdfunding model and its implications on companies implementing it. The first chapter starts 
with a brief description of the historical contest in which CF procedures started to raise, and 
then focuses on the definitions of crowdfunding available until now. Afterwards, benefits and 
risks correlated to this kind of fundraising will be illustrated. By going forward in the chapter, 
the main CF model will be described as well as the actors participating in an online 
crowdfunding campaign. Within the second chapter, equity crowdfunding will be further 
studied, looking deeper in detail the dynamics concerning this kind of CF scheme. The third 
part of the thesis will show the main Italian regulatory frameworks available until now in order 
to manage CF campaigns; while in the last chapter there will be illustrated some examples of 
ECF applied to Italian businesses. Hence, it will be considered a sample of 50 start-ups who ran 
ECF campaigns during 2017, and their business plan projections will be compared with actual 
financial results gained. The analysis included the studying of business plans disclosed in the 











CHAPTER I - CROWDFUNDING: THE CROWD AS FINANCIER 
The idea of crowdfunding basically refers to relate subjects, which may be either people, 
businesses, non-profit organizations or associations who are in need for financial resources to 
develop an idea, a cause, a project, a product or simply to start a business, with a large multitude 
of people who, at least potentially, are willing to give them their support. The possibility to 
enter in contact with a wide audience of “lenders” is made feasible using the Internet, social 
media and electronic payment systems. In this way, the collection of monetary resources takes 
place through the creation of specialized platforms, who perform the function of intermediary. 
This concept is an innovative idea which started to spread around the first years of 2000 and 
is now becoming more and more adopted by several corporations and individuals.2 In 2012 
President Obama signed into the law Jumpstart Our Business Startups, known as JOBS Act. A 
key provision included into the JOBS Act was related to the legalization of crowdfunding for 
equity, by softening up various restrictions concerning the sale of securities. For instance, the 
law relaxed restrictions on general solicitation of securities, eased SEC reporting requirements 
and raised from 500 to 2000 the number of shareholders a company may have while still 
remaining private. Furthermore, the JOBS Act gave the assignment to the SEC to stipulate rules 
specifically related to equity crowdfunding (Alpert, 2019).3 However, the choice of relaxing 
constrictions previously applied raised the concern that crowdfunding would be riskier for 
investors due to fraud or entrepreneurs’ incompetence (Hazen, 2012), as in the case of reward-
based crowdfunding campaigns. In this scenario, one of the most common mistakes made by 
entrepreneurs which receive funds injections is represented by the impossibility to maintain the 
promised shipping date of the product, due to failures in operational activities. This happened 
in the case of Pebble watch in 2012 (Gannes, 2013).4  
Moreover, the digital revolution and the development of structured online platforms led to 
the creation of new opportunities to raise capital and develop new business opportunities. As 
reported by Leboeuf and Schwienbacher (2018), «Internet based crowdfunding now allows 
even small entrepreneurs to raise funds from a large crowd, as communication costs have 
virtually disappeared with the Internet». This seems particularly important in countries with 
lack of sufficient seed and start-up capital such as BAs finance and family and friends. In these 
cases, crowdfunding has shown the capability to fill the funding gap existing. Hence, one of the 
main innovations brought by crowdfunding is related to the geographical location of the 
contributors: indeed, the financing of early-stage creative projects was typically geographically 
localized. This was since these types of funding decisions normally rely on personal 
relationships and due diligence activities, thus requiring face-to-face interactions in order to 
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balance the high level of risk, uncertainty and information asymmetries included in such kinds 
of investments. By looking from this perspective, the rising of crowdfunding and its procedures 
of raising capital from many people through online platforms implied innovations in two main 
areas: the application of a careful due diligence, which started to become tougher and tougher; 
and the composition of the crowd of lenders, which saw the participation of  unrelated people 
rather than only  family and friends, as it was before.  
 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: FROM CROWDSOURCING TO CROWDFUNDING 
The first idea of CF can be seen since the eighteenth and nineteenth century, when it was 
applied in the form of crowdsourcing. It was only during the most recent years that 
crowdfunding procedures started to become available to a high variety of people, thanks to the 
development and application of new technologies and new communication tools, which lead to 
simpler interactions and connections among persons all over the world and made crowdfunding 
procedures become as successful as we can see now (Iosio and Valentinuz, 2016). The key 
element which lead to the huge success of the process stood into the idea of pushing on the 
aspects that, according to Danae Ringelmann, co-founder of Indiegogo.com, normally convince 
people to donate:  passion for the project, trust in the person behind it, involvement in something 
bigger than oneself and the receipt of a perk (Tugend, 2014). 
When studying this new fundraising tool, it is necessary to better define the terms 
crowdsourcing and crowdfunding, which are often and improperly used as synonymous. While 
the concept of crowdfunding relates to the collection of money by a crowd of people, 
crowdsourcing has the object of gathering new services or ideas from a crowd of collaborators. 
This latter term was firstly originated from the two editors Jeff Howe and Mark Robinson, who 
tried to shorten the notion of “outsourcing to the crow”, thus generating the word 
crowdsourcing. After this, the new word has been published for the first time in Jeff Howe’s 
blog in June 2006, and specifically it has been defined as «an open call of a firm to a large 
network of undefined people to perform functions that were until now performed by employees 
of the firm» (Howe, 2006). As it happened for crowdfunding, even crowdsourcing only gained 
wide attention through the rising of the Internet age, which brought people and ideas closer to 
each other and facilitated networks expansion (Wetterhag and Décarre, 2014). In 2008 Daren 
Brabham conducted a study in which he stressed out how most of the definitions available on 
crowdsourcing were emphasizing the role of the Internet (Brabham, 2008). In this way, one of 
the most popular examples of crowdsourcing is represented by the online platform 
Wikipedia.org, which was created through the collection of information given on a voluntary 
basis from each single user willing to contribute with his/her knowledge, without obtaining any 
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kind of economic remuneration. On the other hand, in a second report, Brabham (2008) 
underlined how crowdsourcing is not merely a Web 2.0 buzzword, but is instead a strategic 
model to attract a motivated crowd of individuals capable of providing solutions superior in 
quality and quantity to those that even traditional forms of business can. The crowd solves the 
problems that stump corporate scientific researchers. In support of the theory that 
crowdsourcing operates as a problem-solving tool for corporates, Surowiecki (2004) examined 
how a group of random people could solve issues that even a specific problem-solving team 
inside of the company could not. The author stated that the very success of a solution is 
dependent on its emergence from a large body of solvers, and found that «under the right 
circumstances, groups are remarkably intelligent, and are often smarter than the smartest 
people in them» (Surowiecki, 2004). Thus, the power of the crowd is not derived by averaging 
the solutions provided, rather it comes from the aggregation of them into a final idea which is 
at least as good as the best individually provided solution. 
The key difference which stands between the concepts of crowdfunding and crowdsourcing 
refers to the fact that the latter does not imply any type of  economic remuneration, and in  fact 
“crowd-sources'' are moved by the desire to give their own contributions in terms of time, 
competences, expertise and idea needed to reach the objectives planned, and the only benefits 
they obtain are related to the collective output and the satisfaction of having contributed to the 
achievement of it (Estellés-Arolas and González-Ladrón, 2012). Hence, it didn’t take long for 
some individuals to understand that the crowd could not only contribute with knowledge, but 
also with money: this is the input idea through which crowdfunding came into place. Indeed, 
by following the same rational behind crowdsourcing and the collection of knowledge from 
multiple contributors, CF started to raise small individual amounts of money from a large 
amount of people which could have potentially financed a project the same way as if one unique 
large investor would have decided to invest in the same project (Wetterhag and Décarre, 2014). 
As previously said, it is only from the beginning of the new millennium that crowdfunding 
started to spread on a world basis. In those initial years, CF campaigns were mainly developed 
in the arts and creativity-based industries, such as recorded music, film, and video games. The 
first significant online platform, represented by Sellaband, provides a good example: the 
platform was uniquely dedicated to new musical artists not yet signed to a record label, and 
enabled artists to raise capital to finance the recording production of an album. For what 
concerns the recent history of crowdfunding, authors Iosio and Valentinuz (2016) reminded us 
that a key date to remember is 10th February 2012: in this particular day the platform Kickstarter 
had been able to collect one million dollars for a single project for the first time ever (the project 
was Elevation Dock, which gained an amount of $1,46 million rather than $75 thousand initially 
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required). Focusing on the Italian the scenario, the first online platform developed was 
Produzioni dal basso, born in 2005 with the aim of collecting funds of moderate entities in 
order to finance cultural self-productions.  
In conclusion, Bottiglia and Pichler (2016) identified two main factors which led to the 
exponential growth of crowdfunding procedures in recent years: technological innovation of 
Web 2.0 and the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. The authors defined Web 2.0 as all websites 
and applications that allow internet users to share information online, while the financial crises 
played an important role inasmuch after the collapse of the US Bank Lehman Brothers, bank 
credit has almost ceased and it has become more and more difficult to find financing for SMEs 
and start-ups, thus creating a gap (the so-called funding gap). Moreover, when the bank credit 
started to recover, it created the opportunity for crowdfunding to become a complementary 
source of capital (Bottiglia and Pichler 2016). Furthermore, another important consequence of 
CF consists in enabling the masses to invest in start-ups ideas. Thus, individual non-
professional investors can benefit from CF by having the opportunity to diversify their 
portfolios of investments and so reducing the volatility of risk. 
 
DEFINITIONS OF CROWDFUNDING 
The European Union defines crowdfunding as an emerging alternative form of financing that 
connects those who can give, lend, or invest money directly with those who need financing for 
a specific project.5 Gubler (2013) defines CF as «giving ordinary investors the opportunity to 
get in on the ground floor of the next big idea». In this way, crowdfunding is an innovative 
method for funding a variety of new ventures, allowing individual founders of for-profit, 
cultural, or social projects to request funding from many individuals, often in exchange for 
future products or equity. CF projects can range greatly in both goal and magnitude, from small 
artistic projects to entrepreneurs seeking hundreds of thousands of dollars in seed capital as an 
alternative to traditional venture capital investments (Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2010). As 
Lambert and Schwienbacher (2010) defined it, «crowdfunding is an open call, essentially 
through the Internet, for the provision of financial resources either in form of donation or in 
exchange for some form of reward and/or voting rights in order to support initiatives for 
specific purposes». According to the previous definition, CF provides a method for artists and 
entrepreneurs to finance their projects, potentially facilitating gains from trade that would not 
otherwise occur. It works by enabling small funding increments, which are often as low as $5 
in non-equity settings, through the implementation of networking platforms that allow funders 
to communicate with contributors willing to invest their money (Agrawal et al., 2015). This 
tool leads small entrepreneurs to avoid the most traditional forms of raising funds, such as 
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banks, credit institutions and VCs, which may possibly not be available for start-up. However, 
since crowdfunding is a still in evolution fundraising procedure, the definitions provided until 
now potentially leaves out examples that may arise when studying real cases and which may be 
classified under the notion of crowdfunding, such as internet-based peer-to-peer lending and 
fundraising drives initiated by fans of a music group (Burkett, 2011). 
According to the definition provided by Belleflamme and Lambert (2014), the basic idea 
behind crowdfunding stands in the substitution of the entities providing the financing: «instead 
of raising funds from a small group of sophisticated investors, entrepreneurs try to obtain them 
through the Internet from a large audience – the crowd, where each individual provides a small 
amount». In addition to this, as Mollick disclosed (2014), «crowdfunding allows founders of 
for-profit, artistic, and cultural ventures to fund their efforts by drawing on relatively small 
contributions from a relatively large number of individuals using the Internet, without standard 
financial intermediaries». In his report, the author stressed out how personal network and 
underlying project quality play a key role in the determination of the success of the CF 
campaign, influencing it in a positive manner. Besides, although the Internet has been a critical 
ingredient in the development of crowdfunding practices, it is important to point out that it 
differs from open-source practices. Indeed, in the case of open-source, the resource belongs to 
the community, which can then exploit it on an individual basis – basically there is no restriction 
on who can use it; while in the case of crowdfunding the resource ultimately belongs to the 
firm, which is the only entity allowed to use it. This distinction becomes even more evident 
when considering equity-based crowdfunding, since capital cannot be shared. Unlike an idea or 
a software code, capital is not a public good, namely that, in the economic sense, assumes non-
rivalness and non-excludability (Belleflamme et al., 2014). Additionally, a key characteristic 
of CF is the extra private benefits that funders enjoy by participating in the campaign. These 
additional private benefits vary according to the forms of crowdfunding model. Moreover, CF 
works as an innovation-gathering tool, even more if considering that, especially in the case of 
reward-based CF, it allows entrepreneurs to test their products directly on the market, possibly 
generating a category of pioneer customers willing to buy the new product as soon as it becomes 
available on the market.  
By summing up the main characteristics included in crowdfunding definitions, Agrawal et 
al. (2015) underlined the following: (i) funding is not geographically constrained anymore 
thanks to the expansions of the Internet and online platforms; (ii) funding and outcomes are 
highly skewed; (iii) funding propensity increases as accumulated capital increases, leading to 
“herding behavior”; on the contrary, it can even happen a reduction in the propensity to fund 
by new individuals whenever there is the perception that the target will be reached regardless; 
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(iv) funders and creators are initially overoptimistic about outcomes; (v) crowdfunding capital 
may substitute for traditional sources of financing, becoming a valuable alternative tool 
(Agrawal et al., 2014); (vi) friends and family play a key role in the early stage fundraising, as 
their disproportionate amount of investment may generate an optimistic signal for later funders 
through accumulated capital. This effect becomes weaker in the moment when external funders 
start to monitor the project. Indeed, this category of funders is often tied to social obligations 
and therefore investment decisions may be subject to social pressure. Consequently, when 
valuing the worthiness of the projects, later funders should properly discount investments by 
family and friends, assuming their contributions as less informative about quality than other 
investors (Agrawal et al., 2014). 
 
BENEFITS AND RISKS OF CROWDFUNDING  
Among the main benefits for entrepreneurs, both Agrawal et.al (2014) and Belleflamme and 
Lambert (2014) agreed on the followings: firstly, the relative easiness of collecting financial 
resources thanks to a large audience of potential investors who are able to evaluate freely and 
in a market perspective the product or the service that is asked to finance; secondly, low 
transaction costs, due to the creation of wide online platforms, which have the capacity to 
collect resources from a large number of transactions, thus requiring low costs of brokerage; 
thirdly, the verification and validation of the idea, product, price, preferences of potential 
consumers and an estimation of expected market demand, due to the wide range of feedbacks 
coming from lenders who often operate through thematic platforms; then, the opportunity to 
exploit digital word of mouth, intended as a marketing channel, and the possibility of achieving 
sales even before arriving on the market, towards those who joined the collection campaign; 
lastly, in case of success of the CF campaign, the possibility of easy access to more traditional 
forms of financing, since both operational and financial risk can be reduced. 
By looking at contributors’ perspective, it appears that the main benefits they experience 
include the possibility to diversify the risk, by investing in many and unrelated businesses; a 
closer participation with the activity being financed, both in terms of emotions and 
identification with the idea, which is feasible both in the phase of resources collection and in 
the management phase, so generating mutual relationships  and making investors assume a more 
dynamic role than what usually happens; finally, the opportunity to use information available 
on social media to carry out a due diligence of the project available. Nowadays, this 
circumstance can be very easily applied, thanks to the multiplicity of information sources 
available and due to the strong network of contacts generated by Web 2.0. 
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It is important to highlight that there are even professional investors who are interested in 
funding a crowdfunding campaign, and this category of contributors may obtain even different 
benefits from the lending activity. As Mollick (2013) reported, there are many differences 
among professional and occasional investors. Just consider, for instance, the competences, 
knowledge, and experience owned by investors who are constantly working with financial 
markets. Moreover, they adopt different approaches and methods when valuing the best 
opportunity to inject money in. Despite these key differences, Mollick (2013) stated how both 
the categories showed the same valuation approaches whenever it is time to value an early-
stage project and its expected returns, and he declared that «despite the radical differences in 
selection environments, I find that entrepreneurial quality is assessed in similar ways by both 
VCs and crowd-funders, but that crowdfunding alleviates some of geographic and gender 
biases associated with the way that Venture Capitalists look for signals of quality». It is exactly 
for these reasons that, according to Iosio and Valentinuz (2006), professional investors may 
obtain benefits from the success reached by the campaign. Professional investors may also 
benefit from previous and personal offline relationships with the creators of the projects, as well 
as with the team who is going to manage it.  
On the other hand, CF procedures also imply some risks. The main risky areas are related to 
transparency issues, investors protection and guarantees, and possible future exit strategies. 
Moreover, funders face issues related to fraud and valuation of the project, particularly when 
assessing the amount of resources to inject in the project presented. The transparency level 
needed in order to prevent these kinds of risks may result too low in the case of crowdfunding 
campaigns, requiring higher effort levels made by funders in order to determine which projects 
are worthy. Moreover, it is important to underline the connection between funders’ preferences 
and local projects. Indeed, this relation may create consequences for projects geographically 
located in areas less economically developed, undermining the success level of these ventures. 
Relating to the latter issue, Lin and Viswanathan (2013) reported that «if on the one hand the 
link between the local community and the financed party can represent an advantage, in terms 
of greater benefits for the territory itself, on the other hand this geographical preference can 
represent a non-optimal decision in terms of risk/return, not allowing to choose better 
investment opportunities in more distant geographic areas, either in terms of lower risk, with 
the same return, or in terms of higher returns with the same risk». 
As for funders, even creators of campaigns face some risks, which are referred to the capacity 
of successfully completing the campaign, and to deliver the promised product or service. 
Indeed, this objective requires not only a valuable idea at the basis of the project, but also 
competences and experience to efficiently manage and monitor its progress. Added risks are 
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related to the safeguard of entrepreneurs’ reputation and the protection of intellectual property. 
Whenever contributors are particularly sensitive to socially responsible behaviors, 
entrepreneurs should have the entire control of the supply chain linked to the product or service 
offered, so being able to provide sufficient guarantees of compliance with the required value 
principles. This aspect may be particularly relevant in the case of collection of resources that 
are motivated in an ideal or a “good reason”. According to this, Lin et al. (2014) developed a 
study when they identified four main motivations under the decision to participate in a 
crowdfunding campaign: altruism, social benefits, reward, and reputation. These appeared as 
principal factors leading people to share their resources with strangers on an online platform.  
 
CROWDFUNDING CHALLENGES: DISTANCE AND INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES 
Traditionally, early-stage ventures financing has been subject to the effect of distance: 
ventures and investors needed to be geographically close. Literature suggests that, normally, 
offline investments in early-stage ventures tend to be mostly local because of the importance of 
two key factors: reputation and trust (Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009). These 
characteristics become even more important in the case of absence of regulatory disclosures 
and oversight, but also because of the amount of distance-sensitive costs associated with early-
stage investments, such as identifying opportunities, conducting due diligence, and monitoring 
the progress of the project financed (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Moreover, in the case of 
offline fundraising, the only way available for entrepreneurs to build reputation and trust is 
through interpersonal interactions which mostly occur between nearly collocated individuals.  
However, one of the principal characteristics of CF deals with the link which is provided 
between fundraisers and contributors. Perhaps the most striking feature and innovation of 
crowdfunding is the broad geographic dispersion of investors in small, early-stage projects.  
Indeed, for what concerns a CF campaign, distance does not represent a major barrier to 
finance ventures. This can be easily understand by considering that crowdfunding platforms 
normally present three common properties that are properly designed in order to overcome 
distance-related frictions: firstly, easier search, in the sense that online platforms provide 
standardize and comprehensive manner of presentation of online projects, in order to make it 
easier to make searches for investors; secondly, less need for monitoring, as online projects 
allow investors to execute small financial transactions (such as $10), thus limiting the downside 
risk of the investment and relaxing the need of monitoring on the progress of the project; lastly, 
information on what others have done, in the sense that online platforms provide information 
on investments previously obtained (e.g., cumulative amount raised to date and the online 
identity of current funders) and tools for contributors to communicate with each other (Agrawal 
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et al., 2015). In conclusion, the impact on distance-related frictions in crowdfunding depend on 
these distance-flattening properties included in online crowdfunding platforms, as well as the 
amounts needed by early-stage funders. 
The key solution to reduce distance-related frictions in CF is focusing on the role of 
information on online investments. In this way, within the daily communication to investors, it 
is suitably to include the amount of capital raised at date, which conveys information such as 
other funders perception on what they believe about the quality of the project. These 
assumptions on information conveyed are consistent with previous literature that documents 
“herding behavior” in crowdfunding (Freedman and Jin, 2011). According to this, it is rational 
to assume that, in the presence of information asymmetries, investment propensity is much 
higher whenever a funder’s cumulative capital raised is higher. Broadly speaking, this let us to 
assume that, considering an investment which has been made among geographically faraway 
people, «there is a qualitative difference between the types of investments made locally versus 
those made over distance, and this difference seems to be related to information» (Agrawal et 
al., 2015).  
Hence, it persists the existence of a difference between local and distant investments. 
Perhaps the reasons behind such differences are correlated with a social explanation: as 
Agrawal et.al (2015) suggested us, local funders differ from distant funders in their 
responsiveness to the investment decisions of others due to proximity, that enables the creation 
of social ties. According to this rationale, it is important to consider also that entrepreneurial 
finance literature demonstrated how family and friends influence the raising of capital in early-
stage ventures: the main amount of start-up funds come from this category of investors. Indeed, 
family and friends boast of a key informational advantage concerning the quality of the 
entrepreneur. Moreover, by considering the local nature of social networks, family and friends 
tend to be basically local. This shows how the creation of a network of interactions and social 
ties facilitates funders’ decisions to lend money, with the perception of less needs of daily 
monitoring of the quality of the entrepreneur and its project. In other words, although local and 
distant funders do display different investment patterns, this difference is mostly explained by 
the disproportionately local nature of social relationships (Cumming and Johan, 2009). Looking 
deeper in detail at the role of information in crowdfunding, it is interesting to examine also the 
role played by social networks. Indeed, social networks lead to easier communication among 
funders and people they fund, and even among previous funders and possibly interested new 
ones. In this way, prior funders may deal with the communication of worthy projects to 
prospective funders, which in turns trust prior funders and their capacity to select quality 
investment projects, thus requiring even lower monitoring activities. This is also the role played 
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by online platforms, which have the ability to connect people and impressions. On the other 
hand, it may happen that family and friends investment decisions generate mistaken 
interpretations among non-family investors: normally, these kinds of funders are viewed as 
quality-signals of the project interested, but it could occur that investment decisions of this 
category are simply the result of social obligations.  
In conclusion, CF appears to effectively reduce distance-related costs commonly associated 
with the financing of early-stage ventures. Nonetheless, it seems that there are some specific 
frictions which still crowdfunding platforms cannot eliminate, that are mainly associated with 
information asymmetries and this sort of barrier which stop investors to fully provide the 
resources they have available, even more in the case where there isn’t any type of social ties 
among creator of the project and investors. In this way, socially connected individuals, which 
share a higher amount of information by sharing the same social network of relationships, are 
easily inclined to invest (Agrawal et al., 2015). This interpretation emphasizes the role and 
importance of interpersonal relationships in crowdfunding, and it is consistent with what Nanda 
and Khanna (2010) reminded us, namely that cross-border social networks play a key role in 
accessing capital. Therefore, we can say that as long as flows of information cannot be easily 
communicated by using the Internet, distance will keep playing a key role in investment 
decisions. In the end, market efficiency depends on whether there is efficient information 
transfer from preexisting offline social networks to the online global crowd. In this scenario, 
CF may overcome constraints related to distance and information, by creating a market for 
investing in the most valuable ideas, projects, or visions, promoted by creators who can leverage 
their local social networks to access a much larger pool of capital from distant strangers. 
 
CROWDFUNDING BUSINESS MODELS 
The differences between crowdfunding and other sources of financing lie mainly in the 
number of investors involved, the size of firms seeking funds as well as the returns that can be 
expected by investors. However, those differences can be more or less relevant depending on 
the crowdfunding model chosen by the entrepreneur. This paragraph will provide an overview 
of the main CF models, focusing on their processes and structure. The equity-based model will 
be deeper developed later in a specifically dedicated chapter.  
Raising capital through CF platforms can differ significantly based on the project, objectives 
of the campaigns, the size collection, and forms of reward. The activity at the basis of the 
fundraising can be relatively simple, not for profit, for example donation; or likewise, it can 
come to forms of collection more complex and regulated, which affect the share capital of one 
company and in which participants can request not only a monetary return but even certain 
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protections and benefits, proper to the status of shareholder. The complexity of these processes 
is also linked to the number of participants and it is clear that the greater the “crowd” and the 
lower the contributions made by individuals, the greater the administrative burden that 
platforms and entrepreneurs will have to manage. 
With the aim of better understanding the dynamics of crowdfunding, the literature available 
until now tends to make a first division, splitting the models basically in two macro categories 
according to the idea and objective at the basis of the crowdfunding itself: the first macro-
category focuses on the not for profit activities, which are mainly started for cultural or social 
reasons and that are not linked to economic aspects or monetary rewards; the second macro-
family includes those models of crowdfunding dedicated to profitable campaigns. The main 
driver of such models is the creation of profits, and consequently they include both risk and 
reward valuations, aiming at forecasting the economic output (Iosio and Valentinuz, 2016). 
Among the two macro-categories described above, it is possible to identify further models 
which are characterized following their objectives, goals, guide-principles, crowd involvement, 
contributors’ expectations, management of the fundraising activity and regulatory framework 
on which to be based. In addition to this, in both forms of crowdfunding it is reasonable to 
assume  that crowd-funders enjoy some additional utility over regular consumers, such as the 
feeling of participation on a project, the idea of being part of a community of entrepreneurs 










By following a different way of crowdfunding models’ classification, Belleflamme et.al 
(2010) suggested to consider two macro categories according to the benefits contributors are 
going to receive after sharing their resources. The authors defined the two groups as following: 
pre-ordering and profit sharing. The first category relates to campaigns in which the 
entrepreneurs invite consumers to pre-order the product, aiming at collecting the necessary 
capital for launching the production and therefore enabling the entrepreneur to apply different 
prices on the product (and to generate larger profits) according to the type of consumer: crowd-
Figure 1.1: Typology of crowdfunding, Paschen, 2017. 
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funder, who pre-purchased the product at an out-of-the-market price, and other “regular” 
consumers, who normally wait until the product reaches the market to purchase it. In the second 
category, founders solicit individuals to provide money in exchange for a share of future profits 
or equity securities. In this profit-sharing scheme, there is not any future obligation or 
willingness for investors to purchase the product or the service. Focusing on this type of 
classification, it appeared that, in the case of relatively small initial capital requirements, 
entrepreneurs prefer the adoption of pre-ordering mechanisms; while if the funds needed are 
particularly high, founders prefer the profit-sharing scheme.  
This chapter will illustrate crowdfunding models according to the perspective proposed by 
Iosio and Valentinuz (2006), who identified five schemes for crowdfunding campaigns. I chose 
to describe these five models as I found that they are broadly adopted in literature when studying 
crowdfunding procedures. By starting from “not for profit” models, we can find donation-based 
and reward-based models; while among the “for profit” schemes are included lending-based, 
equity-based, and royalty-based models. As declared by Leboeuf and Schwienbacher (2018), 
reward-based crowdfunding resembles more closely supplier finance, while the lending-based 
one resembles bank finance, and equity crowdfunding is closer to angels and VC finance. 
Finally, Iosio and Valentinuz (2006) described the hybrid models, by defining them as more 
flexible and adaptable schemes. Hybrid models include fundraising operations which are 
derived from the blending of both financial institutions and crowdfunding models described 
above, thus creating schemes which are closer to the characteristics needed by the target 
audience. Lending-based model has been the most adopted fundraising model in Italy in the 
year 2019, followed by equity-based and donation & reward-based models (Bedino, 2019). 
Finally, it is important to consider that different CF models refer to different type of 
investors. In particular, while donation and reward-based schemes can uniquely rely on non-
professional participants, such as fans, philanthropists or consumers, lending and equity-based 
CF enable professional investors to take part in the campaign as well, by offering commitment 




Donation-based model, as defined by the name, implies fundraising for initiatives not for 
profit. In most cases these are real donations made with the aim of supporting charitable 
projects. The amounts donated may be of a small entity or even may imply relevant financial 
commitment, according to donators’ preferences and availability of sources. In this scheme, 
contributors do not receive any form of financial or material reward; indeed, they donate in 
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order to feel part of a community and to become actively engaged in a “good cause” which 
makes them feel gratified for the action taken and being recognized for the participation given. 
In the framework of not for profit projects, there may be initiatives of different nature, such as 
charity, artistic projects related to art, music or theatre, or political campaigns. 
By studying deeper in detail donation-based crowdfunding, it is possible to identify two 
separated families: donations created in order to support projects belonging to individuals and 
with a private aiming, or perhaps campaigns dedicated to finance social projects in favor of the 
society as a whole (Iosio and Valentinuz, 2016). Moreover, according to a 2015 industry report 
by Massolutions, it appeared that donation crowdfunding generates the second-largest funding 
volume globally and has been applied as a successful marketing tool (Paschen, 2017). This is 
due to its characteristics which have made the crowd appreciate it, such as its flexibility of the 
target amount to be collected. This is since campaigns promoted through the donation-based 
model are basically charity actions, thus they do not imply minimal investment levels to be 
reached. In this way, it is particularly important to properly market the real objective of the 
campaign, in order to increase interest in people and even their willingness to donate. It is 
perhaps a good strategy to communicate the implicit benefits generated by the participation on 
the donation, such as feeling part of a community of people with the same ideas and principles 




Reward-based model requires participants to invest resources in a project or in a company 
and implies the preference for a non-monetary reward rather than a monetary one. Historically, 
the reward-based scheme was mainly widespread among art, culture and music scenarios, where 
interested and passionate people could be part of exclusive events or limited edition albums or 
pieces of arts, or even be publicly thanked for having contributed to the development of the 
project. Nowadays, the reward promised at the beginning of the investment may consist of 
products or services assigned to contributors and can even take the form of pre-orders, rather 
than other forms of non-monetary rewards such as tickets, attendance at exclusive events, 
previews, or limited series of the financed product. The reward is a kind of practice broadly 
adopted by both early-stage innovative ventures and by more mature companies already 
structured and whose intent is not necessarily linked to the financing of the project but rather 
to the need of testing and validating an idea through the collection of feedback among current 
clients and even future potential consumers. Indeed, the reward model is commonly linked to 
projects or activities whose characteristics of innovation and uniqueness make an eventual 
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equity financing costlier for reasons related to the evaluation of the project itself by an economic 
and financial point of view. Afterwards, one of the main objective of such kind of CF stands in 
the generation of interest within the target market, as well as the collection of useful 
information, advice and opinions on consumers preferences, market trends and saturation, that 
allow the company to re-define product launch processes or services (Leboeuf and 
Schwienbacher, 2018). In general, the funds received do not necessarily have to be returned, 
but the reputation of the person who launches the campaign can be lost if s/he is unable to keep 
promises done. Regardless of the purpose of crowdfunding, it is evident how within product 
development processes becomes crucial to understand the reactions of potential customers, as 
well as their input become central element of dialogue with the market, above all for all 
company functions that must interact in an integrated way, think about marketing, R&D, design, 
product development. (Iosio and Valentinuz, 2006). One of the most appreciated characteristics 
of this kind of scheme relates to the fact that funds raised do not necessarily have to be paid 
back in a monetary form, although the funder has to deliver the promised product or service by 
the time declared in order to keep a good reputation in the market.  
By focusing now on the Italian market, in the report accurately prepared by Bedino (2019), 
donation and reward-based models are considered as a unique family, showing a growth rate of 











Lending-based model is definitely the most adopted scheme in case of crowdfunding 
campaigns, in terms of volume of transactions generated (Paschen, 2017). This scheme, 
generically identified as micro-lending, can be properly divided into two sub-categories: Peer-
to-Business or P2B, mainly oriented to support enterprises, and Peer-to-Peer or P2P, mainly 
geared towards financing individuals. The idea of micro-lending is commonly adopted by a 
several number of people, individuals or institutions which lend their money in exchange for 
Figure 1.2: Donation and reward-based growth, 2019, Bedino, 2019. 
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the payment of future interests and the amount lent at maturity. In the case of loans to 
businesses, participants tend to invest in debt securities  issued and offered on a crowd platform; 
while in the event of persons, loans can be directly given or channeled into vehicles created to 
raise capital and satisfy the request from the potential money taker. Perhaps, it may happen that 
the debtor starts a competitive auction in order to define the interest rate to be paid to the 
potential lender, being able to pay for values that are the result of a competitive process and 
therefore potentially lower than what could be obtained in a non-competitive environment 
(Iosio and Valentinuz, 2016). 
This kind of scheme includes theories linked to micro-credits. Micro-credit has been defined 
as credit of small amounts with the aim of financing a starting business or to meet emergency 
expenses, towards vulnerable subjects from a social and economic point of view, which are 
generally excluded from the more traditional credit institutions (Pizzo and Tagliavini, 2013). 
This concept stands at the basis of the idea of crowdlending. The latter has shown huge 
capabilities in taking advantage of the newest communication technologies. Furthermore, by 
focusing on SMEs, crowdlending has offered a real alternative way of financing, allowing them 
to raise funds while avoiding banks or credit institutions that have suffered credit capacity 
difficulties after the crisis in 2008. In this way, crowdlending represents a vehicle for 
disintermediation from the traditional banking world. Moreover, it acts as a catalyst and 
attractor of a broad number of lenders with a risk appetite consistent with the call for capital 
(Iosio and Valentinuz, 2006).  
Participants of such a kind of fundraising are typically helped in the valuation of the riskiness 
of the investment they are going to make, and this is done by the platforms which intermediate 
funders and founders. Indeed, online platforms take the role of matching borrowers and 
investors and allow the execution of due diligence duties by contributors on the business plan 
presented by the creator of the campaign. In this way, due diligence will mainly focus on the 
future revenue generation capacity of the company in question, as well as on promised 
production objectives. Finally, fundraising activity through lending-based CF can be executed 
either directly, that is to say every individual enters into a credit relationship with the applicant, 
or perhaps indirectly, that is, through the creation of an ad hoc vehicle that collects the necessary 
funds to the business and becomes the reference counterpart. By providing an example of the 
application of this model, we can consider the Italian online platform named Workinvoice, a 
market in which corporates can sell their trade receivables exceeding € 10.000 (per single 
invoice) to private sector customers in order to obtain quick liquidity. In the auctions that are 
organized by Workinvoice, contributors can access the credit assessment of each debtor 
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company, developed by modeFinance, a company which provides for analysis on corporates’ 
creditworthiness.6 
By focusing now on the Italian market, the lending-based model appears to be one of the 
most adopted by Italian small and medium entrepreneurs, showing high growth rate in terms of 
volume of transactions executed through crowdlending platforms (Bedino, 2019). As feasible 
in Figure 1.3, the lending-based model experienced huge volumes of transactions, collecting 










Equity-based model is based on the idea of a sale of shares of risk capital offered to a large 
number of investors. Basically, the venture raises money from a crowd in exchange for an 
ownership stake in the firm; thus, investors are offered equity or bond-like shares (Paschen, 
2017). Such kind of model was firstly launched in the United States in 2012 with the JOBS Act 
issued by President Obama, and has seen a number of countries, including Italy, actively move 
to create the necessary conditions, both from a regulatory and a market point of view, for rapid 
development and complementary support to more institutional fundraising activities 
represented by BAs, VCs and PEs, and the more traditional credit institutions. It appears quite 
obvious that, as a consequence of its higher level of risk and involvement into the corporate’s 
operations, equity crowdfunding (ECF) procedures require more detailed regulatory 
frameworks. Indeed, on the one hand, several legal actions are needed to increase the equity of 
a company or just to modify its amount; on the other hand it is necessary to adequately protect 
public investors, even more in the case where they represent the minority of stakeholders within 
the company.  Through this model, founders of the campaign become able to interact with a 
representative spread of shareholders, while avoiding many of the costs and constraints 
associated with a listing or admission to share trading on multilateral platforms, such as the 
Figure 1.3: Crowdlending growth, 2019, Bedino, 2019. 
20 
 
Alternative Investment Market. On the other hand, investors have the possibility to invest small 
amounts of their sources and easily diversify their investment portfolio reducing associated 
risks. In conclusion, as in traditional venture capital investments, investors expect to receive a 
return from the growth in value of shares or quotas and eventually from any distribution of 
dividends. For what concerns the regulatory framework in Italy, the reference discipline is 
defined by the National Commission for Companies and the Stock Exchange, commonly known 
as Consob (Iosio and Valentinuz, 2016). 
Equity-based model will be further explained in a specifically dedicated chapter in this 
thesis. Nonetheless, it is interesting to see now the growth rate experienced by equity 
crowdfunding platforms in Italy during the last five years. Indeed, equity crowdfunding is the 
model that has shown the highest growth rate, +217% from 2017 to 2018 and +114% from 2018 
to 2019, also thanks to the creation of an appositely thought regulatory framework which eases 












Royalty-based model includes the so-called profit-sharing or revenue-sharing models, in 
which the founders prefer to guarantee a partnership to future profits and revenues with those 
allowed to finance the initiative in question. These kinds of models offer greater flexibility and 
tend to be tailored in order to better fit each situation, so they are normally built case by case 
and based on specific needs of sponsors. In the case of royalty crowdfunding, contributors aim 
at obtaining a percentage or a fixed amount typically calculated on turnover or profit of the 
initiative. The idea is to ensure an economic return that is based on the economic exploitation 
of an intellectual property (Iosio and Valentinuz, 2006). 
 
Figure 1.4: Equity-based growth, 2019, Bedino, 2019. 
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ACTORS PARTICIPATING IN A CROWDFUNDING CAMPAIGN 
Unlike many other forms of venture financing, crowdfunding projects have a wide variety 
of goals (Mollick, 2014). In order to properly understand the scenario in which CF operates, 
just start by considering the first example of a crowdfunding platform as it is defined nowadays. 
Indeed, Sellaband, named as the “granddaddy of crowdfunding” (Kappel, 2009), provides a 
useful example to better define the actors dealing with a CF campaign and their duties. As stated 
above in this thesis, Sellaband is an online platform which links musician artists looking for 
producing their own albums and funders of such artistic projects. Creators of the campaign have 
their own profile on the platforms, in which they describe themselves and their business plan 
and where they upload three demo songs. Afterwards, funders listen to the demos, and choose 
whether to buy one or more shares in an artist’s future album; at the same time funders can look 
for information on the artist in his/her online profile, as well as information about the amount 
raised to date. After the album is completed, revenues generated from its sales are split equally 
among the three parties, and thus the artist, funders and the intermediary platform. In this way, 
the investment resembles a security (Agrawal, et al., 2015). The authors pointed out how the 
financing challenges and constraints faced by artists in Sellaband were very close to the ones 
faced by first-time entrepreneurs in other settings. In conclusion, within the scenario described 
above, artists can benefit from subscribing in the crowdfunding platform, as it provides support 
for their fundraising efforts, including marketing their venture, presenting their budget, sharing 
their plan for promoting future albums and communicating directly with current and potential 
funders. By looking at the scenario just delineated, it appears that the actors operating in a 
crowdfunding campaign are basically three: creators of the campaign, contributors, and 
intermediary platforms.  
 
Entrepreneurs as fundraisers 
Founders are the actors who create the crowdfunding campaign, mainly pushed by two 
principal motivations. Indeed, through CF they are enabled to lower the cost of capital 
compared with traditional credit channels, and they obtain access to more and valuable 
information (Agrawal et al., 2014). Founders are normally entrepreneurs looking for funds with 
the aim of financing their early-stage venture, while this kind of fundraising is commonly linked 
to personal savings, home equity loans, personal credit cards, friends and family members, BAs, 
and VCs. However, CF enables creators to reduce the cost of capital for three main reasons. 
First, crowdfunding campaigns have the capability to link entrepreneurs with people who have 
the highest willingness to pay for equity in their venture, or for early access to new products – 
according to the model that is going to be adopted. In this way, crowdfunding leads to better 
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matches between creators and funders, and moreover, such matches occur on a global rather 
than local basis. Thus, CF procedures imply a decrease in geographical barriers, allowing 
entrepreneurs to have access to capital independently from where they are located. Second, and 
specifically for non-equity-based crowdfunding, it appears that funders positively value the 
possibility of early accessing the product, or the recognition for discovering innovations, or 
even their participation in a new venture’s community as an acceptable and valuable return for 
their financial backing. Perhaps this leads to the adoption of a hybrid approach to financing, 
allowing creators to bundle the sale of equity with other alternative rewards.  The third reason 
by which founders may expect to reduce their cost of capital is linked to the idea that CF 
generates more exchange of information rather than traditional sources of early-stage capital. 
Furthermore, the sharing of such information may influence investors’ decisions, and even 
increase their willingness to pay, thus lowering the cost of capital. Finally, funding need is not 
the only goal of a crowdfunding effort, even in an entrepreneurial context: in this way, founders’ 
goals may include the relation with demand-market for a proposed product, which can 
afterwards lead access to funding from more traditional sources (Mollick, 2014). 
Furthermore, crowdfunding acts as a specific informative channel for creators. This type of 
fundraising often provides marketing research, which is perhaps modeled as reducing the 
variance of post launch demand (Lauga and Ofek, 2009). In their report, the authors stated how 
crowdfunding procedures which include advance selling and subsequent quality signal, lead to 
a growing number of products launched and to a higher rate of success among launched 
products. Indeed, creators may receive input by funders about their product development or the 
business plan, thanks to crowdfunding mechanisms which lead to easier communication and 
exchange of ideas. As Agrawal et al. (2014) reported, this may create an early development of 
an ecosystem around the product. Besides, creating interest in new projects in the early stages 
of development has been especially important in industries where projects seek to create 
ecosystems of complementary products and thus aimed at building a competitive advantage 
even before the commercialization of the product (Mollick, 2014). Thus, as comparably to other 
forms of early-stage venture financing, crowdfunding offers a potential set of resources that go 
beyond capital which can be beneficial to founders (Ferrary and Granovetter, 2009). 
Moreover, crowdfunding may also entail challenges for campaign creators. Perhaps the 
greatest of these is represented by the disclosure requirement (Agrawal et al., 2014). Normally, 
traditional sources of funding allow creators to keep their innovation secret from the crowd, 
until it is totally developed and ready for the market. However, CF requires founders to disclose 
their innovations on a public forum, generating concerns for imitations which are possible 
between the time of raising capital and the launching of the product. In addition to this risk, 
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transparency requirements may have even higher negative influence in the case of intellectual 
property protection, or in the event of bargaining with potential suppliers. Besides, if we 
consider equity crowdfunding, disclosure risk has higher influence, due to the requirement of 
public communication concerning company business plan, and including strategy, key 
employees, customers, and costs. A second challenge has been stated by Hsu (2004), who 
reported the role of the opportunity cost of raising capital from the crowd rather than from 
professional investors. Institutional investors and VCs, indeed, generally provide for additional 
value, such as industry knowledge, relationships, and status. In addition, crowd-funders 
commonly inject smaller amounts than angel investors or VCs, requiring more investors to raise 
a given amount of capital. This leads to investor management issues, which may become 
significantly costly to face. Furthermore, creators have no possibility to control who funds their 
projects, in this way it is impossible for them to prevent funders with totally differing visions 
and strong personalities from joining the campaign and adversely affecting the community 
output (Kelley, 2012).7 
 
The crowd as funder 
Crowdfunding differs from other methods of start-up funding because the relationship 
between funders and entrepreneurs varies by context and nature of the funding effort 
(Belleflamme et al., 2012). Funders are heterogenous in their motivations when taking part in 
a CF campaign. Lin et al. (2014), classified crowd-funders into four groups: active backers, 
trend followers, altruistic backers, and the crowd. These different categories of funders have 
four common reasons by which they decide to invest. Firtly, by engaging in crowdfunding, 
investors obtain access to investment opportunities which otherwise would be impossible to 
reach. Moreover, traditional mechanisms for early-stage financing are typically constricted by 
geographical area. In addition to this, CF backing allows early access to new products or 
perhaps to limited editions or to exclusive events. This is particularly true in the case of hybrid 
crowdfunding models or the reward-based one. In this way, enthusiastic funders may also 
enhance the value of the entire project, providing for better solutions to meet client’s needs. 
The third reason behind funder’s decisions to invest stands in the aim of feeling part of a 
community, thus transforming the CF fundraising into a real social activity (Agrawal et al., 
2014). In this way, contributors commit capital partially with the goal of obtaining preferential 
access to the founder network. Relatedly, some investors positively value the recognition 
obtained by being part of a selected group of early adopters. Even philanthropic ideas are at the 
basis of some funders' decisions to invest, whenever investors do not expect direct return for 
their donations. Finally, crowdfunding campaigns allow the formalization of contracts. Indeed, 
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early investors are most commonly family and friends (Agrawal et al., 2011). In this way, 
crowdfunding platforms act as intermediary and provide an opportunity to formalize the 
contribution given, which would otherwise take the form of informal finance. Hence, in case of 
negative results of the project, such formalization helps the regulation of social relationships 
with family and friends’ members. Besides, when considering equity-based approach, 
crowdfunding efforts may also treat funders as professional investors, giving them equity stakes 
or similar consideration in return for their funding (Mollick, 2014). 
Although crowdfunding is showing high appreciation among the crowd, funders may face 
some risks when investing through online platforms. Agrawal et al. (2014) stated three primary 
disincentives: creators’ incompetence, fraud, and project risk, which are all a consequence of 
high degree of information asymmetries. The first disincentive identified, is exacerbated by 
contributors over optimistic expectations about the capacity of founders to deliver their 
promises. In this way, it appeared necessary to recalibrate the expectations of the community, 
and in doing so it has become needful to increase disclosure requirements and exchange of 
information. Moreover, creators have often little experience in managing an early-stage 
venture. The second risk faced by contributors stands in fraud. Indeed, non-professional 
investors may rationally be less experienced, thus channeling capital toward bad projects or 
even fraudulent campaigns which are intended to appear as real fundraising campaigns. This 
risky situation is even exacerbated by the low level of due diligence and monitoring performed 
by non-professional investors, which normally invest a small amount of money, and thus have 
weak incentives in performing properly those activities (Agrawal et al., 2014). Thirdly, early-
stage projects and ventures are inherently risky. Namely that it is rational to expect a significant 
chance of failure, which may or may not derive from the creator's incompetence and fraud.  
 
Platforms 
Focusing now on the roles and strategies of crowdfunding platforms, it appears that they are 
intended to facilitate the interaction between entrepreneurs aiming at raising new funds and 
contributors willing to participate in the financing of new projects (Bellaflamme and Lambert, 
2014). Crowdfunding platforms work as intermediaries between creators and investors. They 
are basically for-profit businesses, which mostly employ a revenue model based on transaction 
fee for successful projects, that typically amount to 4-5% of the total fundraising. In this way, 
platforms objective stands in the maximization of the number and size of successful campaigns. 
In doing so, online platforms try to engage solely high-quality projects aiming at reducing fraud 
and the risk of inefficient campaigns, in order to attract a large number of founders and 
25 
 
investors. In addition to this, CF platforms also seek to obtain media attention, to expand the 
existing community (Agrawal et al., 2014). 
In their report, Belleflamme and Lambert (2014) identified crowdfunding platforms as 
multisided platforms. By considering what Evans (2011) stated, multisided platforms may 
create a business opportunity in the case where the following three conditions are met. Firstly, 
there must be different groups of customers; secondly, members of different groups, namely 
funders and founders, benefit from the interaction with one or more members of another group; 
finally, coordination among different groups can be facilitated by an intermediary. It appears 
evident that crowdfunding platforms meet these three requirements: indeed, they link at least 
two groups of actors, founders and contributors, and secondly, each group’s valuation depends 
on the participation of the other group members. Moreover, Belleflamme and Lambert (2014) 
stated that «entrepreneurs exert positive indirect network effects on contributors», meaning that 
they look for larger platforms in order to have higher possibility to reach the required amount 
settled by the campaign. Besides, the same reasoning applies on the side of contributors since 
they exert positive indirect network effects on entrepreneurs. Finally, with respect to the third 
condition, platforms undoubtedly ease the connection among entrepreneurs and contributors, 
and furthermore they reduce costs and increase visibility of creators’ campaigns. After all, 
crowdfunding platforms have the capacity to reduce information asymmetries much more 
efficiently than any individual fundraiser could do.  
In the end, when considering a crowdfunding campaign, within-side effects are also present, 
namely that members of the same actor group care about what the members of their own group 
do. Such effects are normally negative among founders, as the higher the number of campaign 
founders, the higher the competition for the funds provided by contributors; while they seem to 
be mostly positive for funders, as they provide quality signals on the funded project. By looking 
at strategies applied by CF platforms, it appears how they use price and non-price instruments 
in order to manage participation on both sides of the market. As reported by Rochet and Tirole 
(2006) and focusing on price instruments which affect the participation on online platforms, it 
can be seen that multisided platforms normally charge exclusively entrepreneurs, as it is very 
likely that any positive fee would discourage the participation of contributors, thus worsening 
entrepreneurs benefits as well. According to the authors, multisided platforms can only 
subsidize the participation on one side. In fact, as each group’s participation is conditioned on 
the other group’s participation, the intermediary has no choice but to fee only one side and let 
the other one act for free.  
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CHAPTER II - FROM CROWDFUNDING TO EQUITY CROWDFUNDING 
Among the variety of CF models, equity crowdfunding has been appreciated particularly for 
its capacity to overcome the funding gap faced by SMEs in recent years. Indeed, after the 
financial crisis started in 2008, small and medium enterprises found more and more difficulties 
in obtaining seed funds from venture capitalists and business angels. The importance of the 
implementation of ECF may be even clearer when taking into consideration the number of 
SMEs in Europe. Indeed, as reported in Statista8, in 2018 there were almost 25.1 million SMEs 
in Europe, of which 23 million were classified as micro-sized firms. SMEs are a relevant part 
of the European Union economy, contributing to the overall economy an average added value 
around 56%, and employing almost 100 million of people – in 2017 almost 66% of the total 
European workforce was employed in SMEs. By looking at this scenario, SMEs are responsible 
for the majority of the new job creation, thus the achievement of an alternative way of financing 
became a necessity in order to foster – among others – employment, innovation, consumption, 













When studying the applications and implications of equity crowdfunding on early-stage 
ventures, it is important to remember that start-ups get financed under what is commonly 
described as the financial growth-cycle paradigm proposed by Berger and Udell (1998). The 
authors suggested a model in which different capital structures are optimal for different points 
in the company life cycle. The report started from the idea that economic growth is correlated 
to innovation, particularly in the high tech, information, and bio-technology areas, which then 
depends on start-ups and small new businesses; thus implying the necessity for funding in order 
Figure 2.1: Number of SMEs in the European Union in 2018, by size (in 1000s), Statista. 
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to develop operating activities and realize products and serviced contained in the business plan. 
According to the authors, the most traditional private investors of small businesses normally 
operate through highly structured and complex contracts that are often acutely informationally 
opaque; and furthermore, they provide for funds by exploiting the role of financial 
intermediaries that play a key role as information providers and execute the activities of 
screening, contracting, and monitoring on start-ups. In conclusion, Berger and Udell (1998) 
proposed a paradigm for small businesses which largely considered a linear relationship 
between stages of company development and source of funding, in which the kind of funding 
is a function of the start-up’s stage of development. In this scenario, each funding source is 
linked with its relative capacity to deal with moral hazard and information asymmetries and its 
funding capacity in terms of size. In particular, start-up firms normally rely on family and 
friends, business angels or VCs, and all of them provide limited amounts of capital. An 
alternative source of funding is perhaps represented by small contributions provided by the 
crowd of professional or perhaps even non-professional investors. 
Focusing now on the definition of this model, as previously anticipated in the first chapter 
of the thesis, equity crowdfunding is a novel type of entrepreneurial finance that has been 
rapidly growing in the past few years. It is also defined as crowd-investing and includes the 
acquisition of shares of a corporate by several unrelated people which form the crowd 
(Bradford, 2012). On the one hand, corporations receive funds in form of capital, on the other 
hand, funders receive compensation in the form of equity revenues or profit-share 
arrangements. In other words, the entrepreneur determines how much funds s/he is going to 
need, thus raising it in exchange for a percentage of equity while each investor obtains a pro-
rata share of the company, which are usually ordinary shares, depending on the fraction of the 
target amount they decided to commit (Wilson and Testoni, 2014). Investment-based 
crowdfunding, crowd-investing, securities-based crowdfunding are all subgroups of equity-
based crowdfunding (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2017).  
As stated by Agrawal et al. (2014), there are gains from trading in the market of start-ups, 
and this represents one of the reasons why equity crowdfunding platforms attract so many 
investors. Indeed, there are contributors who are looking for investments in a particular 
technology market segment, or even have the objective to differentiate their investment 
portfolio with early stage backing. In this way, such investors would definitely benefit from the 
availability of a greater selection of investment opportunities than those available close to their 
geographical area, thanks to equity crowdfunding online platforms. Thus, ECF overcomes 
distance barriers allowing for a more efficient connection among founders who need money 
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and investors who are looking for backing new projects with the aim of achieving future returns, 
realizable through an exit strategy. 
However, ECF is the most complex form of crowdfunding from a legal point of view since 
it implies issues such as creditors protection. Indeed, funders acquire equity stakes in early-
stage ventures, meaning that the value of the stake must be estimated based on market forecasts 
and other factors highly uncertain and extremely difficult to assess. Thus, the level of 
uncertainty involved in crowd-investing, related to the valuation of the start-ups as well as the 
future ability of entrepreneurs to generate liquidity and returns, makes the necessity of creditors 
protection tools. Overall, these complexities pose problems that are distinct and more 
fundamental than those of the other CF models (Wilson and Testoni, 2014). Furthermore, equity 
crowdfunding assumes an even more relevant role when considering the pecking order theory 
which suggests a hierarchical order according to which inject funds in a company. Indeed, the 
pecking order theory suggests that the priority for financing is firstly to go for cash or internal 
funds, then to issue debt and as a last resort to issue equity (Chen, 2011). A crucial role is played 
by transaction costs, which are almost null in case of cash or internal funds injections, while 
they become relevant when providing external financing and particularly in the case of equity.  
Firms issuing equity are therefore those that have been unable to gather internal funds or debt, 
as the case of start-ups. Indeed, early-stage ventures with below average growth and return 
expectations are unlikely to be financed by angel investors or venture capitalists. As shown by 
the World Bank9, the financial crisis caused a drop in savings rates, making it unattractive for 
small investors and savers to keep their money in their savings accounts. In such a scenario, an 
alternative solution included investing that money instead, with the hope to get a higher yield 
than the current low saving rates. In this way, equity crowdfunding represents the CF model 
which more closely exploited these necessities while resembling angel investors or perhaps 
venture capital finance. Start-ups have recently collected huge amounts of euros on ECF 
platforms in Europe, thus making this way of fundraising a valuable potential alternative tool 
to overcome the funding gap. In Figure 2.2, it is possible to see how SMEs used to heavily rely 




Figure 2.2: Financial sources for SMEs in Europe (2015), Iosio and Valentinuz, 2016. 
Despite its huge expansion and the consequent interest of companies and policymakers, 
equity crowdfunding and its dynamics are still not completely understood and regulated. 
Through this type of financing, entrepreneurs make an open call for funding on the Internet, 
then the investments of funders take place on an online platforms that provides the means for 
the transactions, such as the legal groundwork and the ability to process financial transaction 
(Wetterhag and Décarre, 2014).  In return for this service, the platform receives a percentage 
on the total amount of money collected by the page, normally ranging between 3 and 10%. Most 
commonly, an equity-based campaign constantly reports the minimum and maximum amounts 
of money sought, the equity of the entrepreneur’s firm given in return, the current amount of 
money raised, the current number of investors as well as the number of remaining days before 
the end of the campaign. A typical campaign page also includes a description of the project 
and/or the firm, and generally the business plan with financial forecasts in order to attract and 
convince potential investors. 
A key aspect of ECF stands in entrepreneurs’ capability to clearly signal the value of their 
projects to contributors, which, on the other hand, have limited access to investment 
opportunities, especially when considering non-professional investors. In this way, it appears 
how the way by which young start-ups signal to small investors is likely to be different from 
the way they would signal to angels or venture capitalists. For what concerns small investors 
definition, they are intended as those people who invest relatively small amounts of money and 
who receive relatively small stakes of a company in return (Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 
2007). Moreover, small investors are more likely to lack competences and experiences specific 
to the financial markets, which in contrast are one of the key skills of venture capitalists. 
Furthermore, consider that investments costs incurred by angel investors or VCs in order to 
evaluate ideas and teams are fairly small, but they would be prohibitively high for small 
investors (Ahlers et al., 2015). 
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Equity crowdfunding has been expanding globally in the recent years. During the last 
decade, the ECF scheme has shown the highest growth rate with respect to the spectrum of CF 
models, and its volume has doubled every year since 2009 (Ahlers et al., 2015). Just to provide 
a quantitative example of its increasing, the annual transaction value of equity-based CF in 
Europe (excluding UK) has increased from 63.1mln dollar in 2013 to 278.1mln dollar in 2018. 
While solely in the UK, the annual volume of equity transactions went from 28mln in 2013 to 
363mln in 2018, thus making the UK the main ECF market in Europe, representing 68% of the 
total European CF panorama (Statista, 2018)10. This trend is easily recognizable in the charts 
below. Figure 2.3 shows the trend just described in EU transaction volumes related to ECF, 
while Figure 2.4 focuses on providing an image of alternative finance in the UK, which, as 
stated above, represents the largest European market for alternative finance tools. Alternative 
finance includes the funding of individuals, businesses and other entities outside of the 














Figure 2.3: Equity-based crowdfunding value in Europe (Excluding UK) from 2013 to 2018 (in million USD), 
Statista. 
Figure 2.4: Value of alternative finance in the UK (in million USD), Statista. 
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Crowd contributions and knowledge management 
Equity crowdfunding blends characteristics of more traditional crowdfunding procedures, 
such as the reward-based CF, with features of the traditional investment tools. Firstly, it is based 
on the contribution provided by the crowd, formed by several unrelated people. The usefulness 
of the crowd is supported by Benkler (2006), who described it as a tool to sort out firms and 
notice the leading ones. In this way, it is reasonable to assume that the aggregated due diligence 
conducted by potential investors within the crowd can enable them to detect promising business 
opportunities in which to inject funds. However, performing due diligence is a process that 
requires long time and that is often under-performed by investors in equity crowdfunding 
platforms. Indeed, it usually takes a long number of hours to execute it properly, as it has been 
described by Ahlers et al. (2015), which took into examination the number of hours needed in 
relation to the relatively low amount of money invested on average by each contributor on 
equity CF platforms and showed that the opportunity costs resulted too high. The authors 
compared it to the salary that small investors could have earned by working rather than 
performing due diligence, and it appeared that in many situations this process would cost more 
than what s/he planned on investing. In addition to this, it is important to stress out also that 
non-professional investors are normally not able and not experienced enough in order to 
properly and accurately execute due diligence. In this way, investors simply look at the 
accumulated capital before making an investment decision, thus relying on the crowd valuation 
of the project.  
Secondly, equity crowdfunding implies knowledge management. Indeed, investors make 
contributions in an ECF campaign not only to invest money, but also to feel part of the 
community of the new start-up business. In other words, investors aim at actively participating 
on the floor of new ideas development. This willingness to get involved in the firm is in line 
with entrepreneurs’ willingness to take into consideration investors’ feedback and opinions in 
the decision-making of the firm. Moreover, when considering the reasons why they decided to 
use equity investment, entrepreneurs commonly answer that it is not only about the fundraising 
itself, but also about what investors could bring to their firm in terms of knowledge and 
expertise (Belleflamme and Lambert, 2014). Consequently, it is not surprising that 
entrepreneurs encourage the crowd of investors to get involved, obtaining in return feedback 
and ideas on the development of the new enterprise. In conclusion, this situation leads to what 
is commonly named as knowledge management, referring to the necessity for firms to get more 
value than simply money, while requiring coordination of all the different inputs that investors 
inject in the entity. Indeed, efficiently managing knowledge has been recognized as a valuable 
source of competitive advantage (Argote and Ingram, 2000). As suggested by Argote and 
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Ingram (2000), knowledge management is directly related to what they called knowledge 
transfer, inasmuch knowledge flows between the firm and parties outside it – such as investors. 
By focusing on entrepreneurs/investors relationships in an equity crowdfunding, the knowledge 
of people outside the firm has the potential to increase its value only whenever it is shared with 
the firm, thus generating the necessity for properly managing knowledge. However, and mainly 
in the case of non-professional investors, contributors may be unwilling to contribute in terms 
of knowledge and strategy definition of the new firm. Despite this possibility, Belleflamme and 
Lambert (2014) reminded us that normally investors decide to take part in ECF looking for 
actively get involved in firm’ dynamics. Anyway, it also depends on the firm ability to well 
manage knowledge flows. In fact, this would imply constant communication with a huge 
number of investors, taking time and money. 
 
Quality signaling and information asymmetries  
Start-up financing often implies asymmetries of information between investors and 
fundraisers, inasmuch entrepreneurs are assumed to have better knowledge about the true 
realization and quality of the business plan of the project (Connelly et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
this is even more evident in the context of equity crowdfunding, where small and non-
professional investors are unlikely to have experience in evaluating investment opportunities. 
As suggested by the authors, it is reasonable to assume that, in extreme cases, ECF investors 
may not have the capacity to determine the true quality of the start-up idea, and therefore even 
potentially high-performing ventures may not receive any funding.  
What described above set the basis for adverse selection in entrepreneurial finance, indeed, 
whether substantial information asymmetries exist, and the supply of poor projects is large 
compared to the supply of good projects, venture capital markets may fail. In other words, an 
adverse selection problem arises whenever investors are unable to distinguish value-creating 
ventures from poor investment opportunities due to lack of information. Clearly, these 
information asymmetries are easily found in the case of start-ups financing on equity 
crowdfunding platforms, where the possibility of gathering information, monitoring process 
and providing inputs are particularly important but the costs of these activities are sensitive to 
geographical distance (Agrawal et al., 2011). However, it happens that investors have been 
seemingly able to value the quality of early-stage ventures’ projects by interpreting the 
information disclosed on the platform. In this way, funders treat at least some of the information 
provided as signals of project quality. These signals may be based on, for example, positive 
qualities of the entrepreneurs, and their network of relationships (Ahlers et al., 2015). In this 
scenario, Grossman (1981) explained that, theoretically, there is the creation of a strong 
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incentive for entrepreneurs to provide information, thus determining a sort of equilibrium. 
Furthermore, Agrawal et al. (2014) showed how the imbalance between the two sides of the 
market appears to include not only ex-ante disclosed information, but rather it is also due to the 
investors’ ex post inability to originate effort on the side of the creator of the project. Indeed, 
once investors have provided their capital, they have limited tools to actively influence 
entrepreneurs’ actions. In other words, entrepreneurs may behave in a short-term opportunistic 
manner and not maximize the level of effort promised in the beginning, thus generating a form 
of moral hazard. The most extreme example of moral hazard is represented by fraud. In this 
way, the market may fail in deterring investors from allocating capital in value-destroying 
projects. In addition to this, moral hazard may represent a consequence of agency problems 
incurred after the closing of the campaign. Hence, problems related to different visions of the 
company between the principal (investors), and the agent (management of the firm), are related 
to information asymmetries existing. In this case, problems also occur when principals and 
agents have different attitudes towards risk, which may lead to preferring different actions. This 
is even more evident when ECF is compared with listed corporations, in which there exist 
corporate governance frameworks as monitoring tools in order to keep incentives aligned 
between owners and management (Wetterhag and Décarre, 2014). 
When studying market failures, it is relevant to also consider the possibility of failure due to 
a collective action plan. Since the investment levels are low, and consequently the potential 
benefits from investing are limited, investors may free ride on due diligence efforts by 
observing others and waiting for their valuation of the worthiness of the project. By doing so, 
and assuming that all investors can take this approach, the market will fail as soon as everybody 
waits and no one invests (Agrawal et al., 2014). In order to avoid market failure for the reasons 
described above, the market has been designed by establishing rules, technical features and 
cultural norms. These regulations are intended to shape creators and funders’ behavior as well 
as to achieve crowdfunding market efficiency.  
 
MARKET DESIGN  
Agrawal et al. (2014) reported four main market design mechanisms that deal with the 
reduction of information-related market failures in equity crowdfunding. These mechanisms 
are the following: reputation signaling, rules and regulation, crowd due diligence, and provision 
point mechanism. The first three tools aim at reducing information asymmetries between 
entrepreneurs and investors, thus they potentially overcome both moral hazard and adverse 
selection problem, while the last tool deals with the prevention of the collective action problem.  
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Reputation signaling  
Financing of early-stage ventures and creative projects is traditionally characterized by due 
diligence executed through face-to-face interactions and personal relationships. Within the 
crowdfunding scenario, entrepreneurs tend to disclose as much information as possible in order 
to attract a large number of investors, while keeping as safest as possible sensitive information 
and intellectual property. By considering online markets, where personal relationships are 
intermediated by online platforms, trust and reputation assume a key role in establishing the 
success of a project and even to prevent fraud risk in online transactions. As regarding this, 
designers of online markets have offered many tools that establish trust through reputation, such 
as quality signals, feedback systems, and trustworthy intermediaries.  
Quality signals is the most broadly adopted tool. It implies the supply of credible signals of 
quality by the participants of the funding, who can leverage brand reputation. Indeed, Waldfogel 
and Chen (2006), showed the relevance of brands in signaling quality in online marketplaces. 
Most importantly, in their report they stated that as information disclosure becomes more 
accessible, the brand importance diminishes. By looking within an equity crowdfunding 
scenario, signals of quality may be communicated through several ways, including the 
provision of warranties, patents in case of creative ideas, previous successful experience by the 
entrepreneur, and the level of education in the management team, such as share of executives 
with MBA degree. Secondly, feedback systems may help in building a reputation for individual 
buyers and sellers in online platforms. The idea at the basis of such systems is to allow market 
participants to rate their experience after a transaction occurred, for example consider eBay 
rating system through which buyers have the possibility to rate sellers. In this way, high ratings 
place further trust in the seller and investors will easily accept to pay a higher price. However, 
creators of CF campaigns normally do not raise capital repeatedly over short periods of time, 
thus making useless the community rates. A solution can be found for creators by splitting large 
projects into smaller milestones, and thus allowing contributors to give feedback and creating 
an online reputation (Agrawal et al., 2014). Thirdly, third-party intermediaries may play a key 
role in providing quality certificates to sellers who are thus allowed to declare the quality of 
their project and create confidence among investors. 
 
Rules and regulations 
A second tool which can overcome information related issues, is given by setting rules and 
regulations, both at platform, industry, and government level. Crowdfunding platforms keep on 
adapting according to users’ necessities and utilities in order to maximize transactions volume. 
In this way, online platforms showed constant evolution in their rules and requirements. An 
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example is provided by Kickstarter, which after its settlement issued new rules in line with new 
necessities of users. Indeed, the platform tried to prevent frauds by allocating additional 
resources when founding a project, by requiring higher information disclosure for particularly 
risky investments, by taking steps to better set expectations for both founders and investors. In 
addition to these examples, CF platforms will continually modify their regulations and monitor 
users’ reaction with the aim of finding an equilibrium between the maximization of information 
available to funders, and thus transactions volume, and the minimization of disclosure and 
administrative burdens on project founders (Agrawal et al., 2014).   
Industry and government rules include regulatory settlement issued by legal authorities in 
order to better regulate the market, to properly protect investors, to create incentive for creators 
to set up crowdfunding campaigns and to maximize transaction volumes while obtaining market 
efficiency. The regulatory framework is continuously in evolution, due to the lack of legal rules 
specifically issued to administrate equity crowdfunding campaigns. This is a consequence of 
the recent development of this financial practice, which is still in need of proper regulation from 
most of western countries, including Europe. The third chapter of this thesis will provide a focus 
on crowdfunding regulatory framework, at EU level as well as regarding solely the Italian 
scenario.  
 
Crowd due diligence 
The third solution proposed by the authors in order to overcome market failure is through 
crowd due diligence (Agrawal et al., 2014). Since crowdfunding investors normally fund a 
much smaller stake rather than traditional investors, consequently they have a lower incentive 
to spend money and time in executing accurately due diligence, considering also that they do 
not even have competences and experiences required to do so (Schwienbacher & Larralde, 
2010). Therefore, according to these assumptions, the situation described leads to the 
development of the free-rider problem.  
Relying on crowd due diligence may represent a valid solution for detecting fraud or 
avoiding market failure, however such a tool may not be completely efficient, as is the case 
when the crowd is subject to herding behavior. As much of the literature has emphasized, crowd 
investors rely heavily on accumulated capital as a signal of quality and success of the project 
(Agrawal et al., 2011), thus generating an information cascade. Herding behavior works as an 
informative signal of quality while it provides an important marketing function for the project 
and its creator as well, and it gives a “rational” basis to inexperienced investors to believe that 
a project is less risky only because other people already invested in such project before them. 
As the authors declared, this path dependence implies that funding success will solely reflect 
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underlying project quality if early funders do a careful job in screening projects. In addition to 
this, the information cascade may be manipulated. An extreme situation is given by the 
possibility that creators exploit the path-dependent nature of investment by injecting capital in 
the early stages, thereby generating an information cascade, and consequently withdrawing 
their capital before the fundraising is closed. However, this represents only an extreme and 
marginal case, as platform regulations are intended to prevent and avoid such kind of crowd 
manipulation.  
 
Provision point mechanism   
As anticipated previously, mechanisms just described enable to overcome issues related to 
asymmetric information and opportunistic behaviors by founders after they had raised capital. 
Such tools provide information about quality, create incentives for effort, and minimize the 
potential for fraud. On the other hand, the provision point mechanism represents a tool properly 
created in order to avoid losses for funders due to the free-rider problem. In this way, the 
provision point mechanism implies that founders are going to receive the amount collected only 
whenever a threshold level is met or even surpassed, within a predefined period of time. 
 
EQUITY CROWDFUNDING PROCESS 
Equity crowdfunding implies some substantial differences with respect to the most 
traditional models of early-stage fundraising. Indeed, in the case of ECF, transactions are 
intermediated by an online platform, which consequently may play an active role in determining 
the success of the campaign. Online platforms not only operate during the effective capital 
raising process, but they also deal with post-investment activities (Wilson and Testoni, 2014). 
Investing in start-up ventures is normally risky by definition, inasmuch the expected results are 
only based on forecasts and previsions. However, backing a project through equity 
crowdfunding may be even riskier, due to the peculiarities of this kind of fundraising, including 
information asymmetries problems and the lack of competences and expertise by entrepreneurs. 
In this way, it appears particularly important to completely understand the process of such a 





Figure 2.5: The equity crowdfunding process, Wilson and Testoni, 2014. 
Wilson and Testoni (2014) have proposed a schematic way in order to better define ECF 
investment steps, thus identifying the risks correlated to each process (see Figure 2.5). In this 
way, both entrepreneurs and investors may properly evaluate the investment decision, avoiding 
losses and CF market failures. Each step of the process has been studied by making a 
comparison with BAs and VCs. Such tools are going to be deeper described following in this 
chapter, in order to have an even broader picture of the early-stage financing market and its 
implications. 
 
Selection and valuation 
The phase of selection and valuation of a project to finance has been completely changed 
through the implementation of ECF. Indeed, traditionally, business angels and venture 
capitalists executed accurate due diligence previous to the investment decision, relying on their 
expertise and capabilities on early-stage venture valuation, and perhaps also on their social 
relationships with potential members of the management of the new venture. However, such a 
process may be costly for the potential investor, both in terms of time and money, even though 
evidence shows that due diligence is a major determinant in achieving returns on the investment 
(Wiltbanks and Boeker, 2007). Nonetheless, this expense is justified in light of the considerable 
size of such investments. Though, crowd-investors normally execute relatively small capital 
injections, thus making an appropriate due diligence not worthy of the money and time spending 
(Wilson and Testoni, 2014). Moreover, ECF investors evaluate worthy investment by free 
riding on previous contributors’ investment decisions, thus implying systematic 
underestimation of due diligence performance (Agrawal et al. 2014). Having said that, it is 
important to consider also that crowd-investors often lack competences to properly perform due 
diligence. Finally, as previously anticipated, Agrawal et al. (2014) observed also how company 
valuation performed by a crowd might be affected by social biases and herding behavior, 
making it even less rational, and which may consequently lead to overoptimistic expectations 
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(Mollick, 2013). However, valuations performed by the crowd may benefit from the “wisdom 
of crowds”, concept proposed by Surowiecki (2004) and described in the first chapter of the 
thesis. In conclusion, the crowdfunding industry is probably going to benefit from the so-called 
“big-data” paradigm (Agrawal et al., 2014). In this way, it could benefit from its online 
basement, thus trailing data on investors from crowdfunding deals closed on the platform. 
Perhaps in the long period, the analysis of this data could enable CF platforms to provide better 
matches between investors and companies, so maximizing the correlation between the crowd 
and the product demand. 
 
Investment 
Despite equity crowdfunding investments normally rely on standardized contracts provided 
by the platform, they often need tailored contracts as they are backing seed and early-stage 
firms, thus requiring the alignment of entrepreneurs’ interests to those of the contributors. By 
making a comparison with the traditional start-up financing tools, BAs and VCs commonly link 
their contracts to various covenants, such as anti-dilution provisions in order to protect their 
investment against down rounds, and to facilitate exit opportunities or liquidation preferences 
to obtain priority in the final distribution of value (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2016). In 
addition, business angels and venture capitals normally manage to reduce the risk exposure of 
their seed investment and to increase control over entrepreneur’s behavior by splitting their 
financing into tranches. Such tranches are related to the achievement of defined milestones 
which must be reached by the entrepreneur and her/his fundraising campaign. However, these 
mechanisms are difficult to be applied in a crowdfunding setting.  
Moreover, it is a commonly adopted strategy for venture capitalists and angel investors to 
diversify their investment portfolio in order to reduce the volatility of returns and reduce risk 
as well. Equity crowdfunding investors may be able to replicate this kind of business model, 
since crowdfunding platforms expose several projects on their homepage, thus proposing a high 
variety of investments and related riskiness. In this way, crowd-investors can freely decide in 
which project to invest and how to diversify their own investment portfolios to reduce their risk 
of returns. Despite this possibility offered by crowdfunding online platforms, non-professional 
investors are unlikely to have enough competences in order to establish how to properly 
diversify their investment portfolios. Besides, small investors typically do not finance huge 
amounts of capital, but they rather concentrate all their funds in a single venture (Wilson and 
Testoni, 2014). In conclusion, small investors are probably not able to participate in follow-on 
investment rounds. The failure to do so may imply the consequent dilution of such investors’ 
shares, thus reducing their chances to attain a positive return from their project backing.  
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Post-investment support and monitoring  
Once the target amount of capital has been collected, the start-up venture needs to manage 
the newly injected capital in order to generate value. In this post-investment scenario, the new 
management team normally looks for competences, support and perhaps monitoring on firm’s 
operations, in order to make sure the company is efficiently managing its resources. By 
considering traditional seed capital providers, it appears that such kinds of tools are suitable for 
early-stage ventures not only because they inject huge amounts of capital, but also due to their 
active involvement in increasing the value of the company they are financing. There are reasons 
to believe that this kind of support provided by the crowd is likely to be less valuable than that 
provided by traditional and early-stage financiers. Indeed, crowd-funders may have less 
incentive to spend resources in providing active support since they are expecting low return for 
their monitoring actions (Agrawal et al., 2014). On the other hand, in the case where too many 
investors choose to actively participate in the management of the start-up, this could generate 
excessively high costs for the company in order to manage a crowd of non-professional 
investors that want to take part in it. Moreover, in the case of ECF, the venture has limited 
capability to select its crowd-investors, and they may potentially have different managerial and 
ethical ideas on how to better perform the firm’s activities, thus generating even more 
difficulties and inefficiencies.  
Furthermore, information asymmetries problem characterizing crowdfunding campaigns 
persists in the post-investment phase, thus limiting the potential of the crowd (Wilson and 
Testoni, 2014). As previously anticipated, information asymmetries are a direct consequence 
of geographical distance between entrepreneurs and funders, that limits the execution of proper 
supporting and monitoring post-investment activities. Limiting distance barriers is one of the 
main characteristics of CF, which led to its huge expansions, but it also entails higher 
monitoring costs. This appears to be in line with the observation provided by Lerner (1995), 
who stated how venture capital funds tend to invest predominantly in corporates geographically 
close to them. Finally, the lack of social interactions between entrepreneurs and investors 
reduces the potential of reputation as a tool of quality signaling as well as a mechanism to 
incentivize the entrepreneurs to act in line with the interests of investors (Agrawal et al., 2014). 
In some marketplaces, participants have low incentive to misbehave, as if they do so, they may 
be prevented from participating in the market in the future thanks to feedback systems which 
collect ratings from other actors. However, since ECF is often a one-time experience, s/he may 
have lower incentives for behaving correctly, thus leading to potential fraud. In order to prevent 
such misbehaviors, there are online intermediary platforms which actively screen companies. 
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It could likely happen that non-professional investors who fund an equity crowdfunding 
campaign are not adequately aware of the intrinsic characteristics of this kind of investment. 
Indeed, ECF investments often take 5-10 years or even more to produce a return, if any. In this 
way, crowd investors may not be aware of the long period their investment needs to produce an 
eventual gain, and moreover they probably do not realize that most of these investments are 
unlikely to yield any return. In addition to this, it is important to consider that equity investments 
are mostly long-term illiquid assets. (Wilson and Testoni, 2014).  
Broadly speaking, when considering equity investments, a return is provided to investors 
whenever a positive exit strategy is planned at some point in time. Among the most traditional 
and valuable exit strategies, investors can consider liquidating their investment through an IPO, 
or even through a merger or acquisition (M&A). These exit strategies are commonly executed 
by VC funds. However, when considering BAs and ECF investments, implementing a positive 
and profitable exit strategy may take longer time or even it may be less likely to be realized. 
Indeed, VCs and the firms themselves commonly have an exit strategy planned from the 
beginning of the investment, and they proactively work towards making it a reality over a long 
period (Wilson and Silva, 2013). In addition to this, the lack of adequate due diligence before 
the investment decision and the weak support and monitoring during the post-investment phase, 
may generate higher risk associated with a profitable implementation of an exit strategy for 
equity crowd-investors.  
 
Types of funding rounds 
The large majority of successful start-ups have engaged in many efforts to raise capital 
through rounds of external funding. Funding rounds are defined as the provision of capital from 
outside investors; at the same time this represents an opportunity for them to invest cash in a 
growing company, in exchange for equity stakes or partial ownership of the company. In this 
way, Series A, Series B and Series C funding rounds are referring to the growing process of a 
business through outside investments (Reiff, 2020).11 By investing in early-stage ventures, 
external funders, basically excluding family and friends, expect to obtain a return from their 
support. For this reason, nearly all investments made during funding rounds are arranged such 
that the investor or investing company, in the case of VC, retains partial ownership of the 
company, thus acquiring equity. In this way, whether the firm grows and becomes profitable, 
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earnings will work as a reward to the investors for the funds provided. In his article, Reiff (2020) 
described five main crucial funding rounds, which are the following: pre-seed funding, seed or 
angel funding, Series A funding, Series B funding, Series C funding.  
❖ Pre-seed funding, which is the earliest stage of funding, and for this reason it is not 
generally included among the funding rounds. Most commonly, during this phase the 
unique funders are the entrepreneurs themselves, as well as the closest friends, 
supporters and family. Depending on the nature of the start-up company itself, this 
funding round may take shorter or longer time. In most of the cases, investors at this 
stage do not inject money in exchange for equity in the company, but rather they take 
the investment decision because of feelings or social ties. 
❖ Seed funding, which is the first official equity funding stage. This round normally 
happens when the company is at the initial idea stage, or as the entrepreneur has a 
prototype or a proof of the project s/he wants to develop, as well as there are some 
quantifiable signs that there is a demand for what could be offered (Bates, 2017).12 Seed 
round and angel investments may happen at the same time, but the seed funding may 
also occur whenever the business needs additional support to start the operating 
activities and generate cash flow to cover at least all day-to-day running costs. In this 
way, seed funding supports the company to finance its first steps, including activities 
such as market research and product development (Reiff, 2020). During this phase there 
are commonly money injections by angel investors. Indeed, BA investors tend to 
appreciate risky projects, which have little or no track record and business plan solely 
based on market forecasts. During this phase, it is likely for the start-up to collect an 
amount of capital which ranges from $10.000 up to $2 million. (Reiff, 2020). 
❖ Series A funding, which occurs whenever the firm needs additional funding. Once a 
business has developed a track record, including an established user base, consistent 
revenues, or some of the main KPIs, the company may opt for a Series A funding round 
with the aim of further optimizing its funds. In order to obtain funds in exchange for 
Series A shares, the company needs to present a reliable business plan that will generate 
long-term profit. Indeed, in Series A funding, investors are not just looking for 
innovative ideas, but they rather are aiming at finding firms with a great strategy which 
will lead to turn the idea into a successful, money-making business (Reiff, 2020). During 
this phase, venture capitalists may take part into the project.  
❖ Series B funding, this funding round is mostly executed to implement the activity, to go 
further into the product development stage, and to expand market share. The most 
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critical difference between Series A and B funding stands in the participation of PEs 
and VCs specialized in later-staged companies, rather than the one focused on early-
stage ventures as it happens in Series A funding round (Reiff, 2020). By this phase, the 
company is expected to have lower risk and higher valuation, thus making investors 
expecting signs of growth in revenue, product/service users, and success in the 
marketplace (Bates, 2017).  
❖ Series C funding, which happens only in case of successful businesses. This funding 
round occurs when companies need additional resources to develop new 
products/services, expand in new markets, or even acquire new companies. Series C 
round focuses on scaling the company and making it successfully grow (Reiff, 2020). 
These rounds usually raise amounts for $10 million or even more. 
Most commonly, a company will stop its external equity funding with Series C round, 
however it can happen for some ventures to find suitable the implementation of Series D and 
even Series E funding rounds as well. For most companies, though, a Series C round is enough 
to boost the company valuation in anticipation of an IPO. Indeed, at this point, companies enjoy 
valuations in the area of $118 million most of the time. These valuations are also founded 
increasingly on hard data rather than on expectations for future success. Companies engaging 
in Series C funding should have established strong customer bases, revenue streams, and proven 
histories of growth. By understanding the difference between each type of funding rounds, it 
becomes clearer the necessity of different funding tools, which vary from ECF, BAs, VCs for 
early-stage ventures, to VCs and PEs for later-staged companies. By following the funding 
steps, a company is progressing along the road to eventually become an IPO.  
 
The “nominee structure” 
The London based equity crowdfunding platform Seedrs proposed an ECF structure, which 
has been defined essential in order to properly manage the shares of startups on behalf of the 
underlying investors after an investment is completed and to ensure protection of investors’ 
interests (Lynn, 2013).13 Hence, a nominee structure becomes very important whenever the 
platform works as an intermediary between the company and the actual investors. Indeed, this 
arrangement leads the nominee to hold the legal title of the share for the benefit of another 
person. In other words, the intermediary platforms act as the legal shareholder, but at the same 
time it holds the shares on behalf of the various individuals who have invested in the company 
through the online platform. This arrangement is very similar to a trustee relationship, as well 
as to the structures used by stockbrokers and other types of intermediary platforms.  
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The employment of such structure is expected to generate benefits for both investors and 
start-ups. Firstly, it helps investors in their bureaucratic duties derived from their role of 
shareholder in various companies, as well as it supports them in coordinating their decisions 
and actions. Moreover, thanks to the nominee structure, the intermediary platform monitors the 
company to perform in compliance with its subscription agreement, to ensure investors’ rights 
protection. Even start-ups benefit from the nominee arrangement as well as they only have to 
deal with the platform for administrative matters like consents and shareholder votes (Lynn, 
2013). However, by applying this tool, the start-up can no longer take full advantage of 
feedback, experience, and enthusiasm the investors can offer. In addition to this, the nominee 
structure helps the company to better attract further private funds, such as BAs or VCs.  
 
EARLY-STAGE FINANCING OPTIONS 
Early-stage ventures in need of financing may find sources needed through several tools: the 
most adopted involve liquidity injections by family and friends, business angels, venture 
capitals or equity crowdfunding platforms. By looking at what De Buysere et al. (2012)14 
declared, equity investments through crowdfunding platforms appear riskier rather than VC 
investments, due to information asymmetries and lack of publicly available data in the most 
traditional sense. However, equity crowdfunding is becoming one of the most adopted tools for 
fund backing in the case of seed or early-stage venture, while venture capitals are mostly 
directed towards more mature and grown private companies which in turns need higher liquidity 
injections and experience. Another key difference stands in investors’ motivations. In the case 
of start-ups, both crowd-investors and family and friends aim at exploiting investment 
opportunities as well as an entrepreneurial mix of emotional engagement and social return. On 
the other hand, in the case of more mature companies where higher funds are needed, VCs, PEs 
or IPO fit better since they can provide for higher funds and competences.  
The European Business Angels Association (EBAN) published a detailed report showing the 
situation regarding early-stage investments in Europe in 2018.15 By looking at the report, it 
appears that until 2018 the overall European early stage investment market was estimated to be 
worth 12.3 billion euros. In this scenario, business angels represented the biggest share of the 
investment market with 7.45 billion euros, equal to approximately 60% of the total market, 
followed by the early stage venture capital industry (4.13 billion euros), while equity 
crowdfunding investments showed an increasing trend since 2015 which at the time was 
expected to keep growing, as we are experiencing nowadays. Traditionally there have been 
three sources of equity funding for young innovative firms: founders, family and friends; angel 
investors; and venture capitalists (Wilson and Testoni 2014). 
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Family, Friends and Fools 
Traditionally, the most common source of seed capital is represented by the money injected 
by the founder s/herself or by the closest members of her/his social network, namely family and 
friends. This category includes the so-called 3Fs: Family, Friends and Fools. The third subgroup 
is defined as investors who are especially risk-seekers and keen to invest in risky businesses 
(Wilson and Testoni, 2014). As previously anticipated in the first chapter of the thesis, family 
and friends are not always completely rational when deciding whether to invest or not in a 
specific project (Belleflamme and Lambert, 2014). Indeed, such kind of investment decisions 
may easily be taken because of social ties and moral obligations, thus making the funding even 
riskier and generating misleading quality signaling effects for external funders. In addition, 
despite one of the most important features of crowdfunding stands in its capacity to overcome 
distance-related frictions, it appears that the very first investments are commonly made by 
geographically related people, such as family and friends (Agrawal et al., 2011). 
By making a comparison with BAs and VCs, it is important to consider that these tools fill 
gaps for larger amounts, while the smallest amounts are provided by entrepreneurs themselves 
and the 3Fs (Lambert and Schwienbacher, 2010). However, the 3F category plays a very 
important role in signaling the quality of a project, whenever other crowd-funders rely on the 
accumulated capital to value the intrinsic quality of a start-up idea and to decide whether to 
invest or not. In these cases, the higher the amount provided by family and friends, the higher 
the possibility to hit the minimum target requested in the campaign. 
 
Venture Capitals 
Venture capital funds are typically one of the most adopted sources of seed capital for early-
stage ventures. Such a tool has always been appreciated by entrepreneurs due to its capacity to 
bring both capital and managerial competences in the firm. Indeed, VCs provide extra-financial 
services, which enable the start-up to exploit its opportunities and generate value for its 
shareholders and the venture capital itself. Moreover, venture capitalists become actively 
involved in monitoring the companies in which they invest, and they perhaps also provide 
critical resources in order to create a sustainable competitive advantage, such as industry 
expertise, and valuable network of contacts (Hsu, 2004).  Normally, VCs inject relatively high 
amounts of capital, and then they apply exit strategies in order to liquidate their stake and obtain 
positive returns. Despite its expanded adoption in financing early-stage ventures, VCs are now 
focusing more on later-stage investments, leaving an increasing funding gap at the real seed 
and early-stage firms (Wilson and Testoni, 2014).   
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By looking at investment preferences, venture capital funds normally concentrate on 
technology-based companies, which typically generate high-risk/high-return investments, 
while crowd-investors encompass high heterogeneous investment motives and preferences, 
thus making the investment spectrum relatively broader. Another difference between VC and 
ECF investments stands in preliminary information disclosure. Indeed, while for equity 
crowdfunding it is necessary for entrepreneurs to publicly disclose business ideas and strategy, 
firms which rely on VC investments only have to communicate their strategic plan to venture 
capitalists, keeping their intellectual property and innovative ideas outside from the crowd 
(Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2016). Moreover, ECF does not necessarily involve an active 
financial intermediary that makes the investment decisions, while in the case of VCs financial 
intermediaries play a very active role. Indeed, venture capital funds pool financial commitments 
from institutional investors into funds and successively select a portfolio of companies over 
time in which they invest. On the contrary, in the case of ECF, the decision to finance a company 
is ultimately made by the individual investor (Wilson and Testoni, 2014). Moreover, while ECF 
investors execute weak due diligence, venture capitalists spend relevant time and money in 
performing proper due diligence, in order to make sure the investment project they are taking 
is valuable. These expenses are normally justified in light of the considerable size of the 
investment they are going to assess. Furthermore, in order to reduce risk exposure over time, 
venture capitals normally include various covenants in their contracts, aiming at being protected 
against down-rounds or facilitate exit opportunities (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2016) 
 
Business Angels 
The EBAN defines a business angel as a private individual, mostly high net worth, usually 
with business experience, who directly invests part of his or her personal assets in new and 
growing unquoted businesses.16 Angel investors are thus defined as experienced entrepreneurs 
or businesspeople that decide to invest their own funds into a new developing company. These 
investments typically are focused on seed and early-stage ventures and include amounts ranging 
from $25.000 to $500.000. They are commonly net worth individuals who are also sophisticated 
investors, while crowd-investors are mostly individuals with lack of financial experience. The 
importance of angel investors has increased during the recent years since the expansion of the 
funding gap experienced by SMEs. Indeed, BAs are considered as a form of alternative finance 
for innovative firms unable to obtain financing from credit institutions or bank loans (Wilson 
and Testoni, 2014). As it happens in the case of VCs, business angel’s investments are not 
limited to the provision of financing, but rather they also inject entrepreneurial competences as 
well as further critical resources (Hsu, 2004). By looking at investment strategies applied by 
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BAs, they may perhaps invest through group syndicates, thus collecting even higher amounts 
of funds and providing enough capital for start-ups to start their production.  
By looking at similarities between BAs and ECF investors, it appears that both the categories 
not only aim at financial return, but rather they are also looking for social and emotional 
benefits. In other words, they are likely to be motivated in injecting funds in a company with 
the goal of being connected with an entrepreneurial venture that shares their own values, vision, 
or interests. Moreover, both these financing categories are related to the avoidance of active 
financial intermediaries. Indeed, neither type of financing model requires the involvement of 
an active financial intermediary in order to make the investment decisions, but rather both BAs 
and ECF backers made the decision to invest by themselves as individual investors (Wilson and 
Testoni, 2014). However, differently from what happens in ECF, angel investors tend to 
participate locally in projects which are directly related to their network of contacts. Indeed, 
traditional angel investing transactions rely mostly on word-of-mouth promotion. On the 
contrary, ECF investors take profit from geographically distant projects (Agrawal et al., 2011).  
Broadly speaking, authors in the literature proposed a sort of analogy between equity 
crowdfunding and business angel investors (Wetterhag and Décarre, 2014; Wilson and Testoni, 
2014). Despite the market for BAs is much larger than the one for ECF until now, both the two 
financing tools present some similarities. Indeed, both are based on private individuals making 
their own investment decisions in exchanging money against shares of a firm, and both of the 
investing tools are primarily focused on investments in seed- or early-stage ventures. Figure 2.6 
shows the main characteristics of each mechanism of early-stage funding described above, and 
it sums up the most critical differences which may lead investors to prefer one tool or another.  
Figure 2.6: Key characteristics of equity crowdfunders, business angels and venture capitalists, Wilson and Testoni, 2014. 
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SOCIAL OUTCOMES OF EQUITY CROWDFUNDING  
The implementation of ECF may not only represent an opportunity for fundraising, in terms 
of alternative finance, but it can also provide an opportunity to improve social welfare. Indeed, 
the opening of a new marketplace to facilitate the exchange of capital for equity in small new 
ventures, will likely generate outcomes in terms of social welfare and innovation. The 
expectations of positive externalities generated by equity crowdfunding are further proved by 
the support provided at government level, through the JOBS Act firstly and through the 
implementation of ad hoc regulatory framework in most of western countries.  
Firstly, ECF will generate social benefits of two types. Indeed, it will lead to private gains 
from trade as well as additional gains associated with benefits to others that result from the 
trade (Agrawal et al., 2014). In other words, equity crowdfunding will lead entrepreneurs and 
funders to freely exchange equity for cash. Consequently, given crowdfunding’s focus on 
innovative start-ups, there are reasonable expectations of significant spillover externalities of 
the type commonly associated with innovation development. However, ECF may generate 
social loss by relaxing traditional regulation aimed at managing safe transactions and sale of 
securities, to protect investors and creditors from fraudulent activity as well as inexperienced 
entrepreneurs. The second social outcome identified by Agrawal et al. (2014) stands in the 
capability of ECF to promote the creation of valuable innovative start-ups. Equity 
crowdfunding plays a crucial role in this scenario by changing the way in which capital is 
allocated among innovative new ventures, and by giving the possibility to limit the impact of 
geographical distribution of such innovative ventures looking for seed capitals. In this way, 
ECF is an important tool to finance valuable projects that have disproportionately less access 
to financial capital relative to their stock of human capital, and which are located in regions that 




CHAPTER III - REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND MARKET TRENDS 
The actual rise of crowdfunding implementations has raised awareness of and interest in its 
potential. From a political point of view, it is now broadly agreed that crowdfunding should be 
highly promoted as it offers a powerful alternative means for channeling money flows toward 
small and medium and perhaps innovative enterprises. Consequently, these firms are 
recognized as an increasing source of growth and job creation, but at the same time they are 
facing difficulties in fundraising. In this perspective, CF regulation is now one of the most 
debated items in the financially developed countries, which are looking for obtaining the most 
appropriate regulatory framework, trying to develop a global market for CF campaigns as well.  
Within the European Union (EU), though, crowdfunding policies are still restricted by each 
national regulatory provision, which delineated the creation of tailored provisions for each 
national scenario. However, as stated by Belleflamme and Lambert (2014), it is broadly 
recognized that only an EU level initiative would potentially open up the market for 
crowdfunding, as well as it could really level the playing field amongst European countries. 
Furthermore, this is particularly true in the case of equity crowdfunding, as it represents a 
powerful tool for alternative finance and injections of risk capital in start-ups companies. 
Indeed, innovative firms not only operate on a local basis, but rather they overcome national 
geographical barriers, and the crowdfunding market should go in this direction as well.  
In the second part of this chapter, it will be described ECF market trends. This section will 
mainly focus on the Italian market, as the thesis is mostly oriented to study this new scenario 
and the impact that ECF has on firms which apply it.  
 
THE REGULATION OF CROWDFUNDING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
It is commonly agreed that investor protection plays a crucial role in the development of 
efficient and active financial markets, however literature shows the possibility that too strong 
investor protection may also harm small firms and entrepreneurial initiatives. Moreover, it is 
important to also consider the impact that alternative early-stage financing tools have. Indeed, 
optimal regulation for ECF also depends on the availability of BAs as well as VCs financing.  
As suggested by La Porta et al. (2006), securities regulation acts as a driving policy tool 
which ensures strong investor protection. Consequently, whenever investors feel that their 
investments are safe and protected, they normally tend to invest more and more, thus leading 
to the stock market development. By looking at the recent history of financial markets, it 
appears that traditionally, stronger securities regulations have been issued in response to shocks 
in the financial scenario, such as financial crisis, accounting scandals, corporate governance 
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problems as well as financial innovations. An example could be provided by the Securities Act 
of 1993 and the Exchange Act of 1934, which have been adopted by the United States Congress 
in response to the stock market crash experienced by the US in 1929, generating the so-called 
Great Depression. The above-mentioned regulations were intended to reduce information 
asymmetries between securities issuers and creditors and therefore they aimed at protecting 
investors from fraudulent or low-value-creating investments.  
Another important aspect of securities regulation is that it primarily concerns firms, as they 
try to place large security issues in the market. Indeed, firms must adapt their security issuance 
in order to fully respect the regulation and investors’ protections. In this way, one of the most 
critical innovations brought by equity crowdfunding stands in its capacity to enable small 
entrepreneurs as well as small investors to have access to the general public (Ahlers et al., 
2015). While in the past it was unlikely that small entrepreneurs accessed general public 
contributions, due to high transaction costs, equity crowdfunding has changed the scenario, 
providing this new opportunity to all kinds of firms. Indeed, the crucial innovative impact stands 
in the increased availability of external finance for SMEs as well as the access to such 
investment opportunities for small investors. This potentially happens in all countries that allow 
the solicitation of the general public without the issuance of costly prospectus (Hornuf and 
Schwienbacher, 2017). However, this framework has consequences both from a financial and 
from a legal point of view. From a legal standpoint, the true innovation deals with the different 
approaches needed in order to regulate small firms rather than large ones as it was before. 
Indeed, small firms are most likely to benefit from availability of exemptions, which 
consequently require compliance with prospectus and registration requirements as well as 
responsibilities definition within the management team. Therefore, as proposed by Acs et al. 
(2016), the new scenario implies the implementation of a new legal perspective, that examines 
the impact of country-specific institutional arrangements on the pursuit of micro-level 
opportunities to create and fund new firms.  
 
The United Stated as pioneers: the JOBS Act 
The United States has been one of the pioneer countries which started to issue a proper 
legislation to specifically regulate ECF. For this reason, it will firstly be shown the concept 
proposed by the Congress and the impact generated by the JOBS Act implementation. Indeed, 
after this, most of the developed countries including the ones belonging to the European Union, 
started to sign into law new and specific regulations to handle ECF and its share and cash 
transactions, as well as to protect investors who were taking part in it.  
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The US is nowadays the country in which there are the highest transaction volumes related 
to crowdfunding activities, thus emphasizing the necessity to better regulate such an increasing 
market sector. However, until 2015, not all the so-called retail investors, namely small investors 
who compose the crowd, were enabled to access alternative finance, as well as not all small 
entrepreneurs could afford transaction costs needed to employ this tool. In this direction, in 
2012 the Jumpstart Our Business Startup Act (JOBS Act) was signed into law, theoretically 
enabling non-professional investors to take part into fundraising campaigns through 
crowdfunding tools. In 2015 the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) issued the effective 
regulation.  
Traditionally, one crucial rule of the US securities law refers to the mandatory registration 
of the securities with the SEC in order to be offered to the general public. This aimed at 
protecting potential investors. In this scenario, there were some particular exemptions 
especially thought to account for the needs of small offerings. Exemptions may include, for 
instance, accredited investors who can fend for themselves or public offers up to $5.000.000. 
However, such exemption was not available for the use of equity crowdfunding since the 
registration at the state level was required anyway. This made particularly expensive the 
creation of a geographically dispersed offer (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2017). In this 
scenario, the SEC issued detailed rules specifically tailored to equity crowdfunding. One of the 
most important parts of the JOBS Act stands in Title III, also referred as CROWDFUND Act. 
The SEC refers to it as «amendments to the existing Securities Act rules to facilitate intrastate 
and regional securities offerings». More in detail, such rules were intended to «assist smaller 
companies with capital formation and provide investors with additional protections».17 Thanks 
to the innovations brought by the Title III, companies can now collect an overall amount of up 
to $1.000.000 during a 12-month period without any requirements of registration with the SEC 
or at the state level. This exemption, though, requires the existence of three conditions in order 
to be applied: firstly, the usage of a broker-dealer or a funding portal; secondly, there are 
limitations on the amount that can be sold to individual investors; and lastly, there are disclosure 
requirements for the issuers.18 According to such legislation, the issuer can avoid the 
registration with the SEC only in the case where the transaction between entrepreneurs and 
investors is intermediated by broker-dealer or funding portal, thus making the intermediary 
working as a private gatekeeper, that is supposed to ensure the correctness and completeness of 
the securities issued. On the other hand, the JOBS Act leads to some confused roles, since it 
does not make an explicit provision about the liability of funding portals in the case of material 
misstatements or omission of material facts by the issuer (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2017). 
In addition to this, the legislator stated some limits in order to better ensure correctness of the 
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securities issued as well as investors’ protection. In summary, the JOBS Act has regulated 
equity crowdfunding legislation, by establishing a maximum value for offers without a 
prospectus and also by setting thresholds for the amounts an individual can invest. Furthermore, 
the JOBS Act required information disclosure as well as the establishment of a private 
gatekeeper, namely an online platform.  
 
EU legislative environment 
Recently, EU is becoming more and more aware of the importance of crowdfunding 
development, and it is starting to introduce specific provisions to provide proper regulation and 
improve certainty and protection among both entrepreneurs and investors. European Union 
considers ECF as a valuable tool to enhance economic growth, in terms of investments, 
innovations, job occupation and higher choice selections for credit users. However, European 
Commission pointed out some problems related to ECF, which are linked to the lack of 
awareness, intellectual rights protection, fraudulent behaviors, consumer protection, and also 
legislative uncertainty due to the absence of appositely issued ECF provisions (Iosio and 
Valentinuz, 2016).  
Nowadays, EU member states have several different ECF legislations, without any proper 
coordination which promotes cross border investments. The European Commission described 
the legislative situation by saying that «the EU market for crowdfunding is underdeveloped as 
compared to other major world economies. One of the biggest hurdles faced by crowdfunding 
platforms seeking to offer their services across borders is the lack of common rules across 
the EU. This raises compliance and operational costs and prevents crowdfunding platforms 
from expanding».19 In this scenario, there are some national legislation which are not yet 
properly thought to specifically regulate equity crowdfunding, but rather they have been solely 
modified just to be adapted to new necessities. By looking deeper in detail, it appears how each 
national state is signing into law autonomously, taking the local market context and the 
expectations and requests of citizens as proxy for decisions. This way of acting led to numerous 
legislations presenting some significant differences related to the basic aspects in the various 
countries. Such differences are concerning, for instance, methods of accessing the market 
(minimum or maximum thresholds), platform regulation (generally favorable from a national 
perspective but not from an international perspective), tax treatment and requirements of 
transparency and investor protection.20 
According to what was declared by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), 
it is necessary to find a common regulation of crowdfunding, especially in the case of ECF. 
This choice would enable the creation of a unique European market, and consequently would 
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lead platforms to efficiently operate in cross border operations. The Committee is responsible, 
for example, for adopting common rules for the functioning of crowdfunding within EU state 
members, for investor protection, for the remote sale of financial instruments through the 
Internet, for orders cancellation.21 At the same time, EESC is aware of the risks related to 
excessive regulation, which could potentially block the market and its transactions. Indeed, ECF 
legislation must be thought for enabling fundraising for SMEs, which have different necessities 
rather than large multinational companies. SMEs need regulations which enable them to obtain 
funds from all over the world, thus legislations must be efficient and flexible at the same time. 
Furthermore, SMEs are normally not able to sustain high costs related to the adaptation to 
complex legislations, which consequently need to be as simple as possible. In addition to this, 
EESC is aware that a more uniform legislation would generate higher trust on alternative 
finance among savers and investors, thus leading to higher development of such tools, including 
equity crowdfunding, and to the generation of better possibilities of credit for small and medium 
European enterprises. In this direction, one of the main goals of European Commission is to 
create a sort of brand for crowdfunding operations.22 Thanks to such EU “quality brand”, both 
entrepreneurs and investors would know that the campaign has been set according to specific 
legislative provisions, properly applied to reduce the risk of fraud and increase trust in investors.  
By considering entrepreneurs’ point of view, it appears that they are wishing to obtain 
legislation which allows them to operate in an easy and fast manner, in a situation of regulatory 
certainty. Thus, they are aiming at the implementation of a unitary regulation in a European 
context that reduces the excessive fragmentation of regulations at the local level and enhances 
transparency and efficiency (Iosio and Valentinuz, 2016). On the other hand, investors have 
different objectives regarding the regulation as well.  
By a study conducted by Wardrop, Zhang, Rau and Gray (2015), it appears that the 










 Figure 3.1: Industry perspectives on regulations in a European context, Wardrop et al., 2015. 
53 
 
By looking at Figure 3.1, it appears the width of the range including various perceptions of 
ECF users in 2015. In this scenario, the 21% of the interviewed people had the perception that 
the existing regulations were excessive and too strict, in line with the necessity of relaxing 
legislation stated above in this chapter. Finally, we can consider what said by Steven Major as 
chair of European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) in 2015, who declared the concrete 
intention of EU to lower companies’ dependence on banking credit-system, trying to increase 
the active participation in capital market also from retail investors, and to develop a European 
capital market wider and more interconnected. In this direction, setting European provisions 
would enable online platforms to operate at a European level and in all member states with the 
requirement of a unique authorization.23 
On September 30, 2015, the European Commission published its Capital Markets Union 
(CMU) Action Plan.24 The plan aims at having benefits for both firms and investors: it wishes 
to deal with investment shortage by increasing and diversifying the funding sources for 
European businesses, especially in the case of SMEs, as well as it focused on the development 
of more options and better returns for savers and investors. The plan's focus stands in 
crowdfunding regulations. Indeed, European Commission was aiming at being able to act in a 
timely manner in order to properly discipline equity crowdfunding campaigns, thus requiring 
convergence of regulatory approaches in the member states. In this direction, CMU was 
intended as a tool to create an appropriate regulatory system that improves cross-border access 
to information on the companies looking for credit, quasi-equity and equity structures, with the 
objective of increasing the adoption of non-bank financing models, including crowdfunding 
(Klöhn, 2018). The focus of the regulation environment is more on equity crowdfunding than 
on crowdlending, as, even though there is an active crowdlending market in Europe, it does not 
seem to be frequently adopted by start-up ventures, perhaps as a consequence of the fact that 
debt financing is unsuitable for firms without hard assets.  
In conclusion, currently there are not any specific crowdfunding regulations at European 
Union level. Notwithstanding, there are several legal acts that establish the general regulatory 
framework for equity crowdfunding, such as the prospectus requirements and financial 
intermediaries’ regulation.  
 
Prospectus requirements  
The standard tool adopted by Securities Regulation in order to limit information asymmetries 
between issuers and investors is information disclosure requirements. This tool aims at 
providing investors with as complete as possible information prior to the investment decision. 
Such information is required to be disclosed in the form of a prospectus. Furthermore, this 
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obligation is normally enforced publicly, most of the time by the state, which requires issuer 
companies to submit the prospectus with the competent authority before offering the market 
securities (Klöhn, 2018). Securities laws are generally supplemented by the action of private 
law, as it is impossible for regulators to verify all the information they receive within a 
reasonable period of time. More specifically, private law enforcements are specifically 
employed in order to regulate prospectus liability related to material omissions or misstatements 
contained in the documents or even in the case of complete failure to submit a prospectus with 
the competent authority prior to the offer.  
As regarding prospectus requirements, the European Union issued two main regulations: the 
EU Prospectus Directive and the accompanying Prospect Regulation, which are intended to set 
rules for the public side of the above-mentioned regime and also set out some basic duties for 
the private law side. The Prospectus Directive is a legal act which needs to be implemented by 
the member states, as it is not directly applicable in each national legislation; on the other hand, 
the Prospect Regulation is directly applicable in all member states without any necessity of 
implementation by the singular nation. Firstly, the Prospectus Directive25 provides that prior 
publication of a prospectus is mandatory in order to offer securities in the market. Moreover, it 
states that the prospectus shall not be published until it has been approved by the competent 
authority of the home member state. In addition to this, the Directive provides parameters under 
which the prospectus shall be prepared, indeed, it has to contain all information which, 
according to the particular nature of the issuer and the securities offered, is needed to enable 
investors to assess the value of the company, of its assets and liabilities, financial position, 
profit and losses. Secondly, the Prospect Regulation26 is enforced in order to set minimum 
requirements regarding what information must be disclosed, the format of the prospectus, the 
modalities of disclosure, the methods of publication and dissemination of the document. One 
of the most relevant characteristics of these European regulations stands in the fact that, once 
the company’s prospectus has been approved by the competent authority of the home member 
state, it has automatically validity for a public offer in any host EU member states. This scheme 
of mutual recognition in the European Union is commonly known as the “European passport” 
(Klöhn, 2018). 
As stated previously in the chapter, within the legislative environment, exemptions play a 
crucial role in determining the effective possibility of relaxing fundraising for SMEs. By 
looking at the exemptions included in the Prospectus Directive, they allow to be exempted from 
publishing a prospectus in the case when: (i) the offer is addressed to solely qualified investors; 
(ii) the offer is addressed also to non-qualified investors which in turn are no more than 150 
natural or legal person per member state; (iii) investors purchase securities for a total 
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consideration of at least €100.000 per investor; (iv) the offer securities represents a total 
consideration of less than €100.000 over a 12-month period (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2017).  
Finally, the Directive allows member states to forgo the requirements of prospectus disclosure 
as long as the total consideration of the offer is less than €5 million. In this scenario, member 
states must exempt offers from the prospectus requirement if the total consideration is less than 
€100.000 and they must require it if the total consideration is €5 million or more. However, 
there is uncertainty for the offers which stand within that range between €100.000 and €4.99 
million: in such cases member states can choose what legislation to adopt, requiring or not 
prospectus disclosure (Klöhn, 2018). In addition to this, it is important to consider that the 
Prospectus Directive only refers to securities as stocks (common or preferred) and bonds, thus 
excluding a big pie of the capital market securities. Such securities offers must be regulated by 
national laws, which in turn may or may not require prospectus publication prior to the offer. 
In conclusion, there is absence of a single unified prospectus regime in the EU, but rather there 
are several different domestic regimes, only partly harmonized by the European Directive.  
By looking at start-up ventures in the specific, there is legislation uncertainty among 
investments contracts when considering what disclosed by Klöhn (2018): 
❖ When start-ups offer transferable securities as defined by MiFID (Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive, contained in European Directive issued in 2004), there is the 
application of the harmonized regimen, until the total consideration is less than €5 
million and whether the member state in which the offer is taking place has chosen to 
exempt the offer from the prospectus requirement. Whether the consideration is less 
than €100.000, the exemption applies mandatorily.  
❖ When start-ups place investment contracts which do not qualify as transferable 
securities, the EU Prospectus Regulation does not apply. In this case, national law will 
determine whether there is prospectus requirement. However, this will undermine 
legislative harmonization at EU level.  
 
Platforms regulations   
 Platforms and financial intermediaries are regulated by provisions contained in the MiFID. 
Such European Directive was first issued in 2004, and it was then remodeled in 2014, therefore 
often referred to as MiFID II. Just like the Prospectus Directive, even in the case of MiFID, as 
a directive, it is not directly applicable, but rather it needs to be implemented by each national 
member state legislation.  
Firstly, MiFID establishes requirements in relation to the authorization of financial 
intermediaries. In this way, the directive requires the provision of investment services to be 
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subject to prior authorization by the competent authority per member state. After having 
received the authorization, the intermediary can freely provide investment services within the 
territories of all EU member states. As previously anticipated, this mechanism is commonly 
referred as “European Passport” (Klöhn, 2018). In particular, the Directive establishes such 
authorization aiming at protecting the financial market as well as investors participating in such 
market, indeed it says that «persons who provide the investment services and/or perform 
investment activities covered by this Directive should be subject to authorization by their home 
Member States in order to protect investors and the stability of the financial system».27 
Furthermore, MiFID establishes organizational requirements, for example concerning the 
compliance structure of the investment firms or measures to be taken to prevent conflicts of 
interests. In this way, the Directive makes as sure as possible that, when providing investment 
services, an intermediary firm acts honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the 
best interests of its clients and in compliance with all principles set by the EU Directive. 
Moreover, appropriate information shall be provided, regarding investment firm and services, 
financial instruments proposed and investment strategies, all costs and related charges. In 
addition, information must be provided in a comprehensible way in such a manner that clients 
are reasonably able to recognize the nature and the risks of the investment and, more generally, 
to take an investment decision on an informed basis. Intermediaries investment firms are also 
required to know their customers, in order to assess the investments more suitable for such 
customers, her/his investment possibilities as well as loss management capacity. Among this 
set of rules, there is no specific provision which is expressly directed to crowdfunding 
platforms. In this scenario, such platforms are considered as firms providing financial services 
relating to financial instruments. Therefore, the regulatory regime for crowdfunding platforms 
in Europe is just as divided as the prospectus regime (Klöhn, 2018).  
As intermediary platforms are considered as financial intermediaries, specifically in the case 
of ECF, they must have enough initial capital in order to obtain the authorization. These capital 
requirements are governed by the EU Capital Requirement Directive (CRD) and the EU Capital 
Requirements Regulation (CRR). Moreover, ECF platforms which operate under MiFID 
legislature are subject to anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing rules regulated by 
the Anti-Money Laundering Directive.28 Whether platform’s activity qualifies as concluding 
distance contracts for financial services, then clients have the right to receive pre-contractual 
information in addition to a right of withdrawal within 14 days without justification, under the 
Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Service Directive.29 Lastly, whenever platforms or 
issuers process personal data, they will be governed by EU data protection legislation, namely 
the European General Data Protection Regulation.30 
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In conclusion, the EU lacks a harmonized regulation which specifically addresses crowd-
investing, and the scope of application of EU securities laws regulating securities offers to the 
public as well as financial intermediation are limited. Indeed, within this legislative 
environment, there are several national regimes which discipline ECF without any coordination 
and harmonization. This leads to the necessity for the European legislator to set detailed new 
rules enhancing cross-border transactions and certainty among both securities issuers and 
investors. However, it has been shown that entrepreneurs who raise funds through ECF 
platforms are incentivized to disclose information even when it is not mandatorily required by 
the legislation, since they try to convince the crowd of investors that projects offered are 
valuable investment opportunities by virtue of simple reputation mechanisms (Wilson and 
Testoni, 2014).  
 
THE ITALIAN LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT: CONSOB REGULATION 
Italy was the first European member state which signed into law regulations specific to 
equity crowdfunding practices. Indeed, on October 20th, 2012, the Decreto Legge called 
“Decreto Crescita 2.0” n. 179/2012 went into effect. Furthermore, starting from July 29, 2013, 
portals’ managers were given the opportunity to register within the register established 
according to the Testo Unico della Finanza (TUF). Therefore, exemptions were established for 
innovative start-ups and, starting from 2015, also innovative SMEs that offer common equity 
shares via online portals (Hornuf and Schwienbahcer, 2017). Consequently, the exemptions 
included in the law enabled innovative start-ups and SMEs to make offerings of up to € 5 million 
without the obligation to register a prospectus. By looking at the definition of such firms, they 
are intended as firms which: (i) are not registered with a regulated market or a multilateral 
trading facility; (ii) the beginning of firm’s operations should have taken effect no more than 
48 months ago; (iii) the management location has to be located in Italy as well as the main 
business activities; (iv) the annual turnover in the second year of business does not have to 
exceed €5 million; (v) the main purpose of the company has to be solely to develop, produce, 
and sell innovative products or services with a high-technological value; (vi) the firm does not 
and did not make payouts to shareholders using previous corporate profits; (vii) the firm was 
not established as part of a merger, de-merger, or sale of a corporation or corporate entity (Iosio 
and Valentinuz, 2016). Furthermore, innovative start-ups are required to constantly update their 
web-site page, which must be done at least weekly. The online page has to describe minimum 
information settled by the legislator, and that include, for instance, the registered office location; 
a description of the activity carried out; an indication of the educational qualifications and 
professional experience of the shareholders as well as of staff; a list of industrial and intellectual 
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property rights; a brief description of the activity carried out, including research and 
development activities and expenses; a list of investee companies; the latest financial statements 
filed.31 Within the Italian legislative environment, Consob has the main role in governing and 
determining rules for ECF. Although it has established disclosure requirements and exemption 
for innovative start-ups and SMEs issuers, it has not yet defined which exemptions and critical 
threshold for issues without prospectus would apply for non-innovative start-ups and SMEs. 
Thus, this may lead to a situation of legal uncertainty for companies which are not classified as 
innovative according to the criteria provided by the definition. The figure below provides an 







Consob prepared a specifically dedicated report in order to define and describe processes 
and regulate equity crowdfunding in Italy. Such specific attention has been dedicated to ECF 
as, by looking at Consob (2016) definition, it represents a truly innovation in the start-up phase 
and business developments, since it represents «the possibility that a start-up or SME is given 
to present itself to a large audience of potential investors and raise the necessary financial 
resources for the implementation of the business plan». Indeed, Consob started its report by 
declaring that the specific regulation of ECF starts from the idea that this tool has the peculiarity 
of shifting the emphasis on ideas and on people who, if deserving, can collect the necessary 
financial resources. Moreover, the validation mechanism of the business model by the online 
community, in one short-term perspective, could potentially raise the firm’s rating so that it can 
be used by banks for granting credit to entities otherwise difficult to finance. In addition to this, 
according to Consob’s vision on ECF implications, the filter of meritocracy brought by such 
fundraising tools will ensure that, progressively, science and technology become the real 
driving force of the economy. At the same time, Consob declared how it is realistic to expect, 
even on smaller projects, prospectus quality (business plan above all) higher than the current 
one and this will be accompanied by a growing maturity of entrepreneurial class that will 
become increasingly sensitive to issues of transparency information and verifiability of data. 
Figure 3.2: Summary of the main legislative innovations introduced on equity crowdfunding from 2012 until today, 




Finally, equity crowdfunding has many similarities with an initial public offering (IPO), so it 
would be fair to see it as a first approach to the financial markets that, over time, can give life 
to one new generation of companies whose natural outlet is likely to be, firstly, admission to 
listing on smaller markets (dedicated for example to small and medium-sized enterprises, such 
as AIM Italia), and subsequently listing on regulated markets major (such as the MTA of the 
Italian Stock Exchange or equivalent foreign markets).  
Broadly speaking, Consob has the duty to regulate and monitor online platforms. As already 
stated, online platforms are the main tool through which early-stage ventures can reach the 
crowd and collect funds through ECF. Indeed, the governing of such portals is only allowed to 
those subjects which have been authorized by Consob and have registered with it, or in 
alternative subjects which are bank or financial investment companies previously authorized. 
For subjects authorized by Consob, registration in the appropriate register takes place following 
the positive confirmation of the existence of the required requisites, including, for example, the 
legal form of a corporation; the possession by the controlling shareholders of the required 
integrity requirements; the possession, by the persons who perform administration, 
management and control functions, of the required integrity and professionality requirements; 
the presentation of a report on the business activity and on the organization structure (Iosio and 
Valentinuz, 2016). In addition to this, Consob stated some specific provisions properly issued 
to manage ECF platforms. Indeed, the managers of online portals registered in the ordinary 
section of the Consob register, which enjoy a less binding discipline than traditional 
intermediaries, cannot hold sums of money pertaining to investors, and they cannot carry out 
financial advisory activities towards investors, just as they are not authorized to directly execute 
the orders for the subscription of the financial instruments offered on its portals, while they 
have to transmit them exclusively to banks or financial intermediation companies (Consob, 
2016).  
The rules proposed by the Italian legislator also aim at protecting investors, focusing on 
small and non-professional ones. Indeed, with the object of protecting retail investors and 
making them aware of the characteristics and risks of the proposed investments, the portal 
registered in the Consob register must provide a variety of information on both itself, as well 
as on the general characteristics of the investment in risk capital issued by innovative start-ups, 
and on individual offers. Broadly speaking, Consob (2016) requires that individuals are 
provided with proper information about the platform, risks of the investment in innovative start-
up, and individual offers. In particular, investors are expected to receive information regarding: 
❖ the portal: (i) by who the portal is managed, and the activities carried out by it; (ii) how 
the orders for the subscription of the financial instruments offered are processed; (iii) 
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transaction costs borne by investors; (iv) the measures prepared by the portal to manage 
the risks of fraud, conflicts of interest, complaints and the correct processing of personal 
data; (v) aggregated data on the offers carried out by the portal and the achieved results; 
(vi) the relevant legislation, the link to the register kept by Consob, to investor education 
section and to the special register section of companies dedicated to innovative start-
ups; (vii) sanctioning or precautionary measures that Consob has adopted against portal 
management; (viii) initiatives taken towards innovative start-ups in cases of non-
compliance with the portal’s operating rules. 
❖ the investment in an innovative start-up: (i) the risk of losing the entire capital invested; 
(ii) the peculiar illiquidity of the investment, thus the risk of not being able to quickly 
liquidate the investment; (iii) the lack of dividend distribution as long as the company 
is an innovative start-up; (iv) tax benefits as well as exemptions to company law and 
bankruptcy law; (v) the typical contents of a business plan; (vi) the right of withdrawal 
belonging to retail investors who can exercise it without any additional expense or 
reason within seven days from the date on online acceptance of the offer. 
❖ individual offers: (i) a “sheet” with all the information that Consob has listed and related 
updates; (ii) banks and investment firms to which orders for their execution will be 
transmitted; (iii) the current account of the innovative start-up where the collected sums 
will be deposited; (iv) the information and methods for exercising the right of 
withdrawal from the offer that the Consob regulation attributes to retail investors in 
cases where facts occur influencing the investment decision (new facts on the offer or 
changes in the information provided following an error); (v) information on the status 
of subscriptions to offers, also giving information on the methods publication and 
updating.  
In addition to this, before executing the investment, retail investors must read information 
belonging to the investor education section, fill an online questionnaire where they declare to 
be aware of information provided, declare to be economically able to sustain the whole 
investment in case of loss. Moreover, platforms cannot directly deal with funds raised, but 
rather they need to rely on a bank account or a financial intermediary, which in turns will 
register all the investors (Iosio and Valentinuz, 2016).  
Here below, Figure 3.3 shows the mechanism which is activated whenever an ECF 
transaction takes place. The scheme shows how both investors and security issuer rely on the 
activity of the bank in order to collect the money, even though the overall transaction is executed 
through the interface of the online platform. They also benefit from the activity of financial 
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consultants, which help in developing the best strategy. In this scenario, Consob works as a 












DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ABOUT ECF IN ITALY 
Following the regulation of ECF through the “Decreto Crescita”, such fundraising tool 
started to expand more and more, as an increasing number of SMEs started to implement it. By 
looking at the data available, it appears that from 2014 until now, the evolution and growth of 
ECF was almost exponential, both when considering new platforms creation, the number of 
campaigns and the amount collected. According to this exponential growth and adoption, the 
Politecnico of Milano started to publish every year a report named “Crowdinvesting 
Observatory”, with the aim of studying and highlighting the main trends and figures of the year 
for both equity and lending crowdfunding.  
As observed by several reports, 2020 is being a crucial year for the overall economy and for 
ECF campaigns as well. Indeed, Covid-19 effects are limiting the access to equity funds for 
both entrepreneurs and investors. The crisis the world is experiencing has generated upheavals 
in all short-term macroeconomic data, from industrial production to GDP, from government 
deficit to public debt, from productive investments to corporate margins. In this scenario, 
analysts expect medium-term repercussions linked to the survival of many companies, 
especially SMEs, which are going to face reduction of sales, supply difficulties and lack of 
liquidity (Politecnico Milano, 2020). However, Italian crowd-investing market reaches the 
overall value of the mobilized resources equal to €908 million, of which €159 million has been 
invested through equity crowdfunding, while the remaining part, €749 million,  through the 
lending portals (which can be even split between €410 million to individuals and €339 million 
Figure 3.3: Subjects involved in ECF transaction, own elaboration based on data provided by Consob, 2016. 
Figure 3.3: Subjects involved in ECF transaction, own elaboration based on data provided by Consob, 2016. 
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to businesses). The Politecnico (2020) reported that the contribution of the last 12 months 
concerning ECF was equal at €76.6 million, which represented a new historical record. Indeed, 
as shown in the report, until now there was not any substantially negative impact from the crisis 
in the crowd-investing market, which in turns has been re-evaluated as a source of “fast” 
liquidity for businesses, with respect to the slowness of public bureaucracy and of the banking 
sector. Even the website Crowdfunding Buzz32 shows the increase in ECF campaigns. The 
figures here below aim at describing the main trends, by looking at successfully closed 
campaigns, the amount collected in euro, the average amount collected as well as the average 
investors that took part in the fundraising.  
 
 
By looking at Figures 3.4 and 3.5, it appears how, starting from 2014, ECF phenomenon is 
expanding and becoming more and more adopted by companies. The number of successfully 
closed campaigns shows a positive trend, even though there is a deceleration experienced in 
2020. Indeed, in 2019 there have been 140 successfully closed campaigns, while in 2020 they 
were 114. However, this slowdown has lower impact on the amount collected in the campaigns, 
which shows an increasing trend as well, with a lower stop in 2020. In this way, the amount 
collected in 2019 was € 65.711 thousand, while in 2020 € 65.202 thousand, implying that the 
lower number of successful campaigns collected a higher average amount of funds. Moreover, 
this mechanism is shown in Figure 3.6, which describes how the average amount collected per 
each project was the highest in 2020, compared with the previous years from 2014. Indeed, 
such an average amount was equal to € 572 thousand in 2020, while it was equal to € 469 
thousand in 2019. It is also interesting to highlight investors participation’s trend though the 
last years (Figure 3.7). In 2019, there was the highest average participation, while in 2020 the 
number of participating investors has reduced. Also, the participation trend shows a positive 
increase, in compliance with the overall ECF recent expansion following the application of a 
centralized regulation. 
 
Figure 3.4: Successfully closed ECF campaigns in Italy, 
Crowdfunding Buzz, 2020. 
Figure 3.5: Successfully closed ECF campaigns in Italy per 
euro collected, Crowdfunding Buzz, 2020. 
Figure 3.4: Successfully closed ECF campaigns in Italy, 




Crowdfunding Buzz also provides a graph which shows the trends in amount in euro 
collected and successfully financed start-ups by dividing the results by quarters, thus leading to 
a clearer picture of such trends. By looking at Figure 3.8, the red columns describe the amount 
collected in thousands of euro, while the blue points show the number of companies financed 
through ECF. By studying the figure, it appears how the ECF Italian market experienced a huge 
expansion starting from the first three months in 2019, which lasted until the first quarter in 
2020. After this, the market shows a heavy slowdown, most probably due to the impacts of 












Authorized platforms in Italy  
As of June 30, 2020, in Italy there were 42 authorized platforms of equity crowdfunding, 7 
more than the last year, 2019. Among those authorized, 40 platforms were enrolled in the 
ordinary section of Consob register; while only 2 were currently inactive, which were 
Unicaseed.it and Tifosy.com, and were registered in the special section. The number of active 
platforms in Italy is still one of the highest within the European environment. Moreover, in the 
last 12 months, 9 new authorization have arrived, namely they are Crowdkasse.it, 
Figure 3.6: Successfully closed campaigns per average 
amount collected in Italy, Crowdfunding Buzz, 2020. 
Figure 3.7: Successfully closed campaigns per average 
amount of investors in Italy, Crowdfunding Buzz, 2020. 
Figure 3.8: ECF quarterly trend in Italy, Crowdfunding Buzz, 2020. Figure 3.8: ECF quarterly tre d in Italy, Crowdfu ding Buzz, 2020. 
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Crewfunding.it, Mybestinvest.it, Hensoo.it, Capital4solutions.com, Ecrowdengineering.com, 
Fundyourjump.eu, Activant.eu, Pariterequity.com, while the authorization for Crowd4capital.it 
and Italyfunding.com was deleted (Politecnico Milano, 2020). Moreover, the Italian panorama 
benefits from the activity of the Associazione Italiana Equity Crowdfunding (AIEC), that works 
as the exponential representative body of ECF platforms. In this scenario, it appears how many 
of the platforms are taking advantage of the new opportunities provided by the new legislation 
and the possibility given to place minibond debt securities. Fundera was the first platform to 
place minibond offers. Indeed, as of 30 June 2020, there were placed 4 securities for € 1.6 
million with annual rates between 4% and 4.50% and 2 more other placements were in progress.  
In addition, there are several positioning strategies that platforms can adopt in their 
fundraisings. Firstly, there is a cluster of portals that decided to verticalize specific sectors, 
which are for example, real estate, life sciences, energy, impact finance. A second tool is related 
to the target of investors. Indeed, almost all of the platforms are opened to the overall public of 
investors, giving the opportunity for each potential investor to observe and evaluate all 
information provided on individual campaigns. On the other hand, there are platforms, such as 
Clubdealonline.com, which follow the “club deal” model, so giving the opportunity to evaluate 
projects and companies only to a selected group of investors (mostly high net worth individuals, 
family office and institutional), who pay annual entrance fees. Moreover, there is an 
intermediate model, adopted by Doorway, according to which the open campaigns are visible 
to everyone, but only selected investors can obtain details in terms of business plan, collection 
target and evaluation (Politecnico Milano, 2020). Figure 3.9 shows the number of campaigns 
published in the mostly used platforms, describing the cumulated campaigns and the one 
executed in the last 12 months. The most active campaigns overall appear to be CrowdFundMe 


















In addition, the following figure shows the collected amount per online platforms. In this 
perspective, the most successful platforms during the last 12 months have been CrowdFundMe, 













In conclusion to this chapter about descriptive statistics in the Italian scenario, it is interesting 
to point out the impact that the pre-money valuation has on the target amount of the activity 
and how the sources collected are then going to be exploited in the operating activities of the 
company. By looking at the pre-money valuation, it appears that for most of the start-ups it 
results for a value lower than € 1 million. This is in line with the assumption that ECF is mostly 
adopted by start-ups and innovative SMEs, which consequently face lack of liquidity and 
working capital, and thus need the fundraising in order to implement their operating activities 
Figure 3.9: Number of campaigns published by authorized equity crowdfunding portals in Italy, as at 30 
June 2020: total cumulative value and flow of the last 12 months, Politecnico Milano, 2020. 
 
Figure 3.10: Capital raised until 30/6/2020 from Italian equity crowdfunding platforms authorized by 




and their strategy. However, ECF may also be implemented by more mature companies which 
in turns need to collect liquidity in order to develop an innovative product, or perhaps to re-
brand their positioning. Figure 3.11 shows the pre-money valuation for companies during the 
year 2020, while Figure 3.12 shows the pre-money valuation trend, both in the years starting 
from 2014, and in the case of the last year, 2019. During the recent years, the trend appears 
fairly stable, with the majority of companies showing a pre-money valuation lower than € 1 
million and between a value of € 1 million and € 5 million. As shown by Crowdfunding Buzz 
(2020), the higher the pre-money valuation, the higher the target amount which can be 
potentially collected by the company. In this way, the last graph in Figure 3.12 shows how the 
last year valuations included a lower percentage of companies valued below € 1 million while 





















Figure 3.11: Relationship between collection and evaluation of the financed companies, Crowdfunding Buzz, 2020. 
 
Figure 3.12: Pre-money value attributed to businesses protagonists at the first equity campaign crowdfunding on 
portals authorized by Consob until 30/6/2020. Vehicles are excluded of investment and the real estate campaigns, 




Finally, Figure 3.13 shows investment typologies financed through equity raising. The most 
frequent investment appears to be toward marketing activities, 49%; 30% of the cases there was 
the objective of financing the creation of an online IT platform or the release of an app; 27% of 
the funds are mostly directed to R&D expenditures as well as investment toward tangible assets 
and raw material acquisition; while 23% of business plan were intended to invest in new human 
resources. In the 16% of the cases the forecasted achievements were not specifically stated in 
the business plan, and this phenomenon showed an increasing trend during the last 12 months 















Post-campaign results  
For what concerns post-campaign results, Politecnico of Milano (2020) reported some trends 
experienced by 547 companies which participated in ECF campaigns during 2020. Among 360 
firms which succeeded in the first round, 30 of them have been able to collect further funds in 
another equity campaign, by employing a different online portal and starting the new 
fundraising with higher valuation multiples. Moreover, it has been analyzing ECF impact on 
firms’ balance sheets, by considering data on revenues, EBITDA and profit.  
Figure 3.13: Investment objectives cited by companies’ protagonists of an equity campaign crowdfunding 


















Figure 3.14 describes revenue trends following the closing of the campaign. Year 0 refers to 
the year in which the fundraising closed. By looking at the figure, the scenario appears to be 
divided in two main situations: year 1 in which revenues are fairly stable and do not present 
any increase; on the opposite there are situations in which year 1 experienced a huge increase 
in revenues. Broadly speaking, companies with revenues almost equal to 0 went from 11% to 
6% in the Year 1, which may be due to positive effects generated by the ECF campaign.  
Figure 3.15 focuses on Earnings Before Interests, Tax, Depreciation, Amortization 
(EBITDA). Even in this case, the situation appears split in two main scenarios: one scenario in 
which companies increase their EBITDA, and an opposite one in which EBITDA remains of a 
low amount as a consequence of high expenses which basically set aside revenues generated. 
Figure 3.14: Evolution of revenues from turnover for 54 companies’ industrialists who have raised through 


















The last figure shows the trend regarding profit generation after the ECF campaign. In this 
case it is observed that even the number of profitable companies does not change (18) in the 
year before campaign (Year -1) and year after (Year 1), probably due to significant investments 














Figure 3.15: Evolution of EBITDA for 54 companies’ industrialists who have raised through equity 
crowdfunding since 2014 to 2017. Year 0 is that of the campaign, Politecnico Milano, 2020. 
 
Figure 3.16: Evolution of profits for 54 companies’ industrialists who have raised through equity 




CHAPTER IV - POST-CAMPAIGN RESULTS: ANALYSIS ON CASE STUDIES 
The final chapter of the thesis aims at offering an analysis of post-campaign outcomes. It 
focuses on the current financial situation of companies which undertook fundraising through 
ECF campaigns during the year 2017. The analysis takes into consideration companies which 
successfully collected equity in 2017 in order to be able to draw a significant picture of the post-
campaign results, taking into consideration the main economic variables in the two years 
following the closing of the campaign. Moreover, the analysis proposed will include a 
comparison of current financial statements with the business plan objectives described during 
the campaign development, aiming at verifying the existence of eventual incongruences with 
such disclosure.  
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
The proposed analysis has been structured in three main steps. Since the analysis was 
engaged for studying ECF in the Italian economic environment, Consob authorized platforms 
have been taken into consideration. Thereafter, only those which were actively operating by the 
end of 2017 have been examined. Indeed, 2017 has been chosen as the last period available for 
the analysis in order to be able to collect financial data for at least two years following the 
closing of the ECF campaign, considering that at the time of the writing of this essay it has been 
possible to study companies’ financial statements until the end of 2019.  
Following the research, data on active platforms have been collected and reorganized in a 
list, which lead to focus on those platforms which contained successfully closed campaigns, i.e. 
those campaigns which have been able to obtain at least the minimum target amount declared 
at the beginning of the campaign and that successfully completed the capital increase. As 
regarding such campaigns, it have been identified 52 successfully closed fundraising, engaged 
by 50 companies. Indeed, “DropTO Srl” and “Nano Srl” companies ended up closing two 
campaigns in the same year 2017, relying on the platform Opstart.it for both the rounds. 
Thereafter, the data collected thanks to such previous research have been organized in an excel 
sheet, thus creating a list containing the successful fundraisings closed during the selected 
period. Afterwards, each single campaign has been implemented with more detailed 
information, which have been searched by looking through the respective ECF platforms. In 
the end, data collected have been organized in a further excel sheet, which contained all 
available information useful for the preliminary step of the research described in this essay. By 
looking deeper in detail, such information include data on: (i) legal information on the company, 
such as business name and industry; (ii) the trimester in 2017 in which the campaign was 
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running; (iii) the portal which hosted the campaign; (iv) parameters of the fundraising, such as 
minimum and maximum amount and percentage of equity offered; (v) the final amount 
collected; (vi) the company pre-money valuation and, where available, the class of shares 
offered. 
Following, the second step of the analysis included the development of a research on the 
documentation provided by start-ups when starting the fundraising campaign through the online 
platforms. This documentation included information potentially needed to investors in order to 
establish the value of the start-up and decide whether to invest in it or not, and it is basically 
summarized in the business plan. As described in the first chapter of this essay, campaign 
founders are required to provide preliminary information which potentially enable investors to 
properly evaluate start-up value and related risks, and consequently the online platform has the 
duty to make such documentation public and easily available in the web page of the ECF 
campaign. Among documents provided by entrepreneurs there is legal information about the 
capital increase, the by-law, the chamber view as well as the business plan. Nonetheless, since 
the time the campaign closed, entrepreneurs are no longer required to keep such documents 
publicly available in the web page of the campaign. For this reason, not all the preliminary 
information and business plan could be taken into consideration at the time of the writing of 
this thesis. Furthermore, as there is absence of a mandatory structure according to which present 
preliminary financial and strategic documents as well as business plans, not all the 
documentation provided through the platforms presented the same parameters. For this reason, 
the analysis on financial data has been developed taking into consideration two of the most 
available performance indicators, which are Revenues and EBITDA. 
The final step of the analysis included the collection of financial and economic performance 
of companies which closed a successful campaign in 2017. Collection of data has been realized 
through online data center Aida.33 In order to have a broad picture of companies’ performances, 
it has been downloaded data from 2018 and 2019. Afterwards, such data have been collected in 
the excel sheet and commented. Lastly, all the figures relative to the main selected KPIs have 
been extrapolated from the companies’ financials and some descriptive graphs and tables have 
been elaborated.   
 
THE SAMPLE 
Year 2017 was confirmed as the turning point for equity crowdfunding in Italy: as 
anticipated in the first paragraph, in the 12 months, 50 companies, of which 41 innovative 
startups, 8 SMEs and 1 UCITS, were financed on the platforms. Total deposits were almost 12 
million euros (11.75) thanks to 3.240 investors (Crowdfunding Buzz, 2018). As disclosed by 
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Crowdfunding Buzz (2018), in 2016 there were 19 financed companies for a total amount of 
4.36 million euros and with the participation of 750 investors. Fundraising in 2017 raised an 
average value of € 235.000 per campaign, against an initial average target of € 125.000, 
therefore almost the double of what companies were expecting at the launch of their round. The 
crowd contributed more and more to this result: indeed, investors per campaign in 2017 were 
65 against 39 in the previous year, although, as a natural consequence, their average investment 
was more limited (€ 3.600 against € 5.800 in 2016).  
As shown in Table 4.1, active platforms in 2017 were 22, while the ones which hosted a 
successfully closed campaign were 10 (highlighted in orange in the table), including: Starsup.it, 
200crowd.com, Crowdfundme.it, Muumlab.com, Mamacrowd.com, Wearestarting.it, 
Backtowork24.com, Opstart.it, Cofyp.com, Walliance.eu. At the time of this essay, two of the 
listed portals are no longer active. They appear highlighted in yellow in Table 4.1, and are 
Crowd4capital.it and Italyfunding.com (Politecnico Milano, 2018). The remaining platforms 
are still operating in the alternative finance market and running ECF campaigns. Moreover, in 
2017 there have been 80 projects, 50 of them were successfully closed, while the remaining 30 

















By looking at Figure 4.1, it appears clearly that 2017 has been the most active year in terms 
of ECF campaigns successfully closed. For this reason, this final chapter of the essay is going 
to focus on successful ECF campaigns solely closed during 2017, which ended up being 52 
Table 4.1: Platforms authorized by Consob in Italy in 2017, own elaboration based on data provided 
by Politecnico Milano, 2018. 
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including 50 different start-ups, which are more than double with respect to the successful 
campaigns closed in 2016. This represents an even further confirmation of what previously 
stated, as regarding the exponential growth which ECF adoption is experiencing in Italy. By 
looking at the success rate, it shows a positive trend which started its consolidation from the 













In conclusion, the sample analyzed in this chapter includes the companies which carried out 
the 52 positively ECF campaigns closed in 2017. They have been briefly described in order to 
better understand their main business and industry, as follows:  
1. WeBeers Srl 
It is an innovative start-up founded in Milan in 2015 with the aim of creating a virtual 
meeting point where artisanal-beer lovers could find and buy best beers thanks to a 
subscription model which led to tailored purchases. The 2017 fundraising through 
200Crowd.com hit the target amount equal to € 250.000 provided by 20 investors, in 
exchange for 25,00% of company equity. 
2. Diamass Srl 
Diamass is an innovative project developed by Sensor Health Srl inventors, which tried to 
obtain a tool able to help people who suffer from glycemia. Diamass is a patch (plaster) 
equipped with micro-needles that continuously measures the blood glucose of people with 
diabetes by sending real-time data to an external support. In 2017, the campaign was hosted 
by Crowdfundme.it and hit its maximum target amount, collecting € 250.000 (2,00% of 
equity) provided by 85 investors. 
3. FruitAma Srl 
It is a project belonging to Dreama Srl, founded through the platform Opstart.it. Dreama Srl 
is a young company headquartered in Bergamo specialized in the production of jams and 
marmalades in tubes, known and marketed under the FruitAma brand. The target amount of 
the campaign closed in 2017, was of € 148.000 in exchange of shares with vote right, 
representing 21,14% of company equity. 
4. FightEatClub Srl 
The main goal of this start-up, belonging to Borass Srl, is providing culinary challenges 
online, among amateur cooks, thus creating a sort of web talent. Moreover, the start-up 
creates digital video through which sponsors can promote their products. It raised through 
Opstart.it, in 2017, € 53.000 with a minimum target request of € 50.000. Thanks to the 
campaign, the company gave away 9,09% of its equity. 




5. Green Koala Srl 
GK Srl is a start-up operating in the food industry, focusing on the home-delivery of Heatly 
and Bio food through its online restaurant. The campaign, hosted by Opstart.it, raised € 
115.000, with a minimum target amount of € 100.000, in exchange for 10,53% of company 
equity. Investors taking part in the fundraising were 13.  
6. Mak Capital Not found. 
7. Verso Srl 
Verso Srl is an innovative start-up born in 2017 and specialized in the development of the 
latest generation of interactive systems. Its developers produced a ring-device which helps 
interacting with smartphones and computers. The campaign of 2017 on Mamacrowd.com 
closed at € 160.910, raised from 115 backers for a 9,09% of the start-up's equity. 
8. DropTO Srl 
DropTo Srl is a start-up operating in IT and digital technologies, which aims at developing 
a social network and an app mobile provided with Augmented Reality. DropTo app leads to 
create multimedia files such as short movies, and digitally share them in the place where 
they were created. DropTo owners ran two campaigns in 2017, both successfully closed and 
hosted by Opstart.it. The total amount collected was € 250.000, in exchange for 9,09% of 
equity in the second round and 14,89% in the first one. 
9. FamilyNation Srl 
Family Nation is an innovative SME associated with the Nana Bianca digital incubator in 
Florence. It operates in the e-commerce sector, providing products for children and 
maternity selected according to quality, design and sustainability parameters. The campaign 
ran in Mamacrowd.com raised € 399.892 thanks to 53 backers, which received in exchange 
2,35% of company equity. 
10. Babaiola Srl 
It is an innovative start-up which offers a travel social platform mainly focused on LGBT 
community in Italy, helping them plan holidays and sharing experiences. The campaign hit 
the target collecting € 94.750 in exchange for 3,40% of equity. 71 investors took part in the 
fundraising, obtaining both series A and B shares.  
11. Qaplà Srl 
Qaplà.it is an online platform which enables e-commerce customers (both B2C and B2B) to 
keep monitoring the delivery phase of their products. Indeed, the start-up leads to monitor 
more than 52 delivery carriers, enabling its clients to save both money and time when trying 
to contact the express-delivery companies. In 2017, it raised € 151.741 through 
Mamacrowd.com platform and thanks to 50 backers. The minimum target amount requested 
was € 45.000 in exchange for 2,66% of equity. 
12. The Digital Box 
Spa 
Founded in 2013, the main goal of this start-up was changing Digital Marketing in an 
innovative way, thanks to ADA online platform, which hosted Artificial Intelligence 
devices. The company relies on a distribution model which uses re-sellers. The campaign in 
2017 raised € 824.103 (2,33% of equity), provided by 164 investors.  
13. Revoluce Srl 
The idea was born within the innovative start-up Stantup Srl, led by a group of young people 
from Campania, with the aim of revolutionizing the energy market by launching innovative 
products and services with very high technological value. The main innovation stands in the 
way energy is paid for: in a rechargeable manner, as in the case of the purchase of telephone 
credit. The campaign in 2017, hosted by Muumlab.com, hit the target amount of € 50.000, 
sustained by 43 investors who received 4,00% of company equity. 
14. Biogenera Spa 
The main challenge of Biogenera Spa was to develop a new era of personalized DNA drugs 
and the specific drug for baby tumors. The start-up was founded in Bologna in 2008. The 
fundraising through 200crowd.com collected € 381.000 thanks to 87 investors who received 
1,17% of equity. 
15. Cubepit Srl 
It is an innovative start-up, part of Seri Spa, which relies on the implementation of 3D 
printing. The passion and in-depth study of the two founders in the 3D printing sector led to 
the creation of the first platform for the secure distribution of 3D model printing licenses. 
The ECF campaign carried out by 200crowd.com raised €75.500 and experienced the 
participation of 28 investors which received 10,00% of company equity. 
16. Ermes Cyber 
Security Srl 
Ermes Cyber Security is an innovative startup and spin-off of the Politecnico di Torino born 
in April 2017. The start-up operates in the IT and digital technologies industry sector. In 
2017, it collected € 249.950 through an ECF campaign held by Mamacrowd.com. 21 
investors took part in the campaign, receiving 8,33% of company equity in exchange for the 
liquidity injections.  
17. Green Energy Srl 
Green Energy Storage Srl is an innovative start-up born in 2015, which obtained an 
exclusive agreement for Europe with Harvard University. The main focus of the start-up is 
providing green energy by implementing new advanced technologies. In 2017, it raised € 
1.000.000 through Mamacrowd.com, and saw the participation of 290 investors which 
received 2,70% of company equity. 
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18. Yocabè Srl 
Yocabè Srl is the first online and global distributor for fashion brands, with a particular 
focus on medium-sized brands, which form the backbone of the fashion system 
internationally. It raised € 132.499 in 2017, through an ECF campaign hosted by 
Mamacrowd.com and backed by 2 investors, which obtained 7,79% of company equity. 
19. Orwell Srl 
Orwell Srl is an innovative start-up which operates in the digital technology industry sector. 
The main goal of Orwell Srl stands in the development, production and marketing of Virtual 
Reality and Mixed Reality applications, created through highly innovative software and 3D 
simulations in terms of user experience. Thanks to an ECF campaign in 2017, the company 
collected € 200.000 through the platform Opstart.it, in exchange for 10,50% of company 
equity. 
20. Smiling Srl 
Smiling Srl is an online platform which leads clients to create and distribute advertising 
videos, on news, information, sports, news, entertainment, fashion, travel, cooking, etc. In 
2017 it carried out an ECF campaign through Backtowork24.com online platform, and 
collected €103.500 involving 11 backers, which obtained 2,50% of company equity. 
21. Taskhunters Srl 
It is an innovative start-up company and it is the leading platform in Europe that allows 
university students to carry out temporary jobs (tasks) for individuals and companies, in 
compliance with the laws and regulations on labor law. Through the ECF campaign hosted 
by Crowdfundme.it, the start-up obtained € 200.000 provided by 105 investors. Backers 
received 5,40% of equity in terms of both series A and series B shares.  
22. LittleSea Srl 
LittleSea is an innovative SME that has developed Babelee: a technology - for which an 
international patent application has been filed - unique in the world, capable of generating 
automatic videos starting from unstructured data present in company databases. This means 
that any company can generate a video for their internal or external communication. It raised 
€ 84.000 in exchange for 2,87% of equity, through an ECF campaign executed by the 
platform Wearestarting.it. 
23. Nano Srl 
Nano Srl conducted two ECF campaigns in 2017, both of which received huge success and 
positive response from investors. Nano Srl has as object the design, production and marketing 
of innovative drinks obtained through a high-level technological process. Its offer is 
characterized by a product line called Diferente, that offers alcohol-free drinks, able to 
generate the same taste as alcoholic beverages. Both the two ECF campaigns were managed 
through Opstart.it, while the first one obtained € 137.500, the second one collected € 252.800, 
in exchange of respectively 12,66% and 13,00% of company equity. 
24. Glass to Power 
Srl 
Glass to Power (G2P) G2P is a spin-off of the University of Milan Bicocca that produces 
transparent photovoltaic windows, which is a patented innovation that basically ensures that 
the windows themselves produce energy. In 2017 the company organized an ECF campaign 
through the platform Crowdfundme.it, that raised € 183.750 in exchange for 10,90% of 
company equity and involving 54 backers. 
25. Paladin True Srl 
Paladin True Srl is an innovative start-up which leads its clients to rent products and objects 
through an online platform. Moreover, they can receive the product rented directly at home 
or wherever they established it. Through the ECF campaign sustained in Crowdfundme.it, 
the start-up raised € 95.456 thanks to 60 investors, which received in exchange 4,80% of 
company equity. 
26. Crowdfundme Spa 
In 2017, the online platform successfully closed an ECF campaign in order to increase its 
corporate equity. The minimum target amount requested was of € 150.000, while it 
experienced an overfunding raising an amount of € 278.345 provided by 122 investors 
(5,70% of company equity). 
27. FindMyLost Srl 
FindMyLost operates in digital technologies, and more in detail, it is the first Lost & Found 
social to find your lost objects wherever you are, 24/7. In 2017, the start-up sustained an ECF 
campaign through the platform 200crowd.it, where it raised € 153.000 rather than the € 
100.000 established as a minimum amount. The campaign experienced the participation of 
30 investors, which in exchange for their capital received 6,00% of company equity. 
28. TakeOff Srl 
Take Off mainly aims at acting as the only interlocutor for the creation of start-ups through 
an integrated multidisciplinary approach, aiming at sustaining start-ups through a path of 
growth, thus guaranteeing them a greater probability of success. Through Starsup.it, in 2017 
it hit the target amount raising € 504.500, in exchange for 98,00% of equity. The ECF 
campaign saw the participation of 13 investors. 
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29. Alea Srl 
Alea Srl is a company founded in Polcenigo in 1995 and registered as an Innovative SME by 
February 2017. It mainly deals with the development of software and iOS / Android 
applications; its main software is the Push to Talk system marketed under the Talkway brand. 
Through the successfully closed ECF campaign hosted by the platform Crowdfundme.it, 
Alea Srl raised € 390.950. 87 investors took part in the campaign and received 2,90% of 
company equity in exchange for their liquidity injections. 
30. BorsinoRifiuti Srl 
Borsino Rifiuti is an innovative start-up and, more particularly, it is an authorized waste 
management intermediary. On the website and in the physical points of Borsino Point, 
individuals and companies can transfer their waste to authorized Concessionaires & 
Environmental Managers. It raised € 192.370 through the platform Crowdfundme.it, which 
saw the participation of 142 investors who received in exchange 6,30% of equity. 
31. Bloovery Srl 
Bloovery is an innovative start-up described as the first digital flower and plant wholesaler. 
It executed home-delivery for flowers ordered through the app. It raised € 64.850 in 2017, 
thanks to the ECF campaign hosted by Crowdfundme.it in which 8,50% of equity has been 
exchanged for the capital of 31 investors. 
32. Graphene XT Srl 
Graphene XT is an innovative start-up based in Bologna, which aims at employing graphene 
in order to revolutionize industry and everyday life. Its owners rely on a patented technology 
which allows to transform graphene into the desired product. Thanks to Mamacrowd.com, 
the company raised € 530.000, a much larger amount than the minimum target requested of 
€ 80.000, showing a complete overfunding. The ECF campaign saw the participation of 153 
investors, which received 2,88% of company equity. 
33. Yakkyo Srl 
Yakkyo Srl operates in e-commerce. In particular, it provides the opportunity for individual 
clients to purchase Chinese products directly from Chinese suppliers, thanks to the 
intermediation of its online platform. Indeed, the start-up allows customers to buy wholesale 
products from China with one click, including certified products at factory prices delivered 
directly to clients' homes. The ECF campaign hosted by Mamacrowd.com raised € 260.116 
through the participation of 46 investors and the exchange of 4,00% of company equity. 
34. Hymy Group Srl 
HYMY manufactures 100% Made Italy modular bags. The bags created by designer Stefano 
Galandrini are built by composing and interchanging the different parts that form the external 
and internal structure. In 2017, the company conducted an ECF campaign through the 
platform Cofyp.com, raising € 213.750 in exchange for 47,50% of company equity. The 
investors taking part in the campaign were 8. 
35. Winelivery Srl 
Winelivery Srl is an innovative start-up which operates in the food and beverage sector. It 
offers home-delivery services for alcoholic drinks and wine, focusing on the speed of the 
delivery. The ECF company hosted by Crowdfundme.it raised € 150.000, much more than 
the minimum target requested of € 50.000. 143 backers took part in the campaign, receiving 
in exchange 11,11% of company equity. 
36. AmbiensVR Srl 
Ambiens VR Srl is an innovative start-up which offers innovative products thanks to the 
adoption of Virtual Reality (VR) systems. The start-up is the virtual reality portal for 
architecture dedicated to real estate professionals. The main goal is revolutionizing project 
communication, offering a unique, immersive and interactive perspective in virtual 
environments, by adopting devices such as the smartphone. The ECF campaign successfully 
closed in Mamacrowd.com obtained € 224.758 from 28 investors. The percentage of equity 
exchanged was 12,16%. 
37. Raft Srl 
Raft Srl is an innovative start-up offered by a young team of owners which wanted to give 
the possibility to many amateur sportsmen (especially tennis players) to feel like real 
professionals, providing them with the web and mobile platform www.raftennis.com, a tool 
through which to participate and / or organize tennis tournaments on the model of ATP 
professionals and WTA. The company raised € 45.000 through the ECF campaign in 
Opstart.it, giving away 30,00% of company equity. 
38. Keisdata Srl 
Keisdata is a company based in Lombardia and founded in 1994, with a consolidated 
experience in the Risk Management and Knowledge Management sector. The company has 
developed a software, called KRC-solution. The main goal of the company is reducing 
operating risk through the implementation of the software. It raised € 210.000, the double of 
the minimum target requested, through an ECF campaign held by Backtowork24 in 2017, 
including 8 investors who received 2,00% of company equity. 
39. Parterre Srl 
Parterre is a platform based on smartphone applications that collect data from the public 
using a mix of entertainment and information derived from social networks. The particular 
feature of the project is the collection of precise data that can be analyzed in real time, thanks 
to the specific structure of the voting data. In 2017, the start-up collected € 100.000, hitting 
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the minimum target requested for its ECF campaign through Mamacrowd.com, involving 68 
investors and giving away 7,55% of company equity. 
40. Cynny Spa 
The innovative start-up has the main goal of producing, also on behalf of third parties, and 
selling software applications, websites and web services of any type. Moreover, it provides 
professional assistance in the case og big data management. In 2017 it increased its equity 
through an ECF campaign, collecting € 341.824 in exchange for 0,10% of its equity. The 
campaign, held by Crowdfundme.it platform, saw the participation of 192 investors. 
41. Oreegano Srl 
Oreegano Srl is an innovative start-up which offers an online community where users can 
find and share healthy and bio receipts. It raised € 140.250 from 76 investors, which obtained 
6,40% of company equity. The ECF campaign was held by the platform Crowdfundme.it. 
42. Scuter Srl 
Scuter Srl is an innovative start-up which offers Scuter, namely an intelligent vehicle thought 
to be shared in order to make more comfortable urban mobility. Scuter relates to a 
technological device. In 2017, the start-up raised € 240.663 from 49 investors through the 
ECF platform Mamacrowd.com. The new shareholders obtained 5,26% of company equity. 
43. Felfil Srl 
Founded in 2015, Felfil Srl is an innovative start-up which focuses on 3D printing. Its main 
product consists in Felfil Evo, a plastic extruder capable of producing the 3D printable 
filament from cheap industrial pellets or by recycling plastic materials. In 2017 Felfil started 
an ECF campaign in Mamacrowd.com, which successfully raised € 100.000 from 52 
investors. Thanks to the campaign, the start-up gave away 6,94% of its equity. 
44. Luche Srl 
Not found. 
45. HK Srl 
Horticultural Knowledge Srl started an ECF campaign in 2017 in order to inject liquidity in 
its start-up PerFrutto. PerFrutto is an integrated system capable of predicting the quantity of 
fruit at harvest and the number of fruits for each size class well in advance and accurately. 
The campaign hosted by Mamacrowd.com collected € 266.550, provided by 36 investors 
which obtained 8,05% of company equity in exchange.  
46. Sharewood Srl 
The start-up Sharewood Srl offers an online platform which helps its clients to find the most 
suitable experience for them, including renting and travelling. It is based on the idea of 
sharing economy, which includes sharing of experiences as well as of objects, such as 
bicycles. The start-up increased its capital by € 247.255 thanks to an ECF campaign through 
the platform Crowdfundme.it. 176 investors took part in it, receiving 2,40% of company 
equity. 
47. SkyMeeting Spa 
SkyMeeting Spa is the owner company of the innovative start-up SkyAccounting, operating 
in the IT and digital sector. The start-up provides for cloud billing and accounting software 
for accountants, companies and VAT numbers. It successfully closed an ECF campaign in 
2017, where it took part 21 investors. It raised €159.000 in exchange for 6,50% of company 
equity. 
48. DiveCircle Srl 
DiveCircle is the first entirely dedicated OTA (Online Travel Agency) which entirely focuses 
on underwater world and correlated sports. Indeed, it provides experiences underwater with 
professional support. In 2017, it raised € 80.000 through the platform Backtowork24.com, in 
exchange for 7,85% of company equity. 
49. Safeway Helmets 
Srl 
The main product of this innovative start-up is the technological helmet, which is provided 
with light signals and technological tools that help the rider safety. The company raised € 
400.000 in 2017 through the ECF platform Starsup.it, giving away 31,39% of its equity 
shares. 41 investors took part in the fundraising.  
50. InfinityHub Spa 
InfinityHub is a managerial, financial and commercial accelerator of Cleantech companies, 
born in Trento. The start-up develops and markets services and products for families and 
businesses with high added value, focused on energy efficiency and the production of energy 
from renewable sources. The ECF campaign sustained in 2017 through the platform 
Wearestarting.it, raised € 105.000 in exchange for 9,09% of company equity. 
 
ECF CAMPAIGN OVERALL OUTCOMES IN 2017 
By looking at companies’ brief description provided above, it is possible to see that the 
sample includes companies operating in a variety of industries. Figure 4.2 aims at summarizing 
such information, showing the number of companies associated with each industry sector. By 
looking at the figure, it appears that there is basically a dominant industry sector relating to ECF 
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campaigns in 2017: IT and digital technologies. Indeed, it is the sector which included 18 
successfully closed campaigns. The second sector appears to be food and beverage, which 
perhaps includes the development of platforms or communities aiming at exchanging culinary 
experiences and selling food and drinks. In this scenario, the most exploited sub-sectors are 
wine and drinks, and bio and healthy food. Moreover, the two most exploited sectors cover 
themselves more than 50% of the total sample, underlying the digital nature of the market. 
However, start-ups normally operate in transversal markets. In this scenario, it appears that the 
most exploited reference market by start-ups which rely on ECF fundraising is the ICT one.  
Here below, Table 4.2 shows all the main parameters and outcomes regarding the 52 ECF 
fundraisings undertook in 2017. The companies sustaining these campaigns were 50, since, as 
it is possible to observe through the table, two start-ups undertook two successfully closed ECF 
campaigns during the same year. Such companies are underlined in bold, and specifically are 
DropTO, which concluded the first campaign in July and the second one in November 2017; 
and Nano Srl, which experienced its first success in January and one more in July 2017. 
Information and data contained in Table 4.2 have been obtained from the websites of the 
platforms through which the campaign have been completed. It happened for two companies, 
namely Mak Capital Srl and Luche Srl, that the campaign pages were not available anymore, 
as well as the company website, thus preventing from the collection of any information related 
to such campaigns. In the case where information was not available, the expression N.A. 
indicates that. Whenever possible, missing information on the ECF fundraising has been 
searched from the capital increase legal documents supplied by the company. 
Figure 4.2: Industry sector for successful campaigns, own elaboration based on data 
provided by online platforms. 
Table 4.2: Post-campaign outcomes, own elaboration based on data provided by online platforms. 
Figure 4.2: Industry sector for successful campaigns, own elaboration based on data provided by online platforms. 
79 
 
By focusing again on Table 4.2, it summarizes the main parameters and observable outcomes 
deriving from a successfully closed ECF campaign. The project which has been mostly funded 
appears to be Green Energy Srl, which raised € 1.000.000, with a pre-money valuation of € 
9.000.000, followed by The Digital Box Spa, which collected approximatively € 824.000, 
starting with a pre-money value of € 12.580.000. Both the campaigns were executed through 
the platform Mamacrowd.com. On the other hand, Raft Srl was the company which collected 
the lowest amount of money, € 45.000, and which showed one of the lowest pre-money 
valuations, equal to € 105.000. The average amount collected appears to be almost equal to € 
228.000, while the average target requested at the beginning of the campaigns resulted in € 
126.700. By looking at the trend of such average results, it appears that the average amount 
Table 4.2: Post-campaign outcomes, own elaboration based on data provided by online platforms. 
80 
 
collected remained fairly stable in the period from 2016 to 2017, going from a value of € 
237.000 to a value of € 228.000. In addition to this, the highest majority of companies belonging 
to the sample showed overfunding, with an average overfunding percentage of 203%. Among 
the sample, 17,31% of companies raised 100% of the minimum target requested, while 82,69% 
of the start-ups experienced overfunding, collecting more than 100% of the initially requested 
capital. The industry sectors which includes the majority of companies showing the highest 
percentages of overfunding are, once again, IT and digital technologies, followed by the energy 
sector. Indeed, Graphene XT Srl experienced 663% overfunding. It also appears the huge 
success of Family Nation Srl, a company operating in the e-commerce sector and which 
provides children and maternity clothes, which obtained 500% overfunding.  The calculus of 
overfunding is based on the figure minimum target. For what concerns the percentage of equity 
offering, it shows an average value of 10,80%. This value appears to be low on average, 
implying the willingness of start-up owners to keep control and vote rights over their 
businesses. The start-up which offered the highest percentage of equity was TakeOff Srl, which 
gave to its investors 98% of its equity. The number of investors has not always been available 
in platforms websites, however they range from a minimum participation of 2 investors (Yocabè 
Srl through Mamacrowd.com) to a maximum participation of 290 backers (Green Energy Srl 
through Mamacrowd.com, as well). For what concern the participation trend of investors, it 
increased by +160% from 2016 to 2017, providing further evidence of the huge expansion ECF 
is experiencing. 
Table 4.3 shows the trend of the average minimum target, the effective amount collected, 
overfunding percentage, % of equity offered, pre-money valuation, investors and minimum 
chip requested to take part in the campaign. In order to compute this trend, it have been 
considered also data deriving from campaigns closed in 2015 and 2016. By looking at different 
years, it appears how the average pre-money valuation of companies approaching ECF 
fundraising has been much higher in 2017, implying that such start-ups already had a positive 
valuation and perhaps were already creating positive value. Moreover, overfunding in 2017 has 
been much higher, showing an average value of 203%, almost the double than the overfunding 
average percentage in 2015, which was 107%. Higher percentages of overfunding may also 
work as marketing tools, as the perception of overfunded campaigns is much better among non-
professional investors. Indeed, in case of overfunding, such investors perceive high quality from 
such projects and thus they are more interested in investing.  
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For what concerns the average amount collected by each platform in 2017, it appears that 
Starsup.it has been the platform which received most of the funds, even though it sustained only 
three ECF campaigns. Indeed, the three campaigns sustained by Starsup.it collected an average 
amount equal to € 354.500. Following, we can find the platform Mamacrowd.com, with an 
average amount collected equal to € 320.922, which 14 campaigns. Mamacrowd.com has been 
the platform hosting the highest number of campaigns. Figure 4.4 shows the number of closed 
campaigns by each active platform in 2017. 
In order to have a broader picture, it is interesting to see how the platforms which on average 
raised the highest amount of capital are not the same which closed the highest number of 
successful campaigns. Indeed, as shown in Figure 4.4, Starsup.it only hosted 3 successful 
projects, while the second most successful platform in terms of number of campaigns closed 
has been Crowdfundme.it, which, on the other hand, collected on average € 200.000, 
positioning immediately after Cofyp.it, that hosted just one successful campaign. Moreover, by 
looking at Figure 4.4., it appears that the platform Backtowork24.com concluded only 4 
successful campaigns while Walliance.eu reports 1 successfully closed campaign. It is 
important to consider, though, that two of the firms which hit the target in 2017 through the 
above-mentioned platforms are now not active anymore, or at least there is absence of actual 
companies’ websites or information.  
 
Table 4.3: Average post-campaign outcomes in the period 2015-2017, own elaboration based on data provided by 
online platforms. 
Figure 4.3: Average amount raised per platform in 2017, own elaboration based on data provided 
by online platforms. 
Figure 4.4: Number of successfully closed campaigns per platform in 2017, own elaboration based 
on data provided by online platforms. 
Figure 4.3: Average amount raised per platform in 2017, own elaboration based on data provided 
by online platforms. 
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In addition, in order to consider a more comprehensive picture of the ECF phenomenon in 
2017, Figure 4.5 provides a representation of the successfully closed campaigns divided by 
trimester among 2017. By looking at the figure, it appears that the period which experienced 
the highest number of closed campaigns has been the last trimester, going from 01/10/2017 to 
31/12/2017, with 14 funded projects. On the other hand, the first period of the year was the one 
with the lowest amount of funded campaigns. 
In conclusion to this section, it appears that the platforms that have contributed most are 
Mamacrowd (€4.7 million), Crowdfundme (€ 2.6 million) and Opstart (€ 1.4 million), whose 
total collection in 2017 constitutes 75% of the market. Another 7 platforms each raised less 
than 1 million (200Crowd, Starsup, Walliance, Equinvest, Cofyp, WeAreStarting and 
MuumLab). It should also be noted that the first two platforms are also those that mostly 
involved the crowd, with a number of investors per campaign clearly above the market average 
(namely 81 investors for Mamacrowd.com and 101 investors for Crowdfundme.it, 
respectively). The only other platform that has performed better in this sense is Walliance.eu 
Figure 4.5: Number of successfully closed campaigns per trimester in 2017, own elaboration based 
on data provided by online platforms. 
Figure 4.4: Number of successfully closed campaigns per platform in 2017, own elaboration based on data provided by 
online platforms. 
Figure 4.5: Number of successfully closed campaigns per trimester in 2017, own elaboration based on data provided 
by online platforms. 
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(118 investors, moreover in the only campaign closed in 2017) which is also the only "vertical" 
platform dedicated to real estate. 
 
CASE STUDIES ANALYSIS: BUSINESS PLAN vs ACTUAL PERFORMANCE 
The remainder of this chapter focuses on the illustration of case studies, by studying start-
up profiles and business plans disclosed during the ECF campaign and comparing them with 
financial results actually generated during operating activities. Such comparison aimed at 
looking whether there were any discrepancies between what disclosed in the business plan and 
what companies have actually achieved. By starting from the initial sample described above, it 
has been taken into consideration each company for which both forecasted business plan and 
actual financial reports were available. Moreover, in order to make the results comparable, only 
companies that presented both 2018 and 2019 financial reports by the time of the writing of this 
essay have been considered. As previously anticipated, the main parameters observed in order 
to establish the success of performance and value creation trend of the companies are Revenues 
and EBITDA. Furthermore, for each company considered in this paragraph, a brief description 
has been provided, illustrating the main strategy at the basis of the company's activity, the  
market in which it operates and the KPIs on which it bases its competitive advantage, and the 
main performance forecasts described in the business plan. Besides, further research has been 
done by looking at start-up balance sheets. Afterwards, incidence of intangibles and tangibles 
over invested capital (IC) has been computed. Finally, it has been provided a qualitative 
description of the start-ups, by identifying the reference market and the business model. 
However, data available until now on the companies forming the sample are still too little, as 
well as the time period is too short, thus making the expectation of any statistically significant 
results too ambitious.  
FruitAma Srl 
Vision and strategy: FruitAma Srl (belonging to Dreama Srl) aims at producing, selling and 
marketing food-based or fruit. Indeed, the start-up’s range of products offered not only includes 
jams and marmalades, but also spreadable creams based on cocoa and hazelnuts, in order to 
increase market share. The main idea on which FruitAma is based relies on the easy portability 
of the product. Indeed, jams tubes are thought in order to be easily transported by clients, and 
of easy use. The portability and lightness of the product make it so appreciated by those who 
prefer the convenience and freshness of the tube over the jar.  
Market and competitive advantage: the competitive advantage sustained by FruitAma relies 
on quality of Italian ingredients, innovative packaging, anti-waste thanks to 100gr size, gluten-
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free, recyclable, since both the plastic cap and the aluminum tube make the product 100% 
recyclable. The market in which the start-up operates is showing huge expansion, as there is 
more and more attention for quality and healthiness of ingredients by customers. In 2015 in 
Italy such a market had a value of € 263,1 million, with about 44,6 million kg of product sold.  
Business Plan: by looking at the business plan provided in the intermediary platform, it 
appears that FruitAma shares its experience with companies such as Zuegg and Rigoni, both 
developed from a family-based idea. Revenues and sales projections are estimated starting from 
market data, which in 2017 showed for dietary and artisan jams a performance of +10,40% and 
+29% respectively. The main target market for FruitAma products are families, and more in 
detail those families composed by one or two members. Indeed, the company focuses on small 
sized products. In 2016 the majority of sales were realized through retail clients (80%), while 
in 2017 70% of sales were realized through wholesales, with minimal online sales (5%) and 
gross distribution (10%). Following the capital raising campaign, FruitAma Srl planned to 
increase its sales through gross distribution, reaching 25% of total sales, and to expand its 
market position, by starting commercial relations with foreign markets (20% of total sales in 
2018). In its business plan, the start-up proposed to invest in foreign expansion, new products 
offering and consolidation in the domestic market.  
Company Status     
FruitAma Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan n.a. 600.000 1.250.000 
Actual results n.a. 140.342 235.908 
Delta - -459.658 -1.014.092 
% of realization - 23% 19% 
% of variation - -77% -81% 
EBITDA 
Business plan n.a. 43.000 89.000 
Actual results n.a. -49.417 -244.099 
Delta - -92.417 -333.099 
% of realization   -115% -274% 
% of variation   -215% -374% 
Table 4.4: Business plan projections and actual results of FruitAma Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
.€ 2017 on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  n.a. n.a. 107.612 77% 88.342 37% 
Intangible assets  n.a. n.a. 5.762 4% 3.486 1% 
Financial assets  n.a.   0   0   
Fixed capital  n.a.   113.374   91.828   
Working capital n.a.   121.625   81.205   
Invested capital  n.a.   234.999   173.033   
Cash and similar n.a. n.a. 6.095 4% 1.350 1% 
Intangibles / IC  -  2%  2%   
Tangibles / IC -  46%  51%  
Table 4.5: Invested capital and cash and similars of FruitAma Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
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The company FuritAma Srl is still active. By looking at Table 4.4, it appears that it is not 
producing value as it aimed. Indeed, both revenues and EBITDA generation are lower than 
expected by the business plan projections, both during 2018 and 2019. Revenues showed an 
increasing trend from 2018 to 2019, but EBITDA generation did not follow such pattern. 
However, according to what was declared in the business plan, the company developed its 
website, where clients can directly purchase their products. Moreover, in 2018 the company 
participated in international food congresses, both in Singapore and in Chicago, following the 
internationalization plan forecasted. In addition to this, further resources have been invested in 
the implementation and improvement, as well as the promotion, of the ChocoAma product line. 
Thanks to such a product line, the company aimed at expanding its market share and increasing 
its product offering, by including spreadable creams. By starting from this data, it is reasonable 
to assume that the firm invested resources on geographical expansion as well as improvement 
in product offering. According to data collected and by looking at Table 4.5, it appears that 
intangibles assets investments remained fairly stable in the period 2018-2019, while tangibles 
over IC rate increased in the same period going from 46% to 51%.  
 
Verso Srl 
Vision and strategy: the start-up main goal is the creation of Verso ONE, a wearable device 
in the shape of a ring that allows people to interact in an accurate, realistic and natural way with 
smartphones, computers and other technological devices. In this way, Verso ONE is the first 
product which provides its clients new ways to interact with video games, music, sport, virtual 
reality, design and art, without writing a line of code.  
Market and competitive advantage: the business model implemented by Verso Srl is a blend 
between wearable products (technological devices which can be worn by people) and gesture 
controllers. Both the markets are experiencing a huge expansion. According to the business 
plan, the market sector in which Verso is operating is going to experience a +1500%. 
Business plan: the distribution takes place through the website and selected commercial 
partners, while post-purchase services are carried out directly by Verso Srl. The product offered 
by Verso is expected to build its competitive advantage by providing an easy-to-use product, 
which properly understands and follows human moves and communicates them to the devices. 
Moreover, the clients are looking for an efficient app through which to communicate with 
product developers. The product is thought to satisfy the target market, which is composed by 
musicians, video-gamers, professional designers, video-makers. The main competitors 
identified are those companies which produce wearable devices. According to the business plan 
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provided, the capital raised is going to be invested in human resources (25%), R&D (40%), 
marketing expenditures (30%), machinery (5%).   
Company Status     
Verso Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan 480.000 1.600.000 3.700.000 
Actual results 35.000 299 20.795 
Delta -445.000 -1.599.701 -3.679.205 
% of realization - 0% 1% 
% of variation - -100% -99% 
EBITDA 
Business plan 18.000 671.500 1.592.400 
Actual results 4.730 -58.201 -3.448 
Delta -13.270 -729.701 -1.595.848 
% of realization 26% -9% 0% 
% of variation -74% -109% -100% 




on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  0  0% 0 0% 816 4% 
Intangible assets  2.596  7% 31.151 10418% 54.580 262% 
Financial assets  0    0   0   
Fixed capital  2.596    31.151   55.396   
Working capital 11.264    16.032   22.676   
Invested capital  13.860    47.183   78.072   
Cash and similar 168.309  5% 75.267 25173% 27.459 132% 
Intangibles / IC  19%    66%   70%   
Tangibles / IC 0%    0%   1%   
Table 4.7: Invested capital and cash and similars of Verso Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
By looking at 2019 financial results, the start-up closed the year with a positive revenues 
value. However, revenues generation experienced a huge decrease the year after the ECF 
campaign (-99%), while during 2019 the company has been able to generate revenues equal to 
€ 20.795. According to the business plan projections, in such a year the firm already expected 
highly positive results deriving from operations, thus showing a percentage of realization equal 
to 1%.  Moreover, it showed an impressive negative EBITDA value in 2018, which is supposed 
to be due to huge investments in R&D resources destinated to improve its product immediately 
after the closing of the ECF campaign. Indeed, EBITDA value improved during 2019, although 
it was completely not in line with business plan projections yet (variation rate equal to -100%). 
By studying intangible assets at the balance sheet, they showed a huge increase from 2017 to 
2018 (representing almost 66% of IC). By looking at the firm's website and social network 
pages, it appears how the company has invested further resources in marketing and 
communication, in order to better reach target customers. In July 2020, the company started to 
promote a reward crowdfunding campaign, looking for users willing to try and promote the 
innovated products.  
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Family Nation Srl 
Vision and strategy: Family Nation operates in e-commerce and its main goal is to offer 
quality, Italian branded and eco-friendly clothes for both children and mother-to-be. It operates 
through B2C and B2B channels and is aiming at entering the Chinese market immediately 
following the capital raising campaign.  
Market and competitive advantage: FamilityNation.it had 23.000 registered clients (2017) 
which purchase online for an average value per order of €75. Moreover, the start-up based its 
competitive advantage on the adoption of technological tools to improve customer experience 
as well as customer care, and to make as easy as possible the utilization of the app in order to 
make purchases. In this way, it has developed an app for mobile devices which eases e-
commerce, without the necessity of using a computer. 
Business plan: according to its business plan, Family Nation Srl is expecting +120% growth 
in its revenues. The start-up relies on a lean warehouse business model, which leads to the 
reduction of warehouse costs while keeping a high level of efficiency in orders delivered. 
Moreover, the start-up is going to enhance the creation of a community of users, which not only 
share purchases but also experiences and ideas. This leads to the creation of a strong brand 
identity and therefore brand loyalty. The capital raised through the fundraising is going to be 
invested in marketing expenses, technological and R&D as well as in the expansion towards 
Chinese market.  
Company Status     
Family Nation Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan 2.055.000 4.570.000 6.000.000 
Actual results 2.196.029 3.181.793 4.248.143 
Delta 141.029 -1.388.207 -1.751.857 
% of realization 107% 70% 71% 
% of variation 7% -30% -29% 
EBITDA 
Business plan n.a 500.000 1.200.000 
Actual results 80.634 92.774 257.550 
Delta n.a. -407.226 -942.450 
% of realization - 19% 21% 
% of variation - -81% -79% 






€ 2017  on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  8.179 0% 12.061 0% 30.884 1% 
Intangible assets  280.138 13% 459.350 14% 586.403 14% 
Financial assets  0   0   0   
Fixed capital  288.317   471.411   617.287   
Working capital 362.352   650.124   1.040.178   
Invested capital  650.669   1.121.535   1.657.465   
Cash and similar 220.754 10% 256.075 8% 130.107 3% 
Intangibles / IC  43%   41%   35%   
Tangibles / IC 1%   1%   2%   
Table 4.9: Invested capital and cash and similars of Family Nation Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
Family Nation Srl is a still active company. By looking at the financial results, the company 
generated highly positive revenues both in 2018 and 2019. In those years, revenue value was 
equal to € 3 million and € 4 million, showing an increasing trend and a percentage of realization 
respectively equal to 70% and 71%. The same happened for EBITDA, which was equal to € 
92.774 in 2018 and € 257.550 in 2019. However, such positive results still are not in compliance 
with business plan projections, which were expecting higher value creation immediately after 
the ECF campaign closing, starting from 2018. Indeed, variation rates related to EBITDA are 
negative and equal to -81% in 2018 and -79% in 2019. As it appears from the income statement, 
the most part of costs was due to raw materials and consumption, which cost € 3 million in 
2019. By looking at long-term investments, immediately after the ECF campaign closed the 
company started to invest funds in intangible assets. In 2019 intangible assets had a value equal 
to € 586.403, representing 35% of invested capital. Such a category mainly refers to marketing 
and communications expenses and R&D. Indeed, both the website and the Facebook page of 
the start-up are constantly updated, in order to establish a direct communication with clients 
and to create a user’s community, as declared in the 2017 business plan. By looking at 
documents available until now, there is no evidence of the realization of geographical expansion 
toward Chinese market.  
 
Qaplà Srl 
Vision and strategy: Qaplà Srl aims at easing deliveries for companies, in particular it 
focuses on the post-shipment control and on promptly action in case of problems. Basically, 
Qaplà operates in improving customer service and reducing time and costs for clients in case 
of bad management of deliveries.  
Market and competitive advantage: Qaplà Srl works as an intermediary platform between 
delivery firms and clients, letting the last to keep tracking of the process. Moreover, clients 
need to have fast and efficient delivery, both qualities guaranteed by the Qaplà team. In addition 
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to this, the start-up works as an intermediary between e-commerce platforms and marketplaces. 
According to the business plan provided by the company, the e-commerce market sector was 
expected to experience an increase of +16% in 2017 in Italy and +13,6% in Europe. In Italy, it 
has been estimated 15,3 million deliveries per month, representing a huge market opportunity 
for the start-up. The main competitors in the Italian scenario are Gsped and ShippyPro.  
Business plan: the business model adopted includes revenues generation following shipping 
and customer services utilized by clients. According to the business plan presented, the capital 
raised is going to be invested in R&D, human resources, marketing expenditures.  
Company Status     
Qaplà Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan 186.504 448.919 908.629 
Actual results 165.392 360.790 553.072 
Delta -21.112 -88.129 -355.557 
% of realization 89% 80% 61% 
% of variation -11% -20% -39% 
EBITDA 
Business plan -61.545 -7.732 202.036 
Actual results -13.033 12.842 10.439 
Delta -48.512 -20.574 -191.597 
% of realization 21% -166% 5% 
% of variation 79% 266% -95% 
Table 4.10: Business plan projections and actual results of Qaplà Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
 
€ 2017 on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  590 0% 3.107 1% 7.998 1% 
Intangible assets  59.218 36% 80.800 22% 80.742 15% 
Financial assets  0   0   107   
Fixed capital  59.808   83.907   88.847   
Working capital -1.695   19.747   -51.986   
Invested capital  58.113   103.654   36.861   
Cash and similar 117.528 71% 25.397 7% 56.713 10% 
Intangibles / IC  102%   78%   219%   
Tangibles / IC 1%   3%   22%   
Table 4.11: Invested capital and cash and similars of Qaplà Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
Qaplà Srl is a still active innovative company, which both in 2018 and 2019 generated 
positive revenues results, which have increased starting from the year after the ECF campaign. 
For what concerns EBITDA value, it appears how the company had been overperforming 
expectations in 2018 but has not been able to keep on this path the year after. Indeed, in 2019 
the variation rate was only equal to -95%, while it was 266% in 2018. However, the e-commerce 
market sector showed a huge expansion during 2020, thus both revenues and EBITDA results 
are expected to grow. By looking at the balance sheets, it appears that intangible assets 
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investments have increased in 2018 and kept mainly constant in 2019. As declared in the 
business plan, such resources have been invested mainly in R&D and communication expenses. 
Indeed, the start-up currently has a very active social page. The current pandemic situation has 
raised the necessity to even improve the delivery service and the tracking service offered to 
retail business. However, with the resources available until 2019, the company has not been 
able to meet business plan projections yet. 
 
The Digital Box Spa 
Vision and strategy: The Digital Box Spa aims at changing the way through which Digital 
Marketing is perceived and implemented by entrepreneurs. The start-up employs a high level 
of digital technology, in order to create marketing campaigns through smartphones and mobile 
devices. It has already obtained a market share in Italy, Spain and Brazil and aims at expanding 
in Latin America, France, UK, Germany, Portugal and Romania. The strategy includes the offer 
of ADA, an online platform for Mobile Engagement which eases the direct communication with 
clients.  
Market and competitive advantage: according to the business plan proposed by the start-up, 
the IT market for communication and marketing technologies was experiencing a huge 
expansion, reaching 67,2 million dollars in 2019. The market segment in which ADA is 
positioned is that of the Mobile Engagement Automation Platform, that is a category of software 
that allows companies to create and maintain the relationship with customers over time 
(Engagement) through automation tools (Marketing Automation).  In this way, ADA 
competitive advantage is linked to its high technology and simple and intuitive way to use. The 
distribution channel is based on resellers, which lead high scalability by contacting marketing 
agencies and retailer companies, which then directly communicate with clients.  
Business plan: by looking at the business plan, it appeared that the capital raised through 
ECF campaign was planned to be invested in market expansion towards Northern Europe, to 
enhance marketing and communication division, and towards the implementation of new tools 
for controlling operations, administrative and legal expenses, and development of the Patent 
Pending procedure for the patenting of ADA algorithms. The main part of revenues was 






Company Status     
The Digital Box Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan 7.329.000 13.983.000 25.984.000 
Actual results 2.559.341 2.737.637 2.665.632 
Delta -4.769.659 -11.245.363 -23.318.368 
% of realization 35% 20% 10% 
% of variation -65% -80% -90% 
EBITDA 
Business plan 1.254.000 4.168.000 10.641.000 
Actual results 383.776 235.452 9.526 
Delta -80.634 -3.932.548 -10.631.474 
% of realization 31% 6% 0% 
% of variation -6% -94% -100% 
Table 4.12: Business plan projections and actual results of the Digital Box Spa, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
€ 2017 on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  26.183 1% 23.993 1% 25.239 1% 
Intangible assets  202.507 8% 331.152 12% 643.860 24% 
Financial assets  2.400.971   2.795.961   2.431.393   
Fixed capital  2.629.661   3.151.106   3.100.492   
Working capital 643.465   355.881   332.560   
Invested capital  3.273.126   3.506.987   3.433.052   
Cash and similar 588.700 23% 110.431 4% 931.597 35% 
Intangibles / IC  6%   9%   19%   
Tangibles / IC 1%   1%   1%   
Table 4.13: Invested capital and cash and similars of The Digital Box Spa, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
By looking at the income statement results, in the period 2017-2019 the company generated 
positive value, with revenues stream equal to € 2.665.635 in 2019 and EBITDA € 9.526. 
However, such results are not in line with forecasted value estimated in the business plan 
projections, which probably were over-optimistic. Indeed, the revenue variation rate in 2019 
was negative and equal to -90%. Following the ECF campaign, the company started 
investments in the R&D division, in order to improve its product ADA. Such investments 
appear in the balance sheet, where it is possible to observe the increase in intangible assets 
value, that went from a value of € 202.507 in 2017 to a value of € 643.860 in 2019, representing 
respectively 9% and 19% of IC. By investing in software improvement, in 2018 The Digital 
Box was able to participate in a FED event in Milan (Forum dell’Economia Digitale). In 
particular, the start-up has been invited to discuss customer engagement and artificial 
intelligence in digital marketing, thus proving the success generated by its technology.  
Moreover, in 2019 the company has been selected to participate in Euronext Techshare, which 




Ermes Cyber Security Srl 
Vision and strategy: Ermes Cyber Security Srl operates in the cyber security sector, in 
particular it offers a platform to allow companies to regain control on the information they have 
exposed on the Web and gives them the opportunity to defend themselves from all risks 
generated by Web trackers. In this context, the team of Ermes has conceived and engineered 
one platform distributed, able to totally block the spill of information to the Web tracker. In this 
way, the start-up bases its strategy on the offering of improved web-traffic filtering and 
protection of all corporate devices, wherever they are located (at home or at the office) and 
connected with every kind of internet connection (WiFi or cable).  
Market and competitive advantage: the services provided by the start-up consist of patented 
algorithms. With respect to its main competitors (Zscaler, Cisco, Check Point), Ermes Srl 
provided higher technological services protected by 2 patents. By looking at the business plan 
disclosed, it appears that the cyber security market was considered the hottest in the technology 
sector, with a market worth $77 billion in 2015, and growth estimates of up to $170 billion in 
2020. Ermes' team defined such a market as a blue ocean, giving an idea of the huge possibility 
for expansion and creation of profit for the start-up.  
Business plan: according to the business plan, the main part of the capital raised through 
ECF was planned to be invested in the final development of Ermes software. Afterwards, the 
start-up aimed at exploiting a geographical expansion, reaching North America (USA and 
Canada) and part of Asia (Russia, China and Japan).  
 
Company Status     
Ermes Cyber Security Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan 21.880 862.080 4.932.500 
Actual results 84.213 246.775 527.961 
Delta 62.333 -615.305 -4.404.539 
% of realization 385% 29% 11% 
% of variation 285% -71% -89% 
EBITDA 
Business plan -178.540 300.090 1.103.920 
Actual results 21.345 3.488 6.663 
Delta -199.885 -296.602 -1.097.257 
% of realization -12% 1% 1% 
% of variation 112% -99% -99% 






€ 2017 on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  10.227 12% 19.008 8% 35.968 7% 
Intangible assets  61.936 74% 260.368 106% 545.203 103% 
Financial assets  0   0   0   
Fixed capital  72.163   279.376   581.171   
Working capital -3.181   304   39.762   
Invested capital  68.982   279.680   620.933   
Cash and similar 215.864 256% 131.312 53% 597.687 113% 
Intangibles / IC  90%   93%   88%   
Tangibles / IC 15%   7%   6%   
Table 4.15: Invested capital and cash and similars of Ermes Cyber Security Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
Ermes Cyber Security is a still operating company. As it appears from its income statement, 
both revenues generation and EBITDA margin show a positive and increasing trend, with a 
value of respectively € 527.961 and € 6.663 in 2019. However, such results are still not in line 
with business plan projections, and present high deviations from what was expected. On the 
other hand, as it appears through the balance sheet, the start-up has invested a relevant amount 
of resources in intangible assets, starting immediately after the ECF campaign closing. Indeed, 
intangible assets had a value of € 279.680 in 2018, representing 93% of invested capital. For 
what concerns further investments in geographical expansion forecasted in the business plan, 
at the beginning of 2020 the company publicly declared its expansion in the Spanish market.  
 
Green Energy Storage Srl 
Vision and strategy: Green Energy Storage has developed an organic storage system for 
renewable energy based on quinone, a molecule found in rhubarb and other plants. In this way, 
the start-up aims at providing renewable energy in a flexible way. Moreover, company’s 
technologies are improved by the collaboration with Harvard University, as well as  
partnership with the University of Rome Tor Vergata, the Bruno Kessler Foundation of Trento 
and Industrie De Nora.  
Market and competitive advantage: GES products are characterized by high scalability, due 
to the separation of power components and energy components, long life cycle, safety and 
sustainability. Scalability allows the production of both small domestic devices and big devices 
for companies. Market of renewable energy needs a way through which maintains energy 
produced and creates a flexible way of utilization. In this way, Green Energy Storage is one of 
the pioneer companies providing such service. The market of storage systems is expected to 
grow and reach a market share of about $400 billion by 2022. In such a market, Europe plays a 
crucial role, representing 32% of the total ($160 billion).  
Business plan: as it appears by the business plan provided, the start-up already received €2 
million from the EU through the program Horizon 2020. In addition to this, the Provincia of 
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Trento provided €3 million in order to lead the start-up to improve its products. Thanks to the 
ECF campaign, GES is looking for geographical expansion in the USA and Latin America, 
Asia and MENA (Middle East and North Africa) markets. Moreover, part of the funds raised 
are going to be invested in R&D division, marketing and administrative expenses.  
Company Status     
Green Energy Storage Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan n.a. 2.560.000 15.800.000 
Financial results 1.073.816 1.009.042 1.216.169 
Delta n.a. -1.550.958 -14.583.831 
% of realization - 39% 8% 
% of variation - -61% -92% 
EBITDA 
Business plan n.a -1.310.000 2.160.000 
Financial results 116.228 -245.225 397.397 
Delta n.a. -1.064.775 -1.762.603 
% of realization - 19% 18% 
% of variation - 81% -82% 
Table 4.16: Business plan projections and actual results of Green Energy Storage Srl, own elaboration based on financial 
reports. 
€ 2017 on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  234.886 22% 298.172 30% 239.783 20% 
Intangible assets  1.374.275 128% 2.057.732 204% 2.639.877 217% 
Financial assets  0   0   0   
Fixed capital  1.609.161   2.355.904   2.879.660   
Working capital -297.448   -350.822   -804.144   
Invested capital  1.311.713   2.005.082   2.075.516   
Cash and similar 1.419.410 132% 591.222 59% 1.398.219 115% 
Intangibles / I.C.  105%   103%   127%   
Tangibles / I.C. 18%   15%   12%   
Table 4.17: Invested capital and cash and similars of Green Energy Storage Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
By looking at financial reports, the start-up appears as a well performing company. During 
the two years following the ECF campaign, the company generated positive value, showing 
revenues value equal to € 1.216.169 in 2019 and an average growth rate in revenues equal to 
+7% in the period 2017-2019. EBITDA results overperformed expectations in 2018, but the 
company has not been able to keep on this pattern during 2019 (EBITDA variation rate equal 
to -82% in 2019). By looking at company development and product’s improvement, it appears 
how the start-up is still working on a technology capable of storing renewable energy. In this 
direction, during 2018, the start-up started a second ECF campaign, successfully closed as it 
happened in the case of the first one. During 2020 the firm started a partnership with Harvard 
University in order to obtain the patent for the developed technology. In this way, in 2020 GES 
Srl started the first production of flow batteries, consolidating its figure of pioneer in renewable 
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energy market. Such production may improve revenue results, which are still not in line with 
those values forecasted in the business plan projections.  
 
Yocabè Srl 
Vision and strategy: Yocabè Srl is an innovative start-up which provides online e-commerce 
for medium-sized quality brands of international fashion. At the heart of Yocabè strategy there 
is the technological platform that allows the management of a global multi-shop multi-brand 
model aiming at optimizing all the core processes of e-commerce. The growth strategy is based 
on acquisition of new brands and products and increasing marketplaces. According to its 
business model, the company generates 12% revenues on each transaction. 
Market and competitive advantage: the main customer target of the start-up is represented 
by those companies which generate revenues between € 5 and 50 million. Currently, Yocabè 
operates in many of European countries, including Italy, France, Germany, Spain, UK. With 
respect to the main competitors, Yocabè shows competitive advantage as it allows partners to 
generate sales at an international level without initial investments (no need for infrastructure 
and personnel), with a lower risk (stores already started) and with a more efficient economy of 
scale (the multi-brand approach makes it easier scalable operations).  
Business plan: according to the business plan provided, the funds raised through ECF are 
going to be invested to accelerate the acquisition and sale of brands with the aim, for 2017, of 
34 brands (from 8 in 2016) and the opening of new stores, about 20 in total, on the main 
European marketplaces. 
 
Company Status     
Yocabè Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan 186.408 757.514 2.967.635 
Actual results 842.598 2.005.405 2.236.322 
Delta 656.190 1.247.891 -731.313 
% of realization 452% 265% 75% 
% of variation 352% 165% -25% 
EBITDA 
Business plan 26.688 -222.871 -576.201 
Actual results -82.109 -77.409 -94.980 
Delta -108.797 -145.462 -481.221 
% of realization -308% 35% 16% 
% of variation -408% 65% 84% 





€ 2017 on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  1.273 0% 2.265 0% 7.216 0% 
Intangible assets  0 0% 21.765 1% 199.612 9% 
Financial assets  0   0   0   
Fixed capital  1.273   24.030   206.828   
Working capital -69.894   -286.013   -273.615   
Invested capital  -68.621   -261.983   -66.787   
Cash and similar 271.663 32% 294.273 15% 650.322 29% 
Intangibles / IC  0%   8%   299%   
Tangibles / IC 2%   1%   11%   
Table 4.19: Invested capital and cash and similars of Yocabè Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
Yocabè is a still active company. For what concerns economic results, the start-up is 
generating highly positive revenues (€ 2.236.322 in 2019, average growth rate for the period 
2017-2019 equal to +75%). However, it is not able to produce positive net income (2019 
EBITDA equal to € -94.980), but still overperforming business plan projections. It is reasonable 
to suppose that a high amount of resources is still being invested to create a sustainable 
competitive advantage in the market, and a positive economic result will require a longer-term 
horizon. Nowadays, it is expanding its market position, by acquiring new clients and 
collaborating with a higher number of fashion brands sold through its marketplace. In 2019, the 
company counted 15 employees and collaboration with 25 fashion brands, including 
partnership with Diadora, Superga, K-way, Carrera, Robe di Kappa. As established in the 
business plan disclosed during the ECF campaign, the company carried out geographical 
expansion, and it is now operating in marketplaces in Canada, Mexico, and USA, as well as in 
Europe. From the closing of the capital raising campaign, the company handled almost 130.000 
orders. As it appears by looking at the balance sheet, the company is constantly investing 
resources in intangible assets, which include both the improvement of software, the acquisition 
of new marketplaces, as well as the incrementation of marketing and communication. In 2019, 
intangible asset investments have experienced high growth, reaching a value equal to almost € 
200.000. The willingness for further expansion appears even more evident if considering a 
further fundraising concluded in 2019. Indeed, thanks to round bridge financing, the start-up 
increased its liquidity by € 600.000, supported by Cross Border Growth Capital.  
 
Orwell Srl 
Vision and strategy: Orwell Srl is an innovative start-up which operates in the digital and 
communication technologies sector. According to its strategy, it produces and commercializes 
Virtual Reality and Mixed Reality applications, created through highly innovative 3D software 
and simulations in terms of user experience.  
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Market and competitive advantage: founders of the start-up benefit from a huge experience 
and knowledge with respect to VR and 3D software. By looking at the business plan, the market 
for such products was expected to experience an intense growth. Indeed, an increase in active 
users of 503% was estimated by 2018, going from the current $ 43 million to over $ 215 million. 
By speaking about revenues, they were estimated to reach $4.6 bn in 2018 for the VR-software 
sector, while $5.2 billion revenues were expected for the hardware sector.  
Business plan: capital raised will be committed, in line with the business development plan, 
to the continuation of the activities on special projects today at the experimental development 
stage. At the same time, the go-to-market will be carried out in the new target markets, judged 
to have high potential for the VR proposal and which are not yet managed in a structured manner 
by competitors. According to the business plan, the market expansion will be carried out 
following two main directions: computer graphics and virtual reality. The target customer 








€ 2017 on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  19.151 5% 27.556 5% 21.354 7% 
Intangible assets  26.898 7% 167.020 33% 186.287 60% 
Financial assets  12.381   8.939   7.501   
Fixed capital  58.430   203.515   215.142   
Working capital 129.281   69.476   -6.978   
Invested capital  187.711   272.991   208.164   
Cash and similar 61.894 16% 17.450 3% 2.798 1% 
Intangibles / IC  14%   61%   89%   
Tangibles / IC 10%   10%   10%   
Table 4.21: Invested capital and cash and similars of Orwell Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
By looking at Orwell’s income statement, it appears that its economic results are still not in 
line with business plan projections, which were probably too optimistic. Indeed, business plan 
forecasts expected revenues equal to almost € 3 million in 2019, while they ended up being 
Company Status     
Orwell Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan n.a. 1.256.087 2.883.711 
Actual results 380.669 511.027 312.014 
Delta n.a. -745.060 -2.571.697 
% of realization - 41% 11% 
% of variation - -59% -89% 
EBITDA 
Business plan n.a. 606.506 1.763.376 
Actual results 13.666 -765 2.527 
Delta n.a. -607.271 -1.760.849 
% of realization - 0% 0% 
% of variation - -100% -100% 
Table 4.20: Business plan projections and actual results Orwelll Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
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equal to € 321.014. Besides, EBITDA expectations saw a value equal to € 1.763.376 in 2019, 
while the actual financial result ended up equal to € 2.527, showing a variation rate equal to -
100%. However, by looking at the renewed website, it appears that the company is operating 
in both 3D computer graphic and VR sector, which is in line with what declared in the business 
plan. During 2016 the main part of services was directed to Real Estate clients, while by 2019 
Orwell offer includes services to architects and designers, museums and art galleries, events 
and advertising. In 2017 the company provided personalized experiences for exhibitions, 
events, museums and fairs. Examples of this type are those made for the exhibition on the 
painter Gustav Klimt in Florence, a success with 80.000 tickets, or the Da Vinci Experience. 
 
Little Sea Srl 
Vision and strategy: Little Sea Srl is an innovative start-up which developed Babelee, a new 
patented technology able to generate automatic videos starting from unstructured data present 
in company databases. This represents a huge opportunity in terms of marketing and 
communication, since it is possible to create specific advertising videos for each client, based 
on its preferences and needs. Videos are generated by taking information and data from the 
Web and from each single database. Indeed, according to a research conducted by Cisco in 
2015, 64% of users who watched a video of a product are more enticed to buy it. 
Market and competitive advantage: the market for digital marketing technologies is expected 
to grow in the long term, thanks to the huge expansion of smartphones and mobile devices 
owned by users, and the Internet as well. In this new scenario, technologies are expected to 
adapt to users, and to show them precisely what they are looking for. In 2018, it is expected 
that over 80% of total online traffic will be represented by video viewing. Research by 
consulting firm Forrester predicts a 300% increase in AI investments in 2017 compared to 2016.  
Business plan: according to the business plan provided, Little Sea Srl is going to invest in 
geographical expansion, exploiting the Asian market as first. Indeed, in the opinion of the 
owners, Asian people are more sensitive to video contents than European people, and this could 









Company Status     
Little Sea Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan 534.000 1.592.000 3.260.000 
Actual results 260.210 394.154 448.745 
Delta -273.790 -1.197.846 -2.811.255 
% of realization 49% 25% 14% 
% of variation -51% -75% -86% 
EBITDA 
Business plan 87.965 576.640 1.590.425 
Actual results 4.149 33.690 63.965 
Delta -83.816 -542.950 -1.526.460 
% of realization 5% 6% 4% 
% of variation -95% -94% -96% 
Table 4.22: Business plan projections and actual results Little Sea Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
 
€ 2017 on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  4.867 2% 6.248 2% 5.105 1% 
Intangible assets  369.736 142% 519.111 132% 587.278 131% 
Financial assets  5.000  5.000  5.000  
Fixed capital  379.603  530.359  597.383  
Working capital 40.350  91.448  41.143  
Invested capital  419.953  621.807  638.526  
Cash and similar 207.449 80% 85.309 22% 1.742 0% 
Intangibles / IC  88%  83%  92%  
Tangibles / IC 1%  1%  1%  
Table 4.23: Invested capital and cash and similars of Little Sea Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
By looking at Little Sea financial reports, it appears that the company is experiencing a 
positive trend in economic results. Revenue flows went from a value of €394.154 in 2018 to an 
amount equal to € 448.745 in 2019. The same positive trend encompasses EBITDA, which was 
equal to € 33.690 in 2018 and € 63.965 in 2019. However, such results are not following 
business plan projections, which were expecting an EBITDA equal to € 1.590.425 in 2019, 
implying a negative deviation equal to -96%. Nonetheless, the company is still investing 
resources in the development of its activities, trying to improve its AI software. Intangible assets 
represented almost 92% of invested capital in 2019, while tangibles represented 1%. Such 
investments brought positive results, as it appears by looking at company successes. Indeed, in 
2018 the company received the Best International Technology Transfer Project Award, 
awarded in Russia at the Skolkovo Startup Village. Moreover, in 2019 the company started a 
new project, encompassing AI in the financial market. The project included the provision of 
videos constantly updated in order to describe financial market data, such as quotas and 
companies’ prices.  Moreover, clients with special necessities can personalize their videos, 
including only data on their portfolios. In July 2020 the company’s majority of shares (91,07%) 
was acquired by Doxee, a multinational company leader in the offer of products in the field of 
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Customer Communications Management (CCM), Paperless and Digital Customer Experience. 
The transfer will be completed in January 2021.  
 
Crowdfundme Spa 
Vision and strategy: Crowdfundme Spa is one of the main active platforms for ECF 
campaigns in the Italian scenario. It offers innovative start-ups and SMEs the possibility to 
overcome the funding gap through the participation of online non-professional investors.  
Market and competitive advantage: revenues are based on the success-fee oriented business 
model. In other words, the platform gains fee whenever the start-ups reach the minimum target. 
Among its KPIs, the platform highlighted high correlation between number of registrations and 
€ invested, and average investment constant of about €1.600. 
Business plan: according to the business plan provided by the company, it is expected an 
increase in number of investors per ECF campaign, mainly due to larger start-up/PMI offers 
proposed, leading to an increase in users and registrations.  
Company Status     
Crowdfundme Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan 144.609 399.482 712.703 
Actual results 186.487 390.185 420.795 
Delta 41.878 -9.297 -291.908 
% of realization 129% 98% 59% 
% of variation 29% -2% -41% 
EBITDA 
Business plan -25.023 6.482 197.703 
Actual results -35.404 -106.446 -846.213 
Delta 10.381 -112.928 -1.043.916 
% of realization 141% -1642% -428% 
% of variation -41% -1742% -528% 
Table 4.24: Business plan projections and actual results Crowdfundme Spa, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
 
€ 2017 on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  2.327 1% 2.549 1% 3.311 1% 
Intangible assets  69.167 37% 526.697 135% 808.003 192% 
Financial assets  899   899   899   
Fixed capital  72.393   530.145   812.213   
Working capital -50.293   -315.776   -264.547   
Invested capital  22.100   214.369   547.666   
Cash and similar 347.766 186% 80.456 21% 687.450 163% 
Intangibles / IC  313%   246%   148%   
Tangibles / IC 11%   1%   1%   
Table 4.25: Invested capital and cash and similars of Crowdfundme Spa, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
The company results showed a positive trend in revenue generation, meaning the continuity 
of activity albeit not in line with projections disclosed during the ECF campaign. However, 
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EBITDA results do not follow such a positive trend, indeed in 2019 registered EBITDA was 
negative and equal to € -846.213. For what concern this last year, it has been a peculiar period 
for the company, since on 25th March of 2019 it carried out its first IPO in the AIM, Italian 
capital market. Indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that high costs have been sustained in order 
to implement the quotation. By making this, Crowdfundme Spa is the only Italian ECF platform 
quoted in the capital market.  
 
Take Off Srl 
Vision and strategy: TakeOff Srl is an incubator for start-ups, registered in the innovative 
SME register. It provides professional skills, offices and physical spaces, and collects capital to 
be invested in start-ups.  
Market and competitive advantage: the start-up is based in 10 Italian cities, and aimed at 
expanding in 9 more by 2017. It had company headquarters in the UK, and aimed at 
geographical expansion in Canada, USA, Switzerland, Malta, Russia, Cech Republic and 
Bulgaria by 2017. Indeed, the start-up relied on high resources, both in terms of capital and 
assets, and in terms of knowledge and skills of its team. By looking at the market scenario, it 
appears that in 2016 there were 8.836 start-ups around the world, helped by 387 incubators. In 
the same year, Italian incubators invested € 2.290.000 in start-ups, the most of which were 
located in Lombardia, Emilia-Romagna, Lazio and Veneto. The increase in the number of start-
ups is also pushed by law benefits.  
Business plan: according to the business plan provided, the company is going to improve its 
corporate structure and its operations, in order to implement an exit strategy by 2020, which 
includes an IPO. In this way investors can make their investment liquid.  
 
Company Status     
Take Off Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan 70.000 215.000 275.000 
Actual results 138.806 1.275.023 1.572.718 
Delta 68.806 1.060.023 1.297.718 
% of realization 198% 593% 572% 
% of variation 98% 493% 472% 
EBITDA 
Business plan 25.250 81.300 102.200 
Actual results 31.592 373.272 505.414 
Delta 6.342 291.972 403.214 
% of realization 125% 459% 495% 
% of variation 25% 359% 395% 
Table 4.26: Business plan projections and actual results TakeOff Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
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€ 2017 on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  0 0% 24.011 2% 22.000 1% 
Intangible assets  800 1% 0 0% 506.000 32% 
Financial assets  504.500   551.500   598.500   
Fixed capital  505.300   575.511   1.126.500   
Working capital 15.333   537.680   139.692   
Invested capital  520.633   1.113.191   1.266.192   
Cash and similar 24.159 17% 216 0% 39.854 3% 
Intangibles / IC  0%   0%   40%   
Tangibles / IC 0%   2%   2%   
Table 4.27: Invested capital and cash and similars of TakeOff Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
Take Off Srl is a still active and well performing company, which keeps on operating as an 
incubator for start-ups. By looking at its economic results, it appears how they overperformed 
projections declared in the business plan. Indeed, business plan forecasts have been probably 
computed in a conservative way, as actual financial results showed a percentage of realization 
higher than 100% for both revenues generation and EBITDA. Revenues in 2019 appear to be 
equal to € 1.572.718, while they were expected to value € 275.000, implying a percentage of 
realization equal to 572%. In the same way, EBITDA generation showed a very positive result, 
letting to 395% of variation, with an actual EBITDA almost five times higher than the one 
expected. In compliance with such a positive trend in value creation, the company opted for a 
second round of ECF during 2018, concluding it successfully as it happened for the first one. 
During this second ECF round, the start-up collected € 203.500 provided by 12 investors. As it 
appears from financial reports, the company is currently operating in Italy, UK and Bulgaria 
and it aims at investing in further geographical expansion towards China, India, Russia, USA 
and United Arab Emirates.  
 
Alea Srl 
Vision and strategy: Alea Srl operates in ITC and digital technologies. It is highly specialized 
in the development of smartphone applications for communication in real time and developed 
the Talkway brand. Talkway is a professional Push To Talk (PTT) app through which 
companies can replace traditional radio transmitters. Through the Talkway system, emergency 
communications can be easily carried out through the smartphones, thus easing the process. 
Moreover, the new technology guarantees geolocation and a web platform for supervision and 
monitoring by the operations center. 
Market and competitive advantage: in 2016, the company started a partnership with 
Vodafone and after that with TIM too, both interested in its PTT technology. Alea Srl bases its 
competitive advantage on the production and commercialization of Talkway, which represents 
an innovative technology for PTT market sector. The main competitors identified are 
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companies such as Zello, Tassta and YouCo. However, Talkways is the best fit for SME 
enterprises, as it does not imply high costs for implementation and can easily be used through 
employees’ smartphones. Target consumers are police, armed forces, civil protection, private 
security, large industrial facilities, chemical and pharmaceutical industries, construction sites, 
oil platforms, ships of the Merchant and Military Navy. 
Business plan: according to the business plan provided, raised capital is going to be invested 
in HR, R&D and legal consultants (90%), while 10% for the purchase of the necessary 
equipment with particular regard to the possibility of offering the Mission Critical Push To Talk  
(MCPTT) version at competitive prices compared to other international players. By looking at 
revenue’s generation, they are expected to derive mainly from industrial consumers (50%), 30% 
by police departments while 20% by private security.  
Company Status     
Alea Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan 600.000 900.000 1.500.000 
Actual results 22.595.565 17.808.780 18.480.809 
Delta 21.995.565 16.908.780 16.980.809 
% of realization 3766% 1979% 1232% 
% of variation 3666% 1879% 1132% 
EBITDA 
Business plan 170.000 350.000 700.000 
Actual results 2.920.706 1.397.752 2.142.155 
Delta 2.750.706 1.047.752 1.442.155 
% of realization 1718% 399% 306% 
% of variation 1618% 299% 206% 
Table 4.28: Business plan projections and actual results Alea Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
 
€ 2017 on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  8.301.959 37% 7.826.055 44% 7.651.994 41% 
Intangible assets  118.481 1% 105.997 1% 104.123 1% 
Financial assets  295   295   610.295   
Fixed capital  8.420.735   7.932.347   8.366.412   
Working capital 1.744.429   1.841.255   2.350.982   
Invested capital  10.165.164   9.773.602   10.717.394   
Cash and similar 3.361.555 15% 2.304.146 13% 2.727.277 15% 
Intangibles / IC  1%   1%   1%   
Tangibles / IC 82%   80%   71%   
Table 4.29: Invested capital and cash and similars of Alea Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
Alea Srl is a still active and impressively well performing company. Economic results 
generated by the start-up showed high value generation, supported by a positive trend and 
meaning stability of activity and efficiency in operating activities. During year 2019, both 
revenues and EBITDA results overperformed those expected by the business plan, respectively 
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reaching the value of € 18.480.809 and € 2.142.155. As disclosed in the business plan, financial 
resources obtained during the ECF campaign have been invested in order to enhance the product 
offered. In this way, Talkway has become one of the most adopted products within the whole 
Italian scenario. During 2019, Alea’s shareholders participated to TCCA Control Room 
Workshop meeting, where they had the possibility to discuss about challenges of control rooms 
in broadband networks in collaboration with 65 representatives of the public safety community, 
such as Airbus, DAMN Cellular Systems, Ericsson, Nokia, and most of the European Police 
Institutions. It also took part in the TCCA project in order to establish the importance of mission 
for critical service interoperability and the increasing adoption of 4G/LTE-based services by 
critical users. Moreover, in September 2019 the company participated in the fourth MCX 
Plugtests organized by the ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute). 
 
Graphene XT Srl 
Vision and strategy: Graphene XT operates in the nano technology sector, focusing on R&D 
on graphene. Graphene is expected to be the most utilized material in the near future, thanks to 
its resistance, light weight, versatility. The company is specialized in the production of graphene 
in liquid suspension in water through a patented proprietary process. Potential clients of the 
company are all those companies which require graphene in order to produce their products. 
Moreover, Graphene XT has obtained numerous patents for its technology.  
Market and competitive advantage: the world market of graphene is in full development and 
will be one of the protagonists of the industrial revolution 4.0. The global graphene market is 
projected to reach $ 675 million in 2020 with an annual growth rate of 58.7%. Moreover, the 
company has already agreed various partnerships with, for example, Italian multinational Oil 
& Gas in the drilling sector, Cariaggi Lanificio Spa for high fashion wool yarns. Currently, the 
main competitors are Directa Plus (Italy), Vorbeck (USA), AGM (UK). 
Business plan: by looking at the business plan, it appears that the company consumer target 
is going to be each innovative company looking for exploiting graphene in its R&D division. 
The market served is the B2B market. Capital raised is going to be invested to expand 
commercial employees, to acquire new machinery, to increase R&D activity, to improve brand 








Company Status     
Graphene XT Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan n.a. 560.000 1.120.000 
Actual results n.a. 118.193 157.609 
Delta n.a. -441.807 -962.391 
% of realization - 21% 14% 
% of variation - -79% -86% 
EBITDA 
Business plan n.a. 309.450 768.900 
Actual results n.a. -72.020 -68.642 
Delta n.a. -381.470 -837.542 
% of realization - -23% -9% 
% of variation - -123% -109% 
Table 4.30: Business plan projections and actual results Graphene XT Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
 
 € 2017 on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  29.376 n.a. 19.065 3% 11.060 1% 
Intangible assets  44.860 n.a. 37.145 7% 26.911 2% 
Financial assets  0   447   0   
Fixed capital  74.236   56.657   37.971   
Working capital 12.675   3.808   36.689   
Invested capital  86.911   60.465   74.660   
Cash and similar 383.685 n.a. 309.114 55% 234.975 21% 
Intangibles / IC  52%   61%   36%   
Tangibles / IC 34%   32%   15%   
Table 4.31: Invested capital and cash and similars of Graphene XT Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
For what concerns economic results, they are still not in line with those forecasted by the 
business plan projections and EBITDA results are still negative, even though they have 
increased from 2018 to 2019. Even revenues are increasing, with an average growth rate equal 
to +33% for the period 2017-2019. By looking at Graphene XT social media page, it 
immediately appears the constant communication with clients. Indeed, the page is constantly 
updated, with both technical information and more soft information in order to create a sort of 
brand community. Indeed, resources invested in this kind of communication strategies are in 
line with plans disclosed in the preliminary documents during the ECF campaign. Moreover, 
by taking a look at the company's website, it is possible to see the increasing in product range, 
as declared in the business plan. Indeed, thanks to R&D investments taken, the company 
currently offers 8 different graphene-derived products, each of them peculiar for special 
purposes. Furthermore, the company now serves different market industries, including 
engineering, aerospace, railway, textile, energy, petrochemical, optical, construction, 





Vision and strategy: Yakkyo describes itself as the Amazon for businesses dedicated to 
SMEs who want to buy from China. The company aims at easing the traditional search process 
by solving all import-related problems such as language barriers, minimum order, shipping and 
customs clearance procedure. The business model relies on two channels through which clients 
can buy online products: Yakkyo MyBOT and the online form.  
Market and competitive advantage: China appears to be one of the main commercial partners 
of Europe. Indeed, the market for imports of products from China into Europe has been growing 
steadily in recent years with a total value in 2015 of € 350 billion in EU-7 (Belgium, England, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, Holland, and France). The company relies on its innovative technology 
which leads clients to easily import from China, also through the implementation of AI. 
Business plan: by looking at the business plan, it appears that the company aims at 
strengthening the Google Adwords campaigns as well as advertising on Linkedin and profiled 
DEM campaigns. Furthermore, funds are going to be used to improve marketing and 
communication as well as to increase to market share and acquire new customers.  
Company Status     
Yakkyo Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan n.a. 3.116.229 19.160.347 
Actual results 892.309 1.525.322 2.348.246 
Delta n.a. -1.590.907 -16.812.101 
% of realization - 49% 12% 
% of variation - -51% -88% 
EBITDA 
Business plan n.a. 327.099 1.349.553 
Actual results 3.857 316.987 179.909 
Delta n.a. -10.112 -1.169.644 
% of realization - 97% 13% 
% of variation - -3% -87% 
Table 4.32: Business plan projections and actual results Yakkyo Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
€ 2017 on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  0 0% 3.363 0% 5.728 0% 
Intangible assets  1.127 0% 140.357 9% 463.484 20% 
Financial assets  0   0   0   
Fixed capital  1.127   143.720   469.212   
Working capital 89.514   3.629   46.527   
Invested capital  90.641   147.349   515.739   
Cash and similar 462.191 52% 633.715 42% 995.565 42% 
Intangibles / IC  1%   95%   90%   
Tangibles / IC 0%   2%   1%   
Table 4.33: Invested capital and cash and similars of Yakkyo Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
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Yakkyo Srl is still an operating company. However, by looking at its website, its name has 
changed into Yakkyofy. By looking at the economic results, those achieved by the start-up are 
still not in line with business plan projections. Revenues in 2019 were equal to € 2.348.246, but 
still the variation rate was negative (-88%), meaning that the company was unable to meet its 
expectations. Under the name of Yakkyofy, the company sustained a second ECF round during 
2020 to further increase its capital. During the last three years, the company has experienced an 
expansion phase, ending up in 2020 with the launch of its app for mobile devices. Indeed, the 
app is available in Shopify store, an online store directed to B2B transactions. The successfully 
closed ECF campaign in 2020 is a representation of investors’ trust in the company’s strategy. 
In addition to this, during 2020 the company developed Yakkyofy plugin WordPress, thus 
offering its clients more competitive prices. It is reasonable to assume that the company is still 
investing an important part of its resources in order to achieve strategic goals, such as the launch 
of the app, the direct communication with clients, the offering of more competitive prices and 
the establishment of its competitive positioning, thus creating the base for its sustainable 
competitive advantage. By looking at balance sheets, both tangibles and intangibles have 
increased. During 2019, the last category represented 90% of invested capital.  
 
Ambiens VR Srl 
Vision and strategy: AmbiensVR is the platform that brings architecture and design into 
virtual reality, creating interactive environments available on smartphones. The main focus is 
to provide an innovative way to communicate projects to clients, offering an interactive vision 
through virtual elements.  
Market and competitive advantage: AmbiensVR takes part in the market for professional-
grade graphic design software, a very rich (around $ 16 billion globally) and stable market. This 
market is about to experience the revolution of Virtual Reality which is, in fact, the natural 
evolution of the three-dimensional representation widespread today. The main customer targets 
are designers, real estate agencies, manufacturers of furniture and suppliers.   
Business plan: the declared goal is to proceed simultaneously with two acquisition strategies, 
one offline (fairs and events) and one online. Revenues flows are basically derived from two 








Company Status     
AmbiensVR Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan 260.086 706.987 2.203.968 
Actual results 66.997 179.146 167.535 
Delta -193.089 -527.841 -2.036.433 
% of realization 26% 25% 8% 
% of variation -74% -75% -92% 
EBITDA 
Business plan -203.717 -171.814 1.258.572 
Actual results -77.676 72.954 23.162 
Delta -126.041 -244.768 -1.235.410 
% of realization 38% -42% 2% 
% of variation 62% 142% -98% 
Table 4.34: Business plan projections and actual results AmbiensVR Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
 
€ 2017 on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  4.206 6% 10.933 6% 9.438 6% 
Intangible assets  75.527 113% 161.889 90% 141.753 85% 
Financial assets  0   0   0   
Fixed capital  79.733   172.822   151.191   
Working capital -3.400   8.937   20.811   
Invested capital  76.333   181.759   172.002   
Cash and similar 64.381 96% 8.499 5% 37 0% 
Intangibles / IC  99%   89%   82%   
Tangibles / IC 6%   6%   5%   
Table 4.35: Invested capital and cash and similars of AmbiensVR Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
By looking at economic results, it immediately appears how the optimistic business plan 
projections have not been achieved yet. Indeed, revenue generation showed a percentage of 
realization only equal to 8% (2019 revenues equal to € 167.535 rather than € 2 million 
expected), while EBITDA 2% (2019 EBITDA equal to € 23.162 rather than € 1 million 
expected). At the same time, both categories showed negative variation rates (respectively equal 
to -92% and -98%), meaning that the company negatively deviated from its projection values. 
However, the start-up made investments in marketing and communication, as it is possible to 
assume by looking both at its website and social media page. From the Facebook page it appears 
the creation of a community of users, and the development of a brand identity connected with 
AmbiensVR products and related lifestyles.  
 
Raft Srl 
Vision and strategy: the start-up offers innovative products and services in the sporting field, 
technological services for companies and sport associations, organization and management of 
events in general, merchandising promotion and exploitation activities. The most innovative 
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product is the online platform which leads the organization of tennis championships for amateur 
players, thought to replicate professional matches but affordable for every kind of player aiming 
at matching with other players.   
Market and competitive advantage: by looking at the current competitors, Raft Srl identified 
the basis of its competitive advantage on the quality of its offer, the customer experience and 
customer care provided. Indeed, there are already several online platforms which organize sport 
championships, but none of them is focused on tennis. Moreover, the platform not only focuses 
on tennis (1.400.000 players in Italy in 2016), but it includes all the sports which are played 
with a racket, such as badminton (5.000), paddle (10.000), ping pong (13.000), beach tennis 
(300.000).  
Business plan: funds raised will lead the improvement of the website page, the development 
of new websites focused on other sports rather than tennis, and in activities towards the 
expansion into new geographical markets.  
Company Status     
Raft Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan 18.200 47.110 98.169 
Financial results 5.000 8.022 15.757 
Delta -13.200 -39.088 -82.412 
% of realization 27% 17% 16% 
% of variation -73% -83% -84% 
EBITDA 
Business plan 12.750 39.010 90.069 
Financial results -1.075 2.538 7.124 
Delta -13.825 -36.472 -82.945 
% of realization -8% 7% 8% 
% of variation -108% -93% -92% 
Table 4.36: Business plan projections and actual results Raft Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
€ 2017 on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  1.382 28% 1.075 13% 768 5% 
Intangible assets  27.537 551% 37.853 472% 29.588 188% 
Financial assets  0   0   0   
Fixed capital  28.919   38.928   30.356   
Working capital 10.604   20.399   24.585   
Invested capital  39.523   59.327   54.941   
Cash and similar 29.660 593% 984 12% 39 0% 
Intangibles / I.C.  70%   64%   54%   
Tangibles / I.C. 3%   2%   1%   
Table 4.37: Invested capital and cash and similars of Raft Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
The company is still active. Both revenues and EBITDA are showing a positive trend, even 
if not as much as forecasted by business plan projections, showing variation rates respectively 
equal to -84% and -92%. Currently the company has a very active webpage, as the result of 
communication investments. Indeed, the team achieved to create an active community of users, 
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consequently creating a stronger brand awareness among players. Moreover, matches organized 
by the platform have become nationally known, thus increasing even more website visibility. 
By looking at intangible assets’ resources, during 2018 they appeared to be more than half of 
invested capital (64% of IC), as a consequence of high investments in both R&D and marketing 
and communication activities. In this way, players participation has shown an important 




Vision and strategy: Cynny Spa is an innovative enterprise which offers a platform to create 
and share video and multimedia contents on the most famous social networks. It operates 
through two different divisions: B2C division, through the product MorphCast (software which 
creates video contents); B2B division, through the product CynnySpace (online cloud to storage 
data).  
Market and competitive advantage: the product focuses on the “mobile video” segment 
which, according to recent market data, is the Internet channel that is showing exponential 
growth (+63% CAGR by 2020). The biggest competitors identified are Snapchat, Instagram 
and Facebook. However, Cynny bases its competitive advantage on its innovative software, 
which is capable of creating new videos starting from photos and expressions. Moreover, the 
product offered by the start-up can potentially be adopted in creating efficient advertising 
contents, tailor made for each single client. The target consumers are mainly young people, 
including the so-called millennials.  
Business plan: by looking at the business plan provided, capital raised is going to be invested 
mainly in R&D expenditures (almost 100%). Among the goals described for the medium-long 
term horizon, Cynny aims at acquiring 20 million users for the platform MorphCast and to 












Company Status     
Cynny Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan n.a. 4.643.840 66.558.261 
Actual results 1.169.437 863.731 482.744 
Delta n.a. -3.780.109 -66.075.517 
% of realization - 19% 1% 
% of variation - -81% -99% 
EBITDA 
Business plan n.a. 188.769 35.818.095 
Actual results -1.356.779 -1.065.790 -453.338 
Delta n.a. -1.254.559 -36.271.433 
% of realization - -565% -1% 
% of variation - -665% -101% 
Table 4.38: Business plan projections and actual results Cynny Spa, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
 
€ 2017 on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  47.598 4% 28.708 3% 16.938 4% 
Intangible assets  1.159.551 99% 1.963.665 227% 2.332.659 483% 
Financial assets  1.808.933   1.772.037   80.598   
Fixed capital  3.016.082   3.764.410   2.430.195   
Working capital -134.837   73.402   -103.655   
Invested capital  2.881.245   3.837.812   2.326.540   
Cash and similar 76.889 7% 462.780 54% 21.673 4% 
Intangibles / IC  40%   51%   100%   
Tangibles / IC 2%   1%   1%   
Table 4.39: Invested capital and cash and similars of Cynny Spa, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
By looking at Table 4.38, it immediately appears the low percentage of realization of 
financial results compared with business plan projections. During the last year, the company 
has not been able to generate positive EBITDA. Besides, 2019 results accounted for revenues 
value equal to € 482.744, while they were expected to end up equal to almost € 66 million. It is 
possible to assume that the company is still facing operating inefficiencies, facing costs higher 
than revenues value. As declared in the business plan, the company invested the majority of 
resources collected during the ECF campaign in order to improve and develop its R&D 
activities. Indeed, intangible assets value reported in the balance sheet showed an increased 
value. Such assets category had a value equal to € 1.963.665 in 2018 while it had a value of € 
2.332.659 in 2019. Such investments have increased company value, which during 2018 was 
perceived as one of the most valuable start-ups funded through ECF. Indeed, in 2018 the 
company developed M-roll, an innovative software for digital advertising which allows users 
to make videos able to interact in real time with the emotions of the viewer. Moreover, in order 
to obtain the resources needed to go to the market with the new product, during 2018 the 
company carried out a second ECF campaign through the platform Crowdfundme.it. Always in 
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2018, the company started partnerships with Nucco Brain and Unit9 agencies, which are key 
international intermediaries between digital content developers and marketing agencies.  
 
Felfil Srl 
Vision and strategy: Felfil's mission is to make 3D printing ecological and economical. The 
project wants to allow anyone to independently produce their own print filament starting from 
industrial granulate or by recycling plastic materials. The first step in this direction was made 
through the offering of Felfil Evo, a plastic extruder capable of producing 3D printable filament.  
Market and competitive advantage: the 3D printer market is continuing its transformation 
from a niche market to a global market with a large user base between businesses and 
consumers. Sales of 3D printers in 2015 were in the order of 240 thousand units, with growth 
compared to the previous year by over +60%; and by the end of 2016, there were expected to 
be approximately 496 thousand units with a growth of +103% compared to 2015, and the trend 
was expected to double every year to reach the figure of 5.6 million units in 2019. The project 
goal pursued from Felfil was to create a high-performance machine at an advantageous price. 
Business plan: relying on the capital raised, the start-up aimed at expanding its market share, 
by acquiring new users and by incrementing marketing and communications activities. 
Customers are divided into B2C and B2B targets, and they both could purchase through the 
online platform Indiegogo. Resources raised are going to be invested in R&D (45%), marketing 
(35%), operations (15%), general and administrative expenses (5%).  
Company Status     
Felfil Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan 11.000 110.500 359.500 
Financial results 85.550 96.068 143.037 
Delta 74.550 -14.432 -216.463 
% of realization 778% 87% 40% 
% of variation 678% -13% -60% 
EBITDA 
Business plan -900 -35.900 -67.700 
Financial results 8.537 15.632 17.780 
Delta -9.437 -51.532 -85.480 
% of realization -949% -44% -26% 
% of variation 1049% 144% 126% 







€ 2017 on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  2.889 3% 2.202 2% 1.514 1% 
Intangible assets  30.922 36% 32.069 33% 25.379 18% 
Financial assets  0   0   0   
Fixed capital  33.811   34.271   26.893   
Working capital 6.164   6.311   -14.342   
Invested capital  39.975   40.582   12.551   
Cash and similar 84.792 99% 79.584 83% 100.962 71% 
Intangibles / IC  77%   79%   202%   
Tangibles / IC 7%   5%   12%   
Table 4.41: Invested capital and cash and similars of Felfil Srl, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
As it appears by its financial reports, Felfil Srl is a well performing company, albeit its 
revenues generation is still not in line with business plan projections (realization rate equal to 
40%). However, EBITDA results overperformed projections (actual results equal to € 17.780), 
positively deviating by 126% in 2019. By looking from a broader perspective, it appears that 
the company has been constantly increasing its value generation during the period 2017-2019. 
Indeed, economic results previously of the ECF company were negative, while from 2018, the 
start-up generated positive net profit. This may be seen as a positive implementation of the 
resources collected, that had been mainly invested in the enhancement of the product offered 
through investments in R&D division and the improvement of marketing and communication 
activities, as it is demonstrated now by the constantly updated and easy-to-use website page. 
Currently, Felfil Evo is a valuable product offered to both designers and engineers, aerospace 
engineers and biomedical scientists.   
 
SkyMeeting Spa 
Vision and strategy: SkyMeeting Spa is an innovative start-up which operates through its 
software SkyAccounting. Such software works as billing and accounting cloud software for 
accountants, companies and VAT numbers: through its implementation, clients and accountants 
can potentially share all documentation in real time and on the same platform, drastically 
reducing costs and allowing both parties to always be aligned with their work. The company 
already offers six different products according to the needs of the company served (SME, 
corporate, multinational corporate, small corporate, free-lance workers, accountants).  
Market and competitive advantage: nowadays there is an expansion of Internet-based 
accounting services. Such services are normally divided into firm-oriented and accounting-
oriented service. However, SkyMeeting encompasses both the categories. According to the 
business plan presented by the start-up, the software market for cloud systems for companies 
and accountants was expected to show a development trend of 300% over the next three years. 
The target for the SkyAccounting offer was estimated to be equal to approximately 4.5 million 
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companies and 116.245 accountants in Italy. SkyMeeting bases its competitive advantage on 
the constant sharing of data between client firms, accountants and banks, as well as quality and 
security of its software, and the professional knowledge owned by its operators. The main 
competitors identified are Zucchetti, Team System, Innovare 24, Passepartout, Ranocchi Lab. 
Business plan: according to the business plan provided, future investments will be done 
towards the improvement of the online software, marketing and communications, and the 
development of a Premium service. The development of the business plan is structured in four 
phases, each of them include high promotion of the service. 
Company Status     
SkyMeeting Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan 1.005.885 2.345.897 5.612.670 
Actual results 730.432 828.629 1.143.461 
Delta -275.453 -1.517.268 -4.469.209 
% of realization 73% 35% 20% 
% of variation -27% -65% -80% 
EBITDA 
Business plan 405.625 1.266.879 2.735.180 
Actual results 285.942 361.536 386.385 
Delta -119.683 -905.343 -2.348.795 
% of realization 70% 29% 14% 
% of variation -30% -71% -86% 
Table 4.42: Business plan projections and actual results SkyMeeting Spa, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
 
€ 2017 on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  37.467 5% 33.079 4% 30.543 3% 
Intangible assets  2.339.834 320% 2.253.346 272% 2.270.623 199% 
Financial assets  25.886   25.886   25.888   
Fixed capital  2.403.187   2.312.311   2.327.054   
Working capital 184.286   49.537   477.069   
Invested capital  2.587.473   2.361.848   2.804.123   
Cash and similar 419 0% 2.470 0% 22.039 2% 
Intangibles / IC  90%   95%   81%   
Tangibles / IC 1%   1%   1%   
Table 4.43: Invested capital and cash and similars of SkyMeeting Spa, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
SkyMeeting Spa is a well performing company, and its software SkyAccouting is collecting 
more and more appreciation among clients. As it appears by the financial results, company 
value creation is following a positive trend, with an average revenues growth rate equal to 
+26%. Indeed, both revenues generation and EBITDA results have increased starting from 
2018, year following the closing of the ECF campaign. During the last financial year available, 
the company accounted for revenues amount equal to € 1.143.461, showing a percentage of 
realization of 20% with respect to business plan projections. In the same way, EBITDA value 
accounted in 2019 was equal to € 386.385, meaning 14% of realization of business plan goals. 
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Despite the company is still not reaching target results declared, it is showing a growth trend 
and its value started to be recognized by both clients and investors. Indeed, during 2019 the 
company closed a second round ECF campaign through the platform BacktoWork24.com, 
successfully hitting the target amount. According to the updated business plan, the resources 
collected are going to further improve SkyAccouting software. 
 
Infinity Hub Spa 
Vision and strategy: the innovative start-up offers solutions for green energy affordable to 
both companies and families. The main goal of the company is to become the focus point for 
all green-energy creation activities and Cleantech companies in the geographical areas around 
Trento. The operating arm of YHUB are local businesses, artisans, startups and innovative 
SMEs in the area, which will be guided to settle in the local Hubs, giving them the opportunity 
to become part of the Infinityhub "incubation and support for innovation" project. 
Market and competitive advantage: the market for green and renewable energy is 
experiencing a huge expansion. In 2015, Green Energy reported that 100% of the energy 
utilized will be totally renewable by 2050, thus creating high opportunities for companies 
operating in such a market sector. The competitive advantage is based on the idea to make green 
and renewable energy affordable for every kind of user. In this way, the most optimistic sector 
in which to invest is the home-building one. 
Business plan: InfinityHub aims at acting as a global contractor especially for structures 
such as hotels, hospitals, Rsa, large sports facilities, shopping centers and providing them with 
green energy. According to the business plan, capital raised would be invested in human 
resources improvement and enlargement, including both software engineers and financial and 
accountants’ workers, and marketing and communication specialists. Moreover, the company 
aimed at implementing a database containing all data collected during its operating activities.  
Company Status     
Infinity Hub Active     
€ 2017 2018 2019 
REVENUES 
Business plan 5.037.724 10.530.156 10.892.252 
Actual results 120.801 725.923 1.479.711 
Delta -4.916.923 -9.804.233 -9.412.541 
% of realization 2% 7% 14% 
% of variation -98% -93% -86% 
EBITDA 
Business plan 1.587.011 4.901.609 5.096.791 
Actual results 15.642 102.587 74.926 
Delta -1.571.369 -4.799.022 -5.021.865 
% of realization 1% 2% 1% 
% of variation -99% -98% -99% 
Table 4.44: Business plan projections and actual results Infinity Hub Spa, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
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€ 2017 on revenues 2018 on revenues 2019 on revenues 
Tangible assets  0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Intangible assets  30.629 25% 24.190 3% 64.074 4% 
Financial assets  12.800   51.340   164.957   
Fixed capital  43.429   75.530   229.031   
Working capital 103.132   251.122   133.011   
Invested capital  146.561   326.652   362.042   
Cash and similar 10.850 9% 32.450 4% 3.008 0% 
Intangibles / IC  21%   7%   18%   
Tangibles / IC 0%   0%   0%   
Table 4.45: Invested capital and cash and similars of Infinity Hub Spa, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
Infinity Hus Spa is a still well performing company. As it appears by the income statement, 
revenues showed an increasing trend, albeit still completely not in line with business plan 
projections. Indeed, revenue forecasts for 2019 were expecting the realization of almost € 11 
million revenues, which perhaps was a too optimistic scenario for the second year immediately 
after the injections of liquidity and the realization of new investments. The same reasoning 
applies to EBITDA value, which in 2019 negatively deviated by -99% from projections, with 
an EBITDA result equal to € 74.926 rather than € 5 million. In order to understand the revenue 
model, it is important to understand the position of Infinity Hub, which plays the role of global 
contractor, thus assuming all the burdens and costs related to the implementation of the order, 
guarantees the organization and the success of the entire process. Consequently, the company 
profits are made by applying fees to the operating companies. Besides, thanks to the big 
expansion of the green energy market, the company experienced an important growth and 
during 2019 it started a second round ECF campaign through the platform Crowdfundme.it.  
 
RESULTS 
This final paragraph stresses out the main observable results coming from the analysis of the 
50 companies forming the sample. From a preliminary research, 11 start-ups have not been 
found and for this reason they have considered defaulted for this case study. Such companies 
are: Webeers Srl, Diamass Srl, Babaiola Srl, Revoluce Srl, Biogenera Srl, Cubepit Srl, Nano 
Srl, FindMyLost Srl, Hymy Group Srl, Parterre Srl, Luche Srl. The remaining companies that 
do not appear in the financial focus are those for which the business plan projections are not 
available anymore in the ECF platform, thus making impossible the comparison between 
financial forecasts and actual results. For what concern complete case-studies, Table 4.46 shows 
the main achieved results, collecting percentages which represent the realization rate with 
respect to revenue generation. Such rate has been computed as the ratio between realized 
revenues and the amount of forecasted sales during the year. For instance, the 198% related to 
TakeOff Srl for the year 2017 is meaning that during 2017 TakeOff sales’ value amounted to 
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+198% of what the company was expecting to achieve in its business plan projections. The 
expression not available (n.a.) means that business plan projections or financial results were not 
available for such a year, thus making impossible the calculus of the rate. The cumulative 
variation rate has been computed by considering the cumulative revenues projections and actual 
results, and then by computing the ratio between delta in cumulative revenues and cumulative 
revenues projections. Despite 3 years being a short period of time, the cumulative variation rate 
aimed at describing on a cumulative view the level by which companies have been able to 
realize planned objectives in terms of revenue generation. For instance, for what concerns Alea 
Srl, during the period it positively deviated from declared goals by +1863%, being able to 
overperform projections. The last column illustrates the average growth rate in revenues related 
to each company.  
REVENUES 
realization rate 





Alea Srl 3766% 1979% 1232% 1863% -9% 
TakeOff Srl 198% 593% 572% 433% 421% 
Yocabè Srl 452% 265% 75% 30% 75% 
Crowdfundme Spa 129% 98% 59% -21% 59% 
Family Nation Srl 107% 70% 71% -24% 39% 
Qaplà Srl 89% 80% 61% -30% 86% 
Felfil Srl 778% 87% 40% -33% 31% 
SkyMeeting Spa 73% 35% 20% -70% 26% 
Orwell Srl n.a. 41% 11% -71% -2% 
Yakkyo Srl n.a. 49% 12% -79% 62% 
FruitAma Srl n.a. 23% 19% -80% 421% 
Little Sea Srl 49% 25% 14% -80% 33% 
Green Energy Storage Srl n.a. 39% 8% -82% 7% 
Raft Srl 27% 17% 16% -82% 78% 
The Digital Box Spa 35% 20% 10% -83% 2% 
Graphene XT Srl n.a. 21% 14% -84% 33% 
Ermes Cyber Security Srl 385% 29% 11% -85% 153% 
AmbiensVr Srl 26% 25% 8% -87% 80% 
Infinity Hub Spa 2% 7% 14% -91% 302% 
Cynny Spa n.a. 19% 1% -96% -35% 
Verso Srl n.a. 0% 1% -99% 3378% 
Median  98% 35% 14% -80% 59% 
Median adjusted* 89% 32% 14% -80% 59% 
Minimum rate 2% 0% 1% -99% -35% 
Maximum rate 3766% 1979% 1232% 1863% 3378% 
*Alea Srl and TakeOff Arl have been excluded from the calculus     
Table 4.46: Summary on revenues results from 2017 to 2019, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
Table 4.46 illustrates revenues results by starting from the most high-performing companies. 
By looking at it, it appears that on average the highest realization rate has been realized by Alea, 
which in turns presented very conservative business plan projections. Indeed, most of the 
companies disclosed very optimistic business plan forecasts, and consequently they have been 
unable to achieve the results projected. Focusing now on 2019, this last year is assumed to be 
the one in which companies started to create higher value, as investments have been mainly 
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made the year immediately after the closing of the ECF campaign. In such period, the highest 
realization rates have been realized by Alea Srl (1232%), as previously, and Take Off Srl 
(572%), which both realized a percentage of realization higher than 100%; while the lowest 
results obtained in terms of revenues realization rates in 2019 refer to Verso Srl (1%), Cynny 
Spa (1%), Green Storage Srl (8%) and AmbiensVR Srl (8%), which realized realization rates 
lower than 10%. Three out of four “bad performing” companies operate in the IT and digital 
technologies sector. It is possible to assume that such a sector is starting to experience higher 
saturation than in the past years, and perhaps start-ups looking for external funds need to be 
very optimistic in their business plan projections in order to acquire online investors’ trust. The 
median realization rate appears to be equal to 35% in 2018 and decreased in 2019 becoming 
equal to 14%. Such value has been computed also by excluding the results of Alea Srl and 
TakeOff Srl, since these two companies highly overperformed with respect to the rest of the 
sample. The adjusted median realization rate resulted lower for 2018 (32%), while it remained 
the same for 2019. By looking at the cumulative variation column, 18 out of 21 companies 
showed negative rates, meaning the inability to positively meet the planned performance. 
Positive cumulative variation rates have been realized by Alea Srl, TakeOff Srl, and Yocabè 
Srl. For what concerns the revenues growth rate for the period 2017-2019, 86% of the 
companies showed on average positive growth in revenues, while 3 out of 21 ventures 
experienced negative average revenues growth. The figure below aims at providing a brief 
representation of the revenue generation trend during the years after the ECF campaign of the 
company taking into consideration the case studies.  
As it appears by looking at the Figure 4.6, the high majority of the studied companies showed 
a positive trend in revenues growth, which started from 2017 (year of closing of the ECF 
campaign) and lasted until 2019, at least. The most overperforming company in terms of sales 
has been Alea Srl, whose revenues showed a decrease in 2018 (first year after the closing of the 
ECF fundraising) but an immediate increase the following year. A negative trend in revenues 
growth has been experienced by Cynny Spa, whose sales showed a reduction in value starting 
from 2017. Broadly speaking, 10 out of 21 companies generated revenues for an amount higher 
than € 1 million in 2019, namely those companies are FruitAma Srl, Family Nation Srl, The 
Digital Box Spa, Green Energy Storage Srl, Yocabè Srl, Take Off Srl, Alea Srl, Yakkyo Srl, 
SkyMeeting Spa, Infinity Hub Spa. The highest average growth rate in revenues has been 
experienced by Take Off Srl (+421%) and FruitAma Srl (+421% as well). On the other hand, 
companies which accounted for negative growth in revenues in the period 2018-2019 are The 
Digital Box Spa (-3%), Orwell Srl (-39%), AmbiensVR Srl (-6%), Cynny Spa (-44%). Verso 
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Srl showed an impressively high revenue growth rate, which though is manipulated by the very 
low sales value registered in 2018 (equal to € 299). 
Table 4.47 summarizes revenues results from a qualitative perspective. The table has been 
structured by starting from the highest performers as it happened in Table 4.46, afterwards for 
each company it has been illustrated the reference market as well as the main characteristics of 
the business model. By looking at the table, it appears that the most performing companies are 
operating in IT and Digital Technologies, Financial and e-commerce reference markets. In the 
case of innovative start-ups, it is more appropriate to take into consideration the reference 
market rather than the industry (or market sector) since they often operate in a transversal way 
in more than one traditional market. Indeed, one of the very challenges faced by innovative 
start-ups is the creation of profit opportunities and acquisition of market shares in market sectors 
which are already mature, and which already cover almost the totality of the customer base. In 
this way, such companies try to offer innovative business models in a traditional panorama, to 
bundle different markets, or perhaps they try to base their values on highly technological 
marketing and communication activities. Hence, for instance, Alea Srl operates in the safety-
for-workers devices market by applying its innovative software, while Family Nation Srl offers 
sustainable and quality online products and moreover it created an active brand community of 
users by keeping its social media pages constantly updated and by rapidly communicating with 
clients’ requests. By looking at the results in the table, IT and Digital Technologies reference 
market is the one most exploited, thus generating a sort of saturation. Indeed, companies 
operating in such a reference market may have provided optimistic business plans in order to 
get investors’ trust, but they ended up generating medium-low results. The first and second 




percentile include the 10 most performing companies of the sample; 4 of them operate in the IT 
and digital technologies reference market while 4 of the remaining work in the e-commerce 
reference market. The main successful factor shared by those companies stands in the 
innovative thinking of a more traditional market segment. Indeed, they did not try to create 
completely new products, but they rather aimed at improving existing services. They did so by 
both making the product/service more available to mass customers (see Alea Srl, Yocabè Srl, 
Crowdfundme Spa, Qaplà Srl, Felfil Srl, Orwell Srl, Yakkyo Srl) or perhaps by creating a sort 
of users community in where customers could not only purchase goods but also create a 
connections with other users, feeling active part of a correlated system (as in the case of Family 
Nation Srl and SkyMeeting Spa). On the other hand, the last percentile of the sample includes 
the worst performers in terms of revenue generation compared with business plan projections. 
Companies in this last percentile operate mainly in the energy and new technologies reference 
market. They described very ambitious goals in their business plan. Indeed, most of those 
companies aimed at producing a new product able to totally innovate the existing market (see 
Verso Srl, Cynny Spa, Graphene XT Srl). In this scenario, they may take longer in order to 
generate observable profits since they need higher R&D investments and managerial expertise, 






IT and digital 
Technologies 
Implementation of the Push to Talk technology in order to facilitate the adoption of transceivers 
for workers. The business model relies on the pioneering role of the company in such a 
reference market, which bundles new digital technologies in a more traditional industry. 
TakeOff Srl Financial 
Start-ups incubator on a national level, added with the offer of offices and physical locations 
for those companies in need. Its competitive advantage relies on a selected team of analysts 
who pick up the most valuable investments and diversify clients' portfolios. 
Yocabè Srl E-commerce 
E-commerce platform working as intermediary and providing medium-high quality fashion 
brands. The business model relies on the distribution on an international level of medium-




The company works as an intermediary platform for CF campaigns. Its business model deals 
with the connection between entrepreneurs and investors, aiming at expanding on an 




E-commerce platform that provides for children and mother-to-be clothes and accessories. The 
business model relies on the offering of quality international brands which above all offer 
sustainable characteristics. The company started to create an active community of users, in 





Support for delivery services. Its competitive advantage relies on the constant communications 
with clients, which in turn can know the location of their ordered product in each moment. This 
also helps to relax delivery companies' duties since they no longer need to spend resources in 
dealing with clients' complaints.  
Felfil Srl 
IT and digital 
Technologies 
The company relies on the high expansion expected for the 3D printing sector during the 
following years. Its innovative business model deals with the offering of cheap and easy to use 
3D printings, affordable for each kind of user, both companies and privates.  
SkyMeeting 
Spa 
IT and digital 
Technologies 
The main innovation offered by the company stands in the online platform which enables 
companies, accountant firms and banks to completely share data. This leads to much easier, 




IT and digital 
Technologies 
and Real Estate 
The company offers Virtual Reality and Mixed Reality devices. It started from the market of 
videogames and tried to expand towards architecture and designers’ clients thanks to its 
technological innovations.  
Yakkyo Srl E-commerce 
Yakkyo deals with SMEs which want to acquire products directly from China. It works as an 
intermediary platform and takes care of common issues related to import from China, such as 




The company offers jams and marmalades. The main innovation stands in the size of the 
packaging, which is specifically thought in a sustainable view. Indeed, the product can be 
purchased in different sizes, ranging from the family size to the single-person one.  




It operates in the data telling and advanced visualization market sector, through the product 
branded after the name Babelee. The main innovation stands in the software's capacity to 
generate videos and multimedia products starting from unstructured data.  
Green Energy 
Storage Srl 
Energy and new 
Technologies 
The company operates in the green and renewable energy market sector. Its business model 
relies on the production of a tool which leads to the storage of energy. In order to achieve such 
a goal, the company has several patented technologies and has started partnerships with, for 
instance, Harvard University.  
Raft Srl 
Sport and digital 
Technologies 
The main innovation offered by the company stands in the creation of a sort of online club for 
amateur tennis players. Indeed, through the platform provided, players all over Italy can meet, 
share experiences and organize matches and tournaments. The main goal is replicating 
professional clubs' dynamics. 
The Digital 
Box Spa 
Food and digital 
Technologies 
The company's innovative product stands in ADA, an online platform which helps in creating 
contents for Digital Marketing and Mobile Engagement. The business model relies on platform 
abilities to create contents, distribute contents to the public in a multi-channel perspective 
(SMS, emails, Facebook Ads) and collect data and analyze statistics. 
Graphene XT 
Srl 
Energy and new 
Technologies 
The company deals with the development of nanotechnologies oriented to the utilization of 
graphene, which is seen as the material of the future. Indeed, the business model relies on R&D 
activities in order to create an optimal utilization of graphene as the new main material for both 
energy transmission, smartphone and batteries production, and consumer goods. 
Ermes Cyber 
Security Srl 
IT and digital 
Technologies 
The company's innovative business model relies on Web Tracking software. This software 
protects data from computers, both in case of individuals and in case of companies.  
AmbiensVR 
Srl 
IT and digital 
Technologies 
and Real Estate 
The company deals with VR and AR software through its online platform. It applies them on 
real estate services, as well as designers and architects in order to help them in carrying out 
their duties. The main innovation of the business model stands in the application of VR and 





It operates as managerial, financial and commercial accelerator of Cleantech companies, 
situated in the North-East of Italy. Its business model deals with companies which offer green 
and renewable sources of energy and help them in developing and creating a customer base.  
Cynny Spa 
IT and digital 
Technologies 
Thanks to its 6 patents, the company offers two main digital products. Such products help in 
the creation of tailored marketing contents starting from emotional reactions of users and in 
data collection through an online cloud much cheaper than the one offered by competitors 
(Microsoft, Amazon, Google). 
Verso Srl 
IT and digital 
Technologies 
The innovative product offered by the company is the wearable ring which offers digital 
services. Indeed, the product leads to easy interactions with smartphones, computers and other 
technological devices for what concerns music, video games, sport, VR, design and art. 
Table 4.47: Summary on sample companies’ reference market and business model, own elaboration based on financial 
reports. 
For what concerns EBITDA generation, Table 4.48 summarizes the main observed results. 
The analysis is more significant if made on the variation rate rather than on the realization rate. 
This would lead to the avoidance of misleading results interpretation, as a negative realization 
rate may possibly refer to a positive result achieved. In this case, the variation rate has been 
computed in absolute terms, thus considering the possible distortion of negative results and 
allowing for a consistent interpretation of the data collected. The following table illustrates the 
variation rates computed for the 21 companies forming the sample. The percentages indicate 
the deviation of actual results from projections for the relative year of analysis, and it is 
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calculated as the delta between actual results and projections’ values divided by the projections’ 
value (in absolute terms). Hence, for instance, Yocabè Srl actually realized EBITDA in 2017 
deviated by -408% from business plan projected value. The last column describes cumulative 
variation rate over the period 2017-2019. The table below provides a clear representation of 
companies’ ability to meet projected results, but it does not provide a summary picture on 
effectively recorded performance. For a more comprehensive understanding of the overall 




2017 2018 2019 
Cumulative 
variation rate 
Alea Srl 1618% 299% 206% 430% 
TakeOff Srl 25% 359% 395% 336% 
Felfil Srl 1049% 144% 126% 140% 
Yocabè Srl -408% 65% 84% -67% 
Green Energy Storage Srl n.a. 81% -82% -68% 
Yakkyo Srl n.a. -3% -87% -70% 
Family Nation Srl n.a. -81% -79% -75% 
SkyMeeting Spa -30% -71% -86% -77% 
Qaplà Srl 79% 266% -95% -92% 
Raft Srl -108% -93% -92% -94% 
Little Sea Srl -95% -94% -96% -95% 
The Digital Box Spa -6% -94% -100% -96% 
Ermes Cyber Security Srl 112% -99% -99% -97% 
AmbiensVr Srl 62% 142% -98% -98% 
Infinity Hub Spa -99% -98% -99% -98% 
Orwell Srl n.a. -100% -100% -99% 
Verso Srl -74% -109% -100% -102% 
Cynny Spa n.a. -665% -101% -108% 
Graphene XT Srl n.a. -123% -109% -113% 
FruitAma Srl n.a. -215% -374% -322% 
Crowdfundme Spa -41% -1742% -528% -651% 
Median  -18% -93% -96% -95% 
Median adjusted* -35% -94% -98% -96% 
Minimum rate -408% -1742% -528% -651% 
Maximum rate 1618% 359% 395% 430% 
*Alea Srl and TakeOff Arl have been excluded from the calculus   
Table 4.48: Summary on EBITDA results from 2017 to 2019, own elaboration based on financial reports. 
On average, the companies which positively deviated from their business plan projections in 
both 2017, 2018 and 2019 appear to be Alea Srl (cumulative variation rate for the period 2017-
2019 equal to 430%), Take Off Srl (336%) and Felfil Srl (140%). However, even though they 
performed better than expected, both Take Off Srl and Felfil Srl were among the worst 
performer companies in terms of EBITDA values. Indeed, the first one recorded the lowest 
EBITDA of the sample in 2019, immediately followed by Felfil Srl. On the other hand, 
SkyMeeting Spa and Green Energy Storage Srl negatively deviated from their business plan 
projections, generating lower EBITDA value than what expected. Nonetheless, both the 
companies were among the best performing companies, and accounted for positive value of 
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EBITDA during 2019. It is interesting to notice that more than 50% of the companies forming 
the sample (13 out of 21) negatively deviated from their projected EBITDA value during the 
first year after the ECF campaign closing. In this way, it is possible to assume that business 
plan projections have commonly been computed in a too optimistic scenario. Moreover, this 
number increased during 2019, year in which 81% of companies considered (17 out of 21) have 
not been able to meet the forecasted results. This is probably due to an underestimation of costs 
or to a wrongly allocation of them into their forecasts. Besides, such results may be due to 
overestimation of software values as well as overoptimistic expectations on both R&D and 
marketing achievements. On average, all the companies have presented over optimistic business 


















The thesis focused on crowdfunding procedures, which are becoming more and more 
adopted internationally. As Ahlers et al. (2015) defined it, «crowdfunding is an umbrella term 
used to describe an increasingly widespread form of fundraising where groups of people pool 
money, typically very small contributions, to support a particular goal». Such innovative tool 
relies on the expansion of the Internet, which allowed the connection between people 
geographically unrelated. Indeed, CF leads to overcome geographic barriers which have always 
played a crucial role in financial activities. Furthermore, this tool has been broadly 
implemented, and recently started to deal with several functions. Currently, the variety of 
crowdfunding models is broad, and ranges from equity, lending, and reward-based methods to 
outright donations. Among all these alternatives, equity crowdfunding may be one of the most 
promising tools to improve small businesses growth, as it connects small investors with start-
ups’ entrepreneurs. Through an ECF campaign, a crowd of online investors provide for funds 
in exchange for a percentage of company equity shares. On the one hand, ECF allows non-
professional investors to become shareholders of start-ups and innovative SMEs; on the other 
hand, it supports such companies in facing the funding gap experienced starting from the 
financial crisis in 2008. In this way, early-stage ventures are enabled to collect external funds 
by avoiding credit institutions and banks, which in turns normally do not grant high funds to 
companies that do not have historical performance reports or that base their economic 
projections exclusively on assumptions. However, the participation of non-professional 
investors is subject to higher risks, due to information asymmetries and the lack of financial 
competences, knowledge and expertise necessary to perform due diligence and evaluate 
investment opportunities (Agrawal et al., 2011; Belleflamme et al., 2014; Mollick, 2013).  In 
conclusion, ECF is considered as a form of alternative finance while resembling traditional 
financial tools like BAs and VCs. Such tool benefits from a greater investors base, a much 
shorter fundraising process, and standardized and simpler contracts.  
Despite its huge expansion, ECF still lacks a proper regulatory framework, and rules are 
subject to national legislation, which in turns is still not coordinated among countries. Indeed, 
EU members’ platforms apply different rules both in terms of disclosure and quality of projects 
presented to investors. Since there is absence of specific rules, each start-up can potentially 
select the kind of information to share during the ECF campaign (Klöhn, 2018). Nonetheless, 
business plan projections are reasonably one of the most important sections to disclose by 
entrepreneurs in order to show the quality of the project. Moreover, it is a key document on 
which to perform accurate due diligence by investors. Indeed, as the last chapter of the thesis 
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described, companies raising funds through ECF tend to be overoptimistic on the achievement 
of their financial goals. This may be due to underestimation of operating and administrative 
costs related to the first periods of activity, as well as overvaluation of the product/service 
potential to satisfy customers’ needs through the innovative technology or idea behind it. 
Moreover, financial projections may inflate positive results aiming at signaling the quality of 
the project. Indeed, crowd-investors do not evaluate ventures in a totally rational logic, but they 
rather rely on quality signals by looking at cumulative collected capital and following a sort of 
“herding behavior” (Freedman and Jin, 2011). This in turn leads to investments decisions which 
afterwards do not generate expected returns.  
The trend just described is illustrated by the sample studied in this dissertation. Indeed, it 
resulted that out of the 52 ECF campaigns successfully closed during 2017, 11 were related to 
companies that do not exist anymore, and that are considered defaulted for the study carried 
out. The remaining ventures have been studied in order to understand whether there were any 
discrepancies between financial projections disclosed and actual results gained. As it appears 
in the last section of the final chapter, most companies have not been able to meet planned 
results, showing a median revenues cumulative variation rate equal to -80%, and median 
EBITDA cumulative variation rate equal to -95% (see Table 4.46 and Table 4.48). Summarizing 
tables have been structured according to performance results, starting from the most performing 
ventures. Within the sample there are high performance differences between good and bad 
performers. Indeed, companies belonging to the first percentile in Table 4.46 (which are Alea 
Srl, Take Off Srl, Yocabè Srl, Crowdfundme Spa, Family Nation Srl) showed a median 
cumulative variation rate of revenues equal to 30%; while the last percentile, including 
Graphene XT Srl, Ermes Cyber Security Srl, AmbiensVR Srl, Infinity Hub Spa, Cynny Spa, 
Verso Srl, showed a negative median cumulative variation rate equal to -89%. It is interesting 
to consider whether the amount collected during the ECF campaign may play a role in such 
results. Indeed, by looking at Table 4.2, it appears that companies belonging to the first 
percentile collected an average amount equal to € 341.237, while ventures in the last one 
collected average resources for € 268.740. By looking at the overall sample, companies in the 
second percentile collected an average amount equal to € 174.171 while those belonging to the 
third € 420.221 (this amount is highly influenced by the funds collected by Green Energy 
Storage Srl, which has been able to obtain € 1 million during its campaign). Hence, it is 
reasonable to assume that the level of capital raised does not directly influence performances 
and perhaps this scenario may be a consequence of the low due diligence executed at priori by 
investors. Indeed, online investors may have backed projects that were not worthy of such an 
amount of resources. Besides, it appears that those companies which computed their business 
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plan projections in a more conservative way ended up showing better results both in terms of 
revenues and EBITDA. On the contrary, most studied companies disclosed very optimistic 
forecasts, both in terms of economic results and market expansions. This optimistic approach 
mostly aims at communicating the quality of the project during the ECF campaign, thus 
increasing investors’ trust, and making them providing capitals for the campaign. Such strategy 
relies on the idea that non-professional investors behave by following others’ decisions, relying 
on accumulated capital for quality signaling as it has been described in the literature (Agrawal 
et al., 2014, Belleflamme and Lambert, 2014, Freedman and Jin, 2011). For what concerns 
average revenues growth rates referring to the period 2017-2019, most of the companies 
forming the sample have experienced positive growth showing median revenues growth rate 
equal to +59% (see Table 4.46). Such a positive trend in revenue generation means that ventures 
have been able to carry out their operating activities and to deal with their reference market by 
exploiting funds collected. Highest growth rates have been experienced by Take Off Srl, 
FruitAma Srl and Green Energy Storage Srl (Verso Srl experienced a very high average growth 
rate, but such a positive result is not completely significative due to the very low amount of 
revenues accounted in 2018). The three most growing companies belong to different 
percentiles. While Take Off and FruitAma belong to the first and second ones, Green Energy 
Storage appeared as a medium-low performer in terms of revenues. This may be due to the 
shortness of the time period available until now. Indeed, such a company aims at developing a 
totally new product, which may take higher investments and longer time to generate observable 
positive results. 
Broadly speaking, the reasons behind poor performances overall obtained in the sample are 
several. Among the main commons, we can consider the absence of a specific and clear strategy 
followed by start-ups to create a sustainable competitive advantage as well as a strong customer 
base in the period immediately after the ECF campaign. Moreover, the lack of entrepreneurs’ 
expertise may have effects on their ability to carry out operating activities efficiently and 
effectively. As the case-studies underlined, most of the companies overvalued their intangibles, 
and they projected sales on a wrong market and customer analysis. Indeed, start-ups normally 
operate in transversal markets, including characteristics of more than one. This is intrinsic to 
their innovative strategy. As it appears by studying the business models, most of the companies 
do not offer a totally new product, but they rather improve the existing ones through new 
technologies or they increase the reference market by making it affordable or utilized by a 
higher customer base (see Table 4.47). Wilson and Testoni (2014) identified causes for failure 
also in the lack of accurate pre-investment due diligence as well as post-investments monitoring 
from investors. However, for what concerns economic achievements, the thesis showed the 
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performance results collected solely in the 2 years immediately following the ECF campaign, 
therefore financial reports available refer to a time period reasonably too short. Indeed, the 
creation of a strong customer base, brand identity, sustainable competitive advantage as well as 
the conclusion of assets investments may take longer to generate observable profits. Hence, 
further studies should be conducted in this direction by future researchers, especially if 
considering the huge expansion that ECF is experiencing in the Italian market. Indeed, in a few 
years it will be possible to collect more consistent amounts of data, thus making results more 
significant. Moreover, it would be interesting to perform further studies on exit options which 
become available to investors in the long period after their investments in start-up ventures 
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